Evaluation Strategies in Labor Economics -- An Application to Post-Secondary Education by Augurzky, Boris
Evaluation Strategies in Labor
Economics – An Application to
Post-Secondary Education
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung
der Wu¨rde eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakulta¨t
der Ruprecht-Karls-Universita¨t Heidelberg
vorgelegt von
Boris Augurzky
aus Heilbronn
Heidelberg, Oktober 2000
Contents
1 Introduction and Overview 1
2 Matching the Extremes – A Sensitivity Analysis Based on Real Data 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Practical Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3 The Propensity Score: A Means to An End 47
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 The Matching Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 The Data Generating Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 The Matching Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4 Evaluating the Eﬀect of Postsecondary Education 75
ii
iii
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2 Estimation Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3 The Practical Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.5 Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5 Postsecondary Education: The Magic Potion? 119
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.2 An Extended Human Capital Earnings Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.3 Received Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.4 Evidence from the NLSY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.5 Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6 The Evaluation of Community-Based Interventions: A Monte Carlo
Study 147
6.1 Program Evaluation: The Perils of Self-Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.2 Evaluation Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.3 The Simulation Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.4 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
References 173
Acknowledgements 180
List of Tables
2.1 Distribution of Estimated Propensity and Index Score. . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Estimated Eﬀects. Matching on the p.score, Within caliper:
p.score. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Estimated Eﬀects. Matching on the p.score, Within caliper: Ma-
halanobis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Estimated Eﬀects. Matching on the index, Within caliper: index. 28
2.5 Estimated Eﬀects. Matching on the index, Within caliper: Ma-
halanobis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.6 Balance of Covariates, Aggregate Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.7 Probit Estimation Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.8 Balance of Covariates: Matching on the p.score, Within calipers:
p.score. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.9 Balance of Covariates: Matching on the p.score, Within calipers:
Mahalanobis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.10 Balance of Covariates: Matching on the index, Within calipers:
index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.11 Balance of Covariates: Matching on the index, Within calipers:
Mahalanobis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
iv
v3.1 The Simulation Setup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2 Distribution of Treated and Untreated Individuals. . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Speciﬁcation of Caliper Width ε. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4 Basic Model, Full Probit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5 Basic Model, Partial Probit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6 Mean Ranks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.7 Alternative Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.1 Distribution of the Estimated Index Score. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2 Balance of Covariates, AA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.3 Balance of Covariates, BA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4 Balance of Covariates, MA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.5 Treatment Eﬀects, Men, AA, Narrow Probit Model. . . . . . . . . 97
4.6 Treatment Eﬀects, Men, AA, Broad Probit Model. . . . . . . . . . 98
4.7 Treatment Eﬀects, Women, AA, Narrow Probit Model. . . . . . . 100
4.8 Treatment Eﬀects, Women, AA, Broad Probit Model. . . . . . . . 101
4.9 Treatment Eﬀects, Men, BA, Narrow Probit Model. . . . . . . . . 103
4.10 Treatment Eﬀects, Men, BA, Broad Probit Model. . . . . . . . . . 104
4.11 Treatment Eﬀects, Women, BA, Narrow Probit Model. . . . . . . 107
4.12 Treatment Eﬀects, Women, BA, Broad Probit Model. . . . . . . . 108
4.13 Probit Estimation Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.14 Treatment Eﬀects, Men, MA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.15 Treatment Eﬀects, Women, MA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
vi
5.1 Return to Education for Men According to Weiss. . . . . . . . . . 125
5.2 Return to Education for Men According to Park. . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.3 Return to Education According to Altonji & Dunn. . . . . . . . . 127
5.4 Description of Variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.5 Local Returns to Education, Men. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.6 Local Returns to Education, Women. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.7 Estimation Results for Men. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.8 Estimation Results for Women. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.9 Detailed Regression Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.10 Observations Per Education Cell. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.11 Men, Potential Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.12 Women, Potential Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.1 Variables and Parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.2 Estimation Results, Selection at the Individual Level. . . . . . . . . 162
6.3 Estimation Results, Selection at the Group Level. . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.4 IV Versus Experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
List of Figures
2.1 Illustration of the Evaluation Procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1 Basic Model, Full Probit and Partial Probit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.2 Alternative Model, Partial Probit With and Without Higher Or-
der Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.1 Illustration of the Evaluation Procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
Identifying causal relationships is of central concern in many applied economic research.
For example, political groups might be interested in how union membership aﬀects labor
market outcomes of union members. The government might want to know how certain ac-
tive labor market programs help improve participants’ labor market status. Frequently, for
the sake of evaluation of such programs, candidate causal variables are simply compared
with their supposed eﬀects. However, a simple bivariate comparison might generally lead
to misinterpretations and wrong conclusions. Most likely, there might be other – so-called
confounding – forces determining both the supposed cause and its eﬀect. For example,
participants in an active labor market program might systematically diﬀer from non-
participants, say, they have higher motivation or higher program-speciﬁc skills, such that
they would be more successful in the labor market anyway, even without the program.
Thus, the association of participation and success in the labor market might wrongly
be interpreted as a causal relationship. Applied econometric research attempts to take
account of confounding background variables by multivariate estimation techniques such
as the classical linear multivariate regression approach.
Recently, the econometric literature has been incorporating a new alternative statis-
tical technique which does not need to rely intensively on parametric or functional form
assumptions (see Heckman, LaLonde & Smith, 1999, and Angrist & Krueger,
1999). Rather, this technique is based on directly matching individuals who are equal in
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all observable respects with the only exception that one individual has experienced the
impact of a potentially causal variable while the other has not. Their diﬀerence in the
outcome variable under scrutiny will then be attributable to the eﬀect of the interven-
tion. The idea of matching originates in the randomized controlled trial (RCT). In an
RCT with binary causal variable, units are randomly assigned to one of two states, either
the treatment or the control state. Then, the treatment eﬀect is estimated by taking the
diﬀerence between the mean outcome of treated and control units. The estimate is unbi-
ased since the randomization property of the experiment – if implemented appropriately
– ensures that, on average, all covariates of treated and control units – be they observed
or unobserved – are balanced. In contrast to an RCT, in an observational study treated
and untreated units may diﬀer considerably because of their being self-selected into the
treatment state in lieu of being selected by an exogenous random mechanism.
Matching aims at removing systematic imbalance of covariates in an observational
study by selecting controls from the untreated group, the control reservoir, who are “sim-
ilar” to treated units in all relevant variables. In other words, it aims at constructing
an artiﬁcial control group. Of course, imbalance in unobservable characteristics cannot
be remedied. Insofar, both matching and the classical linear regression model control for
observable confounding variables. Yet, the diﬀerence is that the ﬁrst technique is non-
parametric while the latter interpolates linearly when there are no perfectly equal units.
However, note that even a saturated linear model would not necessarily identify the same
parameter as matching if heterogeneity in the eﬀect was present (see Angrist, 1998
or Angrist & Krueger, 1999). This is because OLS and matching impose diﬀerent
weighting schemes when averaging over individual eﬀects.
If the relevant variables are of high dimension exact matching in a ﬁnite sample is,
in all likelihood, impossible. As an alternative, Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) suggest
in their seminal paper to match on the one-dimensional probability of participation in
the treatment, the propensity score. They show that matching on the propensity score
is a valid approach whenever matching on all covariates is valid. However, since the
propensity score is unknown, further problems might arise in its estimation. For example,
it is often unclear how to specify the selection equation, which variables to include in
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the estimation, and how to deﬁne a propensity score distance. Furthermore, in case of
parametric binary choice models – probit or logit – the question arises whether to match
on the estimated index, i.e. the probits or logits, that is linear in the covariates or to
match on the estimated propensity score that, in order to be located in the unit interval,
depends on the covariates in a nonlinear fashion.
In this thesis the matching approach is used to evaluate postsecondary education and
to contrast estimation results with conventional ordinary least squares estimation. To this
end, data are drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY), an
American panel data set that started in 1979, comprising young individuals aged between
14 and 22 who have been re-interviewed annually until 1994 and biennially thereafter. In
terms of the matching methodology, postsecondary education constitutes the treatment
while the control reservoir is made up of individuals having a high school diploma only.
All empirical chapters of this thesis will use these data.
It turns out that selection into college, especially into four-year colleges, is extraordinar-
ily strong. Observable variables such as ability test scores and socio-economic background
variables are essential determinants aﬀecting the decision to take up a college education.
Unfortunately, matching treated and untreated units in such a case is no easy matter. For
instance, in the extreme case, if selection were perfectly predictable, matching would be
impossible because there would be no unit in the control reservoir having the same char-
acteristics as any treated. Note that also a linear model interpolating the extremes would
not be promising either. Consequently, pair matching, i.e. matching exactly one treated
and one untreated, as frequently pursued in applied work to evaluate active labor market
programs (see e.g. Lechner, 1999), might be inappropriate in the schooling example. It
would have to drop great a number of treated units at the high end of the propensity
score scale and, thus, it would produce matched pairs which are not anymore representa-
tive of the whole treated population. Hence, if the treatment eﬀect is heterogeneous pair
matching estimates might be severely biased.
In order to keep as many treated units as possible, one control should be matched to
more than one treated person, something which is often referred to as matching with re-
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placement. Dehejia & Wahba (1998) suggest an algorithm which follows this approach.
Usually, however, this algorithm lacks some optimality criterion in that it does not neces-
sarily achieve to minimize the overall distance between treated and control units. What
is more, several controls could also be matched to one treated unit to increase statistical
precision. In the end, the full sample might be stratiﬁed into small strata consisting of
either one treated and one or more controls or one control and more than one treated
unit.
Rosenbaum (1991) suggests an optimal full matching algorithm which not only
matches all units in the sample but which also manages to minimize the total distance
between treated and controls. In general, however, exact matches on the propensity score
are not possible and a certain small distance between the matched treated and the con-
trol has to be accepted. Greedy algorithms address this issue by matching a randomly
chosen treated unit to the closest untreated available who will then be removed from the
sample. By contrast, the optimal algorithm is apt to ﬁnd the overall minimum distance
by reconsidering and possibly rearranging already matched units.
Chapter 2 examines several steps in the practical implementation of the method of
matching. Typically, the applied researcher has to make decisions on how to adapt cer-
tain parameters in the matching algorithm. In contrast to the simulation study of Gu
& Rosenbaum (1993), this chapter performs a sensitivity analysis with data from the
NLSY. First, it analyses whether matching on the propensity score or on the linear index
is to be preferred. Second, it suggests to use a so-called propensity score caliper approach
which ensures that the distance between the treated and control unit does not exceed a
certain pre-speciﬁed range. Otherwise, arbitrarily large distances might occur. A broad
and a narrow caliper width are set against. Third, the question arises how to deﬁne dis-
tance within calipers. The literature suggests to either use the propensity score distance
or the Mahalanobis metric, both of which will be investigated. Fourth, three matching
algorithms are compared: optimal full, a greedy full, and a greedy pair matching. Fifth,
suitable stratum weighting schemes are built to identify the mean eﬀect of treatment on
the treated and the mean eﬀect on a randomly assigned person. The results will be dis-
cussed with respect to three measures of success: balance of covariates after matching,
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variance of the matching estimates, and how systematic treated units are discarded by
the algorithms.
Sensitivity of the decision parameters as to the estimated treatment eﬀects appears
to be rather modest. Systematic variation in the estimates caused by variation of the
distance measures between treated and untreated units or by altering matching algorithms
is negligible and statistically insigniﬁcant. Moreover, roughly 80% of the initial bias in the
observable covariates is removed by full matching algorithms and 87% by pair matching.
Yet, mean propensity scores of pair-matched treated individuals are markedly lower than
in the original treatment group before matching. If high-propensity score individuals
experience a higher eﬀect of their education pair matching estimates are expected to be
biased.
Alas, heterogeneity is too weak to unanimously favor full matching since its disad-
vantages clearly emerge. Full matching estimates are accompanied by relatively large
standard errors because a full stratiﬁcation is far from being as uniform as pair matching.
For example, the more strata consist of a large number of treated units sharing only one
control the higher standard errors of the estimated mean eﬀect on the treated individual
are. It turns out that the speciﬁc greedy full algorithm as implemented in this thesis
achieves a more uniform stratiﬁcation than the optimal one. Notwithstanding, in order
to attain a more uniform stratiﬁcation, greedy algorithms can always be replaced by a
suitable optimal one when restrictions on the size of the strata are incorporated in the
optimization process. Therefore, greedy algorithms should be abandoned. Furthermore,
matching on the linear index score turns out to better discriminate between units at the
low end of the propensity score scale. As a result, it drops many low-score untreated
individuals who would almost all be used in matching on the propensity score.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to speciﬁc problems that might arise under strong selection
into college as in Chapter 2. If treatment eﬀects are heterogeneous and selection into
treatment is exceptionally strong, pair matching is an eﬃcient evaluation strategy. In the
heterogeneous case, it is unclear which matching method to prefer. This chapter, however,
suggests to concentrate less on the choice of method but, alternatively, to carefully recon-
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sider the selection equation. Some variables might be strong determinants of the selection
but exhibit a rather modest impact on the outcome. If they are omitted randomness of
the selection process increases or, in other words, some observable self-selection is left to
stochastic noise. This will result in a smaller propensity score diﬀerence between treat-
ment and comparison group and, consequently, matching will become easier. Only the
relevant variables which rule both the selection and the outcome have to be balanced.
On the other hand, a consistent estimation of the propensity score might make it
necessary to include into the selection equation all the variables that rule the selection
process even if they do not determine the outcome. Many applied research emphasizes
the importance of consistent estimation of the selection equation. For instance, Lechner
(1999, 2000) performs and recommends several speciﬁcation tests to examine whether a
probit model is adequate for describing the selection decision. Heckman, Ichimura &
Todd (1997: section 8) choose the predictor variables to maximize the within-sample
correct prediction rates of participation. Although a selection process well understood
might in itself be an important contribution, it is not the main objective of propensity
score matching envisaging to identify the mean eﬀect of treatment. What is to be achieved
by propensity score matching is balance of the relevant covariates in order to eliminate
selection bias, even if the propensity score is inconsistently estimated. Obviously, there
is a trade-oﬀ between feasible matching on the one hand and consistent estimation of the
propensity score on the other.
To assess this trade-oﬀ Chapter 3 performs a simulation study. It turns out that even
when matching builds on quite inconsistent propensity score estimates, estimation results
of the mean eﬀect of treatment can still be superior, in terms of the mean squared error, to
results produced by a consistent propensity score estimation which might separate treated
and untreated units too successfully. The ﬁndings of this simulation study recommend
to only include variables into the selection equation that are highly signiﬁcant. Variables
with low signiﬁcance levels are obvious candidates for exclusion, even if they might play
a role in the outcome equation. Furthermore, if established research suggests that certain
variables are irrelevant to the outcome under study, they should solely be included if there
are other strong reasons for doing so. In sum, the main criterion to judge the success of
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matching is how well it balances the relevant covariates. This aim is more likely to be
obtained if self-selection is weak or the control reservoir is large.
Chapter 4 concentrates on the evaluation of post-secondary education by the method of
matching incorporating the ﬁndings of the previous two chapters. A somewhat diﬀerent
concept of return to education is introduced, namely the eﬀect of college education on
earnings, which takes account of the eﬀect of education on labor market experience,
as well. Its primary aim is estimation of the eﬀect of the associate’s, the bachelor’s,
and graduate degrees on hourly wages for both men and women during the ﬁrst ten
years after they have ﬁnished their college education. Moreover, heterogeneity in the
eﬀect ruled by family background and inherent ability will be considered. The results are
compared to conventional OLS estimation which allows (i) to verify the linear speciﬁcation
of the earnings equation and (ii) to bring out the determinants why matching and OLS
estimates diﬀer. Indeed, there is evidence that matching and OLS deviate particularly
when heterogeneity in the eﬀect is substantial. For men, the eﬀect of college education on
wages seems to depend signiﬁcantly on ability and parents’ education, while, for women,
estimates do not support such clear heterogeneity. At the same time, matching and OLS
estimates diﬀer less for women than for men.
Basically, the empirical results are along the lines of the existing literature. Estimates
of the eﬀect of college education are larger for women. Individuals who obtained their
degree more recently experience a higher eﬀect, i.e. there is evidence in favor of a general
increase. Moreover, the eﬀect seems to grow gradually over the ﬁrst ten years after leaving
college. Yet, this growth cannot be attributed to a positive interaction between experience
and education but partly to a faster accumulation of labor market experience on the part
of college graduates.
Apart from evaluating the eﬀects by the method of matching, Chapter 5 examines the
functional form assumption of the typical Mincerian human capital earnings equation.
A formal framework recently proposed by Card (1995, 1999) is used to take account of
endogeneity of the schooling decision. If the return to education depends positively on
inherent earnings abilities, individuals with higher abilities tend to opt for more schooling.
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If ability is itself rewarded in the labor market but is not controlled for in regression anal-
yses, coeﬃcient estimates of the return to schooling might be upward biased. Griliches
(1977) discusses this classical ability bias. However, this chapter shows that not con-
trolling for ability might additionally bias the estimated functional form of the earnings
equation. Indeed, this bias leads to returns to education that increase with years of
schooling acquired, thus rejecting constant returns as generally assumed in the literature
(Becker, 1967,Mincer, 1974). Other empirical studies also implicitly report increasing
marginal returns to schooling as years of education rise. This suggests that postsecondary
education might work as some magic potion.
However, these ﬁndings seem to be prompted by endogeneity of schooling as a result
of the optimization behavior. Explicit control for ability, especially for an interaction
between ability and schooling, shows that, in fact, the return to education diminishes as
more schooling is acquired, especially for men. In particular, the results show that the
interaction term is mostly statistically signiﬁcant, i.e. that heterogeneity in the returns is
substantial.
Finally, Chapter 6 treats self-selection on unobservables and compares possible solu-
tions to problems raised by this additional dimension in a numerical simulation study.
While it is straightforward to tackle selection on observables, selection on unobservables
provides a serious intellectual challenge. Researchers have proposed several alternative
strategies to overcome this identiﬁcation problem, by invoking a priori information on the
process of selection into treatment in an observational study (Heckman & Robb, 1985,
Angrist & Krueger, 1999) or by designing an appropriate randomized experiment.
In the natural sciences, the RCT has become the method of choice for the evaluation of
interventions.
While emphasis in methodological work is on the individual level, practical applications
frequently concern the case of group-level or community-based interventions. Implemen-
tation of policy measures at the community level is often a matter of necessity. Moreover,
analysts might choose a community-level approach to evaluation for reasons of costs.
Nothing seems more natural as a methodological approach to the evaluation of these in-
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terventions than the translation of the RCT paradigm to the community level. Objects
of randomized assignment into treatment and control samples are then entire communi-
ties. The possible correlation of outcomes within communities, clusters, or groups might
seriously distort conclusions regarding the statistical precision of the results.
Although one might be able to collect data on sizeable numbers of individuals within
each community participating in the study, the number of communities is typically limited.
Thus, while group-randomized experiments produce unbiased estimates it is diﬃcult to
enhance precision. Observational studies, by contrast, typically include a respectable num-
ber of communities, yet, they might suﬀer from the selection problem. Possibly, a biased
but more precise estimate from an observational study may yield a lower mean squared
error than the corresponding estimate of program impact from a group-randomized ex-
periment. In other words, there might be a serious trade-oﬀ to consider in the choice of
the evaluation strategy.
Chapter 6 investigates the potential and the limits of experimental and non-
experimental approaches to the evaluation problem. In particular, it contrasts the use
of instrumental variables as a quasi-experimental technique against the particular back-
ground of community-based interventions. In the simulations, trade-oﬀ between bias and
precision is emphasized by imposing a smaller number of communities in a randomized
experiment, and by allowing for a correspondingly larger number of communities in all
cases where selection into the program is not controlled by the analyst.
Obviously, standard estimators perform well as long as more or less restrictive assump-
tions on the selection process are satisﬁed. The randomized experiment – appropriately
implemented – always performs well without imposing strong assumptions. However, its
small sample size involves disadvantages, especially at group level. Instrumental variable
estimation may be a helpful device to circumvent the small sample problem and may open
the ﬁeld for less costly large scale observational studies, provided that a suitable instru-
ment is available. The simulation results suggest that correlations between instrument
and endogenous treatment indicator of around 0.3 to 0.4 can be considered to make up a
good instrument if the observational study comprises ten times more observations than a
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randomized experiment.
IV estimation yields inconsistent estimates, though, if treatment eﬀects are heteroge-
neous and individuals or groups decide whether to undergo treatment upon their true
eﬀects. In this case, IV identiﬁes the mean eﬀect of treatment on compliers, the so-called
local average treatment eﬀect (LATE), see e.g. Angrist, Imbens & Rubin (1996). In
case of a binary instrument, for example, LATE identiﬁes the mean eﬀect of those indi-
viduals who opt for participation in accordance with the value of their instrument. That
is, they participate if the instrument takes the value 1 and they do not if it is 0. Note
that this parameter might also be policy relevant, for instance, in answering the question
whether to install additional treatment sites or not, when proximity to treatment site is
a valid instrument.
Chapter 2
Matching the Extremes – A
Sensitivity Analysis Based on Real
Data
May 1999/October 2000
Abstract. This chapter uses observational data to estimate the eﬀect of a bachelor’s
degree on earnings for men by the method of matching. The data exhibit an extraor-
dinarily large bias in terms of observable confounding variables between treatment and
comparison group. Therefore, an appropriate implementation of the matching technique
is crucial. Usually, several ad hoc decisions have to be made in advance, e.g. decisions on
which distance measure or which matching algorithm to use. Sensitivity of the estimation
results with respect to some decisions is investigated. In particular, optimal full matching,
a greedy full matching, and a greedy pair matching are compared. Furthermore, a simple
extension permitting heterogeneous treatment eﬀects is suggested.
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2.1 Introduction
Recently, the statistical technique of matching has found widespread attention in econo-
metrics to evaluate eﬀects of policy interventions or welfare programs (Heckman,
Ichimura & Todd, 1997, Kluve, Lehmann & Schmidt, 1999, or Lechner, 1999,
2000), or to estimate labor market impacts of military service (Angrist, 1998). Heck-
man, LaLonde & Smith (1999) provide a comprehensive overview. The technique rests
on matching untreated individuals to treated ones with the same (observable) character-
istics, thus generating an artiﬁcial counterfactual of the treatment group. In eﬀect, this
approach attempts at mimicking a randomized experiment using data from an observa-
tional study to estimate the mean eﬀect of treatment.
Unlike ordinary least squares estimation (OLS) matching as a non-parametric technique
need not rely on functional form or distributional assumptions. What is more, in contrast
with OLS, if the treatment eﬀect is heterogeneous the estimated mean eﬀect of treatment –
a weighted average of individual eﬀects – builds on a more appropriate weighting scheme
than OLS. Angrist & Krueger (1999) or Angrist (1998) show how in case of
heterogeneous treatment eﬀects a saturated linear model estimated by OLS weights the
individual eﬀects by the individual variances of the treatment indicator. In contrast,
matching weights the individual eﬀects by the probability to participate in treatment
which is considered a more appropriate weighting scheme.
Often, applied research using propensity score matching has to make many ad hoc
decisions at various steps of the implementation. For example, decisions have to be made
on the concrete deﬁnition of a distance measure between treated and untreated units and
on which matching algorithm and weighting scheme to use. In an extensive simulation
study, Gu & Rosenbaum (1993) examine several alternatives. This chapter uses real
observational data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 to investigate
sensitivity of the estimation results with respect to some crucial decisions, speciﬁcally
decisions on the distance measure and the algorithm to be employed, and, furthermore,
on which propensity score estimate to match on.
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The empirical example evaluates college education by estimating the eﬀect of the bach-
elor’s degree for men during the ﬁrst ten years after graduation from college.1 It turns
out that selection into college is extremely strong such that treatment and comparison
group are quite distinct. Hence, matching adequate individuals can be expected to be a
serious challenge. As a result, the matching algorithm should take account of potential
pitfalls which is why three matching algorithms will be explored: optimal full matching
proposed by Rosenbaum (1991), a greedy full matching, and a greedy pair matching.
Pair matching produces a stratiﬁcation composed of non-overlapping pairs of treated
and control units. It drops all untreated individuals who are not matched which might
reduce eﬃciency. More importantly, given a certain distance measure some treated might
not ﬁnd a control which would give rise to biased estimates if the loss of treated individuals
were systematic and the treatment eﬀect were heterogeneous. In this case, a full matching
procedure which uses all treated and all untreated units in the sample might be preferred.
In a full matching, one control may be matched to more than one treated person and,
likewise, one treated may also be matched to numerous controls. The latter event will
occur particularly at the low end of the propensity score scale while the ﬁrst event will
mainly happen at the high end. What is more, in a natural way, full matching provides
weighting schemes that permit estimation of the mean eﬀect of treatment on the treated
as well as the mean eﬀect on a randomly assigned person.
Dehejia & Wahba (1998) suggest a solution where controls are allowed to be used
more than once in a matching algorithm with replacement. However, their strategy gen-
erally produces overlapping strata, i.e. certain individuals might be member of more
than one stratum. This makes statistical inference more diﬃcult due to dependencies
across strata. In contrast, this study adopts the optimal full stratiﬁcation strategy which
produces non-overlapping strata and achieves to eﬀectively minimize the total distance
between treated and untreated units. It will be contrasted to a greedy full matching.
“Greedy” means that the algorithm does not necessarily attain the minimum. In addi-
tion, the framework presented in Rosenbaum (1995) facilitates to estimate variances
and to calculate p-values of the estimated treatment eﬀect. This chapter adjusts this
1Chapter 4 extends this analysis to other degrees and to both sexes.
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framework to the present example and, in giving the statistical model more structure,
suggests a simple extension to allow for a special form of heterogeneous treatment eﬀects.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the
methodological framework. Section 3 describes the data, the treatment group and the
control reservoir. It speciﬁes the sensitivity parameters and, in particular, explains the
matching algorithms. Results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Methodology
Following Rosenbaum (1995), this section starts with outlining the formal setup for the
ideal case of a randomized experiment to which the more general case of an observational
study can be reduced under certain assumptions. Assume that N units under observation
are being stratiﬁed into S strata on the basis of their covariates. Let Zsi be a dummy
variable indicating whether unit i in stratum s, s = 1, ..., S, is randomly assigned to
treatment (Zsi = 1) or not (Zsi = 0). Each stratum s comprises ns units, ms =
∑ns
i=1 Zsi
treated and ns −ms controls. Since in this study either one treated unit will be matched
to one or more controls or one control to more than one treated, ms will either be 1 or
ns − 1. Furthermore, let Zs = (Zs1, ..., Zsns)′ and Z = (Z′1, ...,Z′S)′. Let the random
variable Rsi be the outcome of unit i in stratum s after treatment and R be the N -tuple
of Rsi arranged in the same order as Z. If unit si exhibits the same value of Rsi in
both states, treatment and control, the treatment has no eﬀect on that unit. This null
hypothesis implies that the response of that unit is ﬁxed, denoted rsi, and that the only
random variable left is Z.
The mean stratum eﬀect ∆s is estimated as the diﬀerence in the mean outcomes of the
treated units and their controls in stratum s
∆ˆs =
1
ms
Z′srs −
1
ns −ms (1− Zs)
′rs =
ns
ms(ns −ms)(Z
′
srs −msr¯s), (2.1)
for all s = 1, ..., S, where 1 is a suitable vector of ones and r¯s denotes the mean over the
rsi in stratum s. The overall mean eﬀect τ is a weighted average of the stratum eﬀects
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∆s, estimated by
τˆ =
S∑
s=1
ωs∆ˆs, (2.2)
where ωs are positive stratum weights summing to one:
∑S
s=1 ωs = 1. τˆ identiﬁes the
mean eﬀect of treatment on the treated if the stratum weights ωs are proportional to ms
and provided all treated units are being matched or treated units are not systematically
discarded by the matching algorithm. τˆ identiﬁes the mean eﬀect of treatment on a ran-
domly assigned person if the stratum weights are proportional to ns and if all treated and
untreated individuals are being matched (full matching)2. Estimates of both parameters
will be reported in section 4.
The moments under the null hypothesis of no treatment eﬀect are3
IE∆ˆs = 0, IEτˆ = 0,
where IE denotes the expectation operator,
σ2s = V ar(∆ˆs) =
ns
(ns − 1)2
ns∑
i=1
(rsi − r¯s)2, (2.3)
V ar(τˆ) =
S∑
s=1
ω2sσ
2
s . (2.4)
The stratum diﬀerences ∆ˆs are mutually independent, and their variances diﬀer across
strata. Under very mild assumptions Lindeberg’s condition is fulﬁlled and asymptotic
normality of τˆ is established.
Statistical inference will be based on large sample theory exploiting the moments of
the relevant test statistics. Alternatively, it could rest on an exact permutation test.
Calculating all feasible permutations of zeroes and ones of the vector Z and counting how
often the test statistic of the permuted data exceeds the sample test statistic (2.2) would
produce exact p-values. Though, for a large number of strata such a test would exceed
current computer power by far.4
2Sample weights will also be taken into account in order to identify the US population parameters.
3Using the distribution of Zs yields V ar(Z′srs) =
ms(ns−ms)
ns(ns−1)
∑ns
i=1(rsi − r¯s)2. Moreover, note that
ms = 1 or ms = ns − 1 and that rsi is no random variable under the null hypothesis.
4Good (1994) provides a practical guide to permutation tests and resampling methods in general.
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Observational Studies With Overt Bias
In contrast to a randomized experiment, in an observational study the distribution of the
assignment vector Z is unknown because individuals themselves decide whether to par-
ticipate in treatment or not. If the treatment and control group diﬀer prior to treatment
in ways that matter for the outcome under study an observational study is biased. An
overt bias is one that is produced by observable covariates X and that, in general, can be
controlled using adjustments such as matching.
Assuming that there is only overt bias5 matching on X mimics ex post a randomized
experiment in each stratum deﬁned by X. Thus, the formalism for the randomized ex-
periment outlined above can be applied. Alas, whenever X is of high dimension exact
matching will, in all likelihood, be impossible. Alternatively, Rosenbaum & Rubin
(1983) suggest to match on the one-dimensional propensity score, i.e. the probability to
participate in treatment given X, p(x) = IP(Z = 1|X = x), where IP denotes probability.
They show that if matching on X removes overt bias matching on p(X) will do so, too.
Unfortunately, the propensity score is unknown and has to be estimated. In this
study, this is done by a probit model. Three objections against the estimation might be
raised. First, using estimated instead of true propensity scores gives rise to additional
error potentially increasing the variance of the treatment eﬀect estimates. Second, exact
matching on the propensity score being itself a continuous variable is not feasible either.
Its necessary discretization may induce further errors. Third, the special parametric form
of the probit model might be misspeciﬁed and estimates of the propensity score might
thus be inconsistent.6 Albeit, recalling that balance of the relevant covariates between
treatment and control group is exactly the main property of success, these objections
will be of minor concern as long as matching on the estimated propensity score achieves
acceptable balance. Chapter 3 investigates this issue in a simulation study and conclude
that the speciﬁcation of the selection equation is, in fact, of minor relevance.7
5This guarantees that the conditional independence assumption formulated in Rubin (1977) is fulﬁlled.
6Note, however, that consistency of the coeﬃcients of the probit model is irrelevant as long as p(X)
is estimated consistently.
7A method circumventing objections in special cases is described in Rosenbaum (1995: 3.5.1) or in
Rosenbaum (1984).
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Conﬁdence Intervals and a Test for Heterogeneity
Under the null hypothesis of no treatment eﬀect the variance of τˆ is given in equation (2.4).
Yet, if the null hypothesis is rejected (2.4) is not correct anymore. Assuming a constant
treatment eﬀect could easily be coped with by just subtracting it from the estimates such
that the null hypothesis expresses again a zero eﬀect. In this study, however, the treatment
eﬀect may be heterogeneous varying with certain covariates. Therefore, a simple two-step-
model is proposed to address this issue. Alternatively, a direct one-step-model is discussed
in appendix B. However, it is not used due to an unfavorable weighting scheme.
Assume that the treatment eﬀect diﬀers across strata, but is constant within strata.
The response Rsi of unit i in stratum s is
Rsi = rsi +∆sZsi
with rsi being the outcome when the treatment has no eﬀect. ∆s is the stratum eﬀect
and is estimated according to equation (2.1) replacing rs by Rs. Let the stratum eﬀects
∆s alter with certain covariates
∆s = τ + α(As − A¯) + β(Fs − F¯ ) + γ(Ys − Y¯ ), (2.5)
with A¯ =
∑S
s=1 ωsAs and As =
1
ms
∑ns
i=1AsiZsi, and likewise for F¯ , Fs, Y¯ , Ys. Asi denotes
inherent earnings abilities of individual i in stratum s, Fsi characterizes family background,
and Ysi is the year in which the college degree is obtained. Family background and ability
are often considered not only as main determinants of the acquired amount of schooling
but also as determinants of the return to education, see e.g. Card (1999) and Willis
(1986). Ysi intends to capture a possible time trend in the eﬀects. The variables will be
speciﬁed in section 3 and in appendix A.
Write
δ = (τ, α, β, γ)′,
Hs = (1 , As − A¯ , Fs − F¯ , Ys − Y¯ ),
∆ˆ = (∆ˆ1, ..., ∆ˆS)
′.
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The variance of ∆ˆ under the null hypothesis δ = δ0 is V (δ0) = V ar(∆ˆ) = diag(σ
2
s(δ0))
S
s=1
with
σ2s(δ0) =
ns
(ns − 1)2
ns∑
i=1
[(Rsi −Hsδ0 · Zsi)− (R¯s −Hsδ0 · Z¯s)]2 (2.6)
depending on the null hypothesis δ = δ0.
8 For δ0 = 0, equation (2.6) reduces to (2.3).
Although heteroskedasticity of ∆ˆ might be a reason for using generalized least squares,
weighted ordinary least squares with stratum weights ωs will be used for estimation to
keep control over the weighting scheme. Writing H = (H ′1, ..., H
′
S)
′ and ∆ˆ = Hδ+ ε with
an error term ε = ∆ˆ −∆, and a diagonal S × S weighting matrix W = diag(ωs)Ss=1, a
consistent estimate of δ is δˆ = (H ′WH)−1H ′W∆ˆ, with variance under the null δ = δ0
V˜ (δ0) = V ar(δˆ) = (H
′WH)−1H ′W V (δ0)WH(H ′WH)−1.
This variance formula permits calculation of standard errors and p-values. For example,
a test against the null hypothesis of no mean treatment eﬀect, τ = 0, would make use
of τˆ /
√
V ar(τˆ)
as.∼ N (0, 1). However, a (1 − α)-conﬁdence region for δ solving (δˆ −
δ0)
′V˜ (δ0)−1(δˆ−δ0) ≤ χ24,1−α for δ0 would be quite cumbersome.9 Therefore, in the following
application, V˜ (δ0) will be replaced by the approximation V˜ (δˆ).
2.3 Practical Implementation
Data
The data are taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) admin-
istered by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The NLSY is a sample of 12,686 youths
ﬁrst interviewed in 1979 when they were aged between 14 and 22 and re-interviewed
annually until 1994. A detailed description of the data is given by the NLS Handbook
8This is due to the fact that V ar(∆ˆs) = V ar(∆ˆs −∆s), ∆s = IE∆ˆs, and
∆ˆs −∆s = ns
ns − 1(Z
′
sRs −msR¯s)−∆s =
ns
ns − 1(Z
′
srs +∆sZ
′
sZs −msr¯s −ms∆sZ¯s)−∆s
=
ns
ns − 1(Z
′
srs −msr¯s).
The variance of nsns−1 (Z
′
srs −msr¯s) is known to be (2.3). Insert rsi = Rsi −∆sZsi to achieve (2.6).
9For instance, in the case of β = γ = 0, the left hand side is a polynomial in τ4 and α4.
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(1997) and the NLSY79 User’s Guide (1997). Data on wages are extracted until 1994 for
men. Oversampling of Non-whites and economically disadvantaged Whites suggests the
use of sample weights pertaining to 1979 in order to identify the population mean eﬀect
of treatment on the treated and on a randomly assigned person.
The treatment period is the time to achieve the bachelor’s degree, approximately four
years at college and maybe some years out of college as well. The treated individuals
are those who obtained the degree and left college immediately thereafter, i.e. who have
not tried to continue college but eventually dropped out before achieving a higher degree.
Controls are drawn from the pool of individuals with only a high school diploma who
never attended college. High school dropouts and individuals with a general educational
development (GED) are removed from the sample.
The year in which a respondent received his high school diploma marks the beginning
of the treatment phase of those who went to college. In turn, the year in which he received
his bachelor’s degree marks the end. A treated and a control person are supposed to ﬁnish
high school in the same year and at the same age. The control, then, starts to work and
gain labor market experience while the treated is allowed to either go to college straight
away, interrupt college for a while, or even start to work a certain time before ﬁnally
attending college. Note that the estimation strategy pursued here does not identify the
return to education but the eﬀect of the college degree on earnings which also includes
indirect eﬀects on labor market experience. Chapter 4 discusses the diﬀerences of the two
concepts and provides empirical evidence that although college degree holders start with
less experience, accumulation of experience after college is faster for college than for high
school graduates.
The outcome measure is the hourly rate of pay inﬂated to 1996 dollars using the US
consumer price index and transformed into logarithms. For presentation of the results,
the estimate τˆ will be retransformed to exp(τˆ)− 1. To eliminate outliers, all values below
$1 are set equal to $1 and maximum or minimum wages of observations whose wages oscil-
late enormously across years are removed as well.10 Socioeconomic background variables,
10For example, an hourly wage of $5 in one year, $1000 in the second, and again $5 in the third
seems more likely to reﬂect inconsistencies in the calculation of the hourly wage by the NLSY than
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Estimated Propensity and Index Score.
Estimated Estimated
Prop. score Untreated Treated Index score Untreated Treated
[0.0 , 0.1) 946 29 [−4.70 , −3.94) 11 0
[0.1 , 0.2) 150 23 [−3.94 , −3.18) 74 0
[0.2 , 0.3) 80 21 [−3.18 , −2.42) 285 2
[0.3 , 0.4) 56 20 [−2.42 , −1.66) 407 9
[0.4 , 0.5) 29 21 [−1.66 , −0.90) 298 37
[0.5 , 0.6) 33 35 [−0.90 , −0.14) 175 54
[0.6 , 0.7) 15 34 [−0.14 , +0.62) 64 96
[0.7 , 0.8) 20 60 [+0.62 , +1.38) 24 139
[0.8 , 0.9) 9 79 [+1.38 , +2.14) 4 86
[0.9 , 1.0] 4 128 [+2.14 , +2.90] 0 27
Mean score 0.11 0.67 -1.77 0.61
Observations 1342 450 1342 450
Comparison of the number of treated and untreated individuals by propensity score and index
score intervals.
information about the high school career, and ability measures play an important role in
modeling the selection decision to estimate the propensity score. The NLSY provides ten
ability measures, the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery scores. Since respon-
dents participated in the tests at diﬀerent ages the scores are adjusted by regressing the
raw scores on age dummies and using the residuals subsequently as explanatory variables,
analogous to Blackburn & Neumark (1993). Math scores will be used to describe As
and parents’ education to describe Fs in equation (2.5).
The variables and the probit estimation are presented in appendix A. It successfully
separates college and high school graduates which, unfortunately, makes matching at the
boundaries a diﬃcult project. Note, however, that this aspect does not favor a linear
model either because its ad hoc linear interpolations between the extremes would not nec-
essarily be correct. Table 2.1 compares the absolute frequencies of treated and untreated
men for certain propensity score and index score intervals. The index or probits is Φ−1(pˆ),
real fundamental economic changes which is why $1000 would be removed. See e.g. the NLSY79 User’s
Handbook (1997: p. 266): “... the calculation procedure [...] produces, at times, extremely low and
extremely high pay rate values.”
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where Φ is the cumulative normal density function. It is linear in the matching vari-
ables X and might be better suited to reﬂect the underlying distribution of the estimated
propensity scores.
Using pˆ might make individuals at the high end of the propensity score scale look more
similar than they actually are and, analogously, make individuals at the low end look
more identical. Indeed, for low index scores, there are numerous untreated units in cells
with hardly any treated while for low pˆ there is still a reasonable number of treated units.
Matching on the index will drop countless low-score untreated individuals while matching
on the propensity score will keep several of them. In the high end of the distribution, the
situation is comparable but less pronounced. Results will be discussed for both matching
on the propensity score and on the index. For the sake of brevity, “propensity score” will
denote both scores in the main text below if closer speciﬁcation is not necessary.
Distance Measures
A propensity score caliper approach within cells deﬁned by race, age and high school
graduation year is pursued, see e.g. Cochran & Rubin (1973). First, the cells are
deﬁned. Only individuals of the same race are matched. Furthermore, the age structure
is taken into account: individuals of the same age, one year younger or one year older are
permitted to be matched. Similarly, only those who receive their high school degree in
the same year, one year earlier or later than the treated may become potential controls.
This guarantees that untreated individuals within a stratum share a similar economic
environment at the beginning of their treatment phase. Exact matches on age and the
year of the high school diploma would be preferable, but would substantially reduce the
number of potential controls.
Second, within these cells a pool of potential controls is generated for each treated by
excluding all untreated units who exceed a certain propensity or index score caliper ε.
The ﬁnal decision of who becomes an actual control will then be made by minimizing
either the Mahalanobis or the propensity score distance. The Mahalanobis distance is a
weighted Euclidean distance d(xt,xc) = (xt − xc)′V −1(xt − xc), where xt and xc are the
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vectors comprising the observable covariates of the treated and the potential control unit,
respectively. V is the pooled covariance matrix of these variables which serves to norm
the vectors. If the propensity score is inconsistently estimated the Mahalanobis metric
within calipers might help circumvent possible problems. In sum, the distance is
d(xt,xc) =


∞ if |p(xt)− p(xc)| > ε
(xt − xc)′V −1(xt − xc)
or |p(xt)− p(xc)| else.
(2.7)
An inﬁnite distance indicates that matching is forbidden.11
Two diﬀerent caliper widths ε will be compared, a narrow and a broad one. For
propensity score matching, the narrow one will be set equal to 0.05 while the broad one
will be 0.10. For index score matching, the respective numbers are 0.30 and 0.60. They
are chosen such that both matching on the propensity score and on the index employ
an approximately equal number of treated units. Broad calipers allow matching more
individuals at the expense of a potentially less favorable balance of covariates. Narrow
calipers generate closer similarity of matched units but might have to drop several high-
and low-score units. No calipers would have adverse consequences. First, any arbitrarily
large distance between treated and controls would then be possible, and, second, matching
algorithms would consume substantially more time.12
After having constructed the pool of potential controls appropriate wages serving as
the counterfactual wages of the treated are assigned. The time span between the year
in which the treated unit received his college degree and his high school diploma – the
treatment phase – is added to the year in which his potential controls received their high
school diploma. The result is considered as the counterfactual year in which his potential
controls would have received a college degree. Note that the treatment phase is not
necessarily just the years at college because the treated individual might have interrupted
education for a while. Figure 2.1 illustrates the procedure. The counterfactual outcome
11Matching using the Mahalanobis distance is discussed in Rubin (1980). A comparison of three
distance measures is provided in Gu & Rosenbaum (1993). Furthermore, propensity score calipers are
discussed in Rosenbaum & Rubin (1985: 3) and Rosenbaum (1989: 3.4).
12In each step of the algorithm every treated would have to be compared to the whole control reservoir.
Given a caliper, the treated has to be compared to only a small number of suitable untreated units.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the Evaluation Procedure.
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The ﬁrst diagram demonstrates the optimal case when treated and control individuals receive their high
school diploma in the same year. The second indicates how things change when there is one year diﬀerence.
one year after treatment is the wage of the potential control one year after his hypothetical
end of college. If wage information is missing the potential control is dropped for that
year after treatment but is still used for other years. If the wage of the treated is missing
the treated is removed, too. Ten years after college will be examined and each year will be
stratiﬁed separately such that individuals who are removed in some year due to missing
wage information may still be available in other years.
The Matching Algorithms
The ﬁnal decision regarding the matching procedure is how to implement the chosen
matching criteria, in other words, how the distances between treated and controls is
minimized. Three algorithms will be compared in this study, one greedy pair matching
and two full matching, optimal full matching as proposed by Rosenbaum (1991) and
an own greedy full matching. Greedy pair matching randomly selects one treated person
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and chooses – within calipers – the closest untreated as control. Then, the matched pair
is removed and a second treated chooses among the remaining control reservoir. The
procedure continues until treated units cannot ﬁnd controls of ﬁnite distance anymore.
These treated units will then be dropped.
The particular greedy full algorithm used here ﬁrst shuﬄes randomly all treated in-
dividuals. Then, the ﬁrst treated is matched to the closest untreated available. This
untreated is removed from the control reservoir and the next treated selects the nearest
untreated unit. If a treated does not ﬁnd a control he is taken out for this part of the
procedure. After the last treated found his control the ﬁrst treated starts to search a
second control. The algorithm continues until there is no untreated left anymore. By
now, some treated have one or more controls and some still none. Those who have none
are distributed over the strata consisting of exactly one treated and one control. To this
end, the controls of these strata are shuﬄed randomly and the ﬁrst control is matched to
the closest treated. The next control searches among the remaining treated until there is
no one left. Controls may be used more than once.
Although this algorithm attempts to minimize the total distance between treated and
their controls it will, in general, not attain the minimum. Rosenbaum (1991) shows in
a simple but extreme example how a greedy algorithm might be arbitrarily worse than
the optimal. A further unpleasant side eﬀect is that results are diﬀerent each time the
algorithm is used because of the initial random order of records. For illustration, greedy
pair and full matching are performed twenty times for each year after college. It turns
out that the greedy full algorithm is quite stable and variation over the 20 iterations is
negligible. Therefore, standard errors induced by the inherent randomness will only be
reported for greedy pair matching.
Optimal full matching circumvents these shortcomings. It attains the overall minimum
in that it works backwards and rearranges already matched units if a treated would be
better matched to an already matched untreated. In such a case, the ﬁrst match is broken
up and the corresponding treated is again available for matching. Optimal full matching
can easily be transformed into a minimum cost ﬂow problem13 (Rosenbaum, 1991).
13Bertsekas (1991) discusses linear network optimization and provides FORTRAN-algorithms for
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In sum, the sensitivity analysis is carried out along ﬁve dimensions. First, matching
on the propensity and on the index score will be compared. Second, distance within
calipers is either deﬁned by the scores or by the Mahalanobis metric. Third, the caliper
width is varied. Fourth, the three matching algorithms are compared. Finally, weighting
schemes are altered to identify (i) the mean eﬀect of treatment on the treated and (ii) the
mean eﬀect on a randomly assigned person. Three measures of success will be discussed:
balance of covariates after matching, the variance of the matching estimates, and how
systematic treated units are dropped by the algorithms.
2.4 Results
General Remarks
Estimation results of the treatment eﬀects are reported in tables 2.2 to 2.5. For reasons
of parsimony, only results for the ﬁrst, third, ﬁfth, seventh and ninth year after college
are shown. The ﬁrst column of the tables indicates the year after college. Note that the
results are not stochastically independent over the years. The ﬁrst and second columns
for the full matching algorithms report estimates of the mean eﬀect of treatment on
the treated and on a randomly assigned person, respectively. For greedy pair matching,
the two estimates coincide and a supplementary column reports the standard deviations
induced by the initial random order of records. They are calculated for the estimates of
the eﬀect as well as for its sampling standard errors in parentheses.
The third and fourth columns display the number of strata, of treated, and of untreated
individuals used for stratiﬁcation. For pair matching, all three numbers are identical. The
last column of the full matching algorithms reports the mean and maximum number of
treated units in strata that consist of more than one treated. Large numbers typically
increase the standard errors. Furthermore, note that the number of individuals and strata
diminishes continuously from the ﬁrst to the ninth year. This is because many individuals
minimum cost ﬂow problems. Furthermore, there is an operations research procedure called netflow in
SAS for these kinds of problems. Gu & Rosenbaum (1993) examine the performance of optimal full
matching in a simulation study.
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Table 2.2: Estimated Eﬀects. Matching on the p.score, Within caliper: p.score.
Optimal Full Greedy Full Greedy Pair
On the On R’d S T Mean On the On R’d S T Mean Simul. S
Year Treated Assigned C Max Treated Assigned C Max Eﬀect Error Error
Narrow Caliper
1 -0.007 -0.026 150 287 4.9 0.028 0.027 152 286 4.0 -0.011 0.021 151
(0.088) (0.079) 898 27.0 (0.088) (0.077) 898 27.0 (0.057) (0.004) 1.34
3 0.188*** 0.211** 149 250 4.0 0.175** 0.156** 149 250 3.2 0.188*** 0.028 148
(0.076) (0.091) 880 16.0 (0.075) (0.079) 880 15.0 (0.066) (0.003) 0.97
5 0.201*** 0.019 137 230 4.0 0.234*** 0.097 137 229 3.2 0.217*** 0.026 138
(0.072) (0.083) 893 14.0 (0.073) (0.083) 893 11.0 (0.077) (0.004) 1.02
7 0.260*** 0.216** 123 197 3.7 0.276*** 0.222*** 123 197 3.2 0.275*** 0.032 123
(0.091) (0.100) 789 14.0 (0.086) (0.089) 789 11.0 (0.081) (0.004) 0.54
9 0.355*** 0.244** 93 151 3.9 0.299*** 0.234** 92 150 3.1 0.314*** 0.059 92
(0.130) (0.117) 578 12.0 (0.113) (0.104) 578 9.0 (0.119) (0.010) 0.78
Broad Caliper
1 -0.020 0.059 159 333 5.2 0.006 0.151** 163 332 4.2 -0.022 0.026 164
(0.090) (0.090) 1122 28.0 (0.082) (0.082) 1122 21.0 (0.054) (0.004) 1.46
3 0.158 0.253** 158 308 5.1 0.164* 0.204*** 163 307 4.1 0.206*** 0.031 162
(0.117) (0.110) 1116 34.0 (0.101) (0.086) 1116 24.0 (0.067) (0.004) 1.26
5 0.179** 0.054 148 285 5.2 0.192*** 0.205*** 150 283 4.0 0.221*** 0.035 152
(0.089) (0.090) 1084 32.0 (0.075) (0.081) 1084 20.0 (0.072) (0.005) 1.56
7 0.228** 0.219** 130 242 4.5 0.256*** 0.269*** 134 242 3.8 0.278*** 0.044 134
(0.112) (0.101) 959 32.0 (0.103) (0.088) 959 21.0 (0.076) (0.004) 1.10
9 0.362*** 0.271*** 99 188 4.7 0.361*** 0.297*** 101 188 3.9 0.327*** 0.057 102
(0.152) (0.117) 730 27.0 (0.107) (0.104) 730 16.0 (0.113) (0.008) 0.85
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. The weighting schemes
take account of the NLSY sample weights. The ﬁrst columns of the full matching algorithms show estimates of the mean eﬀect of treatment on
the treated while the second show the mean eﬀect on a randomly assigned person. For greedy pair matching, simulation standard deviations
are additionally reported in an own column. Columns denoted by S, T, and C display the number of strata, of treated, and of control units,
respectively. For pair matching all three numbers are equal, simulation standard deviations for S are reported. Finally, columns titled “Mean”
and “Max” show the mean and maximum number of treated units in strata that comprise more than one treated, respectively.
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Table 2.3: Estimated Eﬀects. Matching on the p.score, Within caliper: Mahalanobis.
Optimal Full Greedy Full Greedy Pair
On the On R’d S T Mean On the On R’d S T Mean Simul. S
Year Treated Assigned C Max Treated Assigned C Max Eﬀect Error Error
Narrow Caliper
1 0.023 0.025 153 287 4.9 0.019 0.010 151 286 3.9 -0.027 0.019 152
(0.090) (0.077) 898 27.0 (0.087) (0.074) 898 27.0 (0.059) (0.003) 1.07
3 0.214*** 0.209*** 151 250 3.9 0.172*** 0.151** 151 249 3.5 0.143** 0.020 150
(0.078) (0.087) 880 17.0 (0.071) (0.075) 880 16.0 (0.061) (0.003) 1.14
5 0.219*** 0.119 139 230 3.9 0.225*** 0.094 137 229 3.4 0.162** 0.030 138
(0.075) (0.090) 893 14.0 (0.075) (0.082) 893 12.0 (0.073) (0.004) 1.19
7 0.298*** 0.258*** 123 197 4.9 0.302*** 0.238*** 122 196 3.4 0.216*** 0.028 123
(0.093) (0.097) 789 15.0 (0.090) (0.090) 789 12.0 (0.074) (0.005) 0.85
9 0.318*** 0.286*** 91 151 4.2 0.304*** 0.253*** 92 151 3.2 0.249*** 0.041 92
(0.121) (0.118) 578 14.0 (0.104) (0.109) 578 10.0 (0.097) (0.007) 0.97
Broad Caliper
1 0.028 0.232*** 167 333 5.4 0.002 0.140* 165 333 4.1 -0.003 0.021 166
(0.086) (0.097) 1122 25.0 (0.078) (0.079) 1122 20.0 (0.056) (0.006) 1.70
3 0.177* 0.248*** 166 308 4.9 0.162* 0.196*** 168 308 3.9 0.165*** 0.037 166
(0.111) (0.099) 1116 29.0 (0.094) (0.082) 1116 21.0 (0.057) (0.006) 1.62
5 0.174** 0.243*** 156 285 4.9 0.216*** 0.196*** 158 285 4.0 0.142** 0.025 156
(0.085) (0.101) 1084 27.0 (0.075) (0.081) 1084 14.0 (0.069) (0.004) 0.95
7 0.261*** 0.309*** 138 242 5.0 0.275*** 0.283*** 137 242 3.6 0.232*** 0.036 137
(0.107) (0.104) 959 27.0 (0.086) (0.085) 959 17.0 (0.064) (0.004) 0.78
9 0.372*** 0.352*** 104 188 4.7 0.324*** 0.292*** 103 187 3.8 0.263*** 0.043 103
(0.142) (0.125) 730 22.0 (0.114) (0.104) 730 13.0 (0.090) (0.007) 1.42
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. The weighting schemes
take account of the NLSY sample weights. The ﬁrst columns of the full matching algorithms show estimates of the mean eﬀect of treatment on
the treated while the second show the mean eﬀect on a randomly assigned person. For greedy pair matching, simulation standard deviations
are additionally reported in an own column. Columns denoted by S, T, and C display the number of strata, of treated, and of control units,
respectively. For pair matching all three numbers are equal, simulation standard deviations for S are reported. Finally, columns titled “Mean”
and “Max” show the mean and maximum number of treated units in strata that comprise more than one treated, respectively.
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Table 2.4: Estimated Eﬀects. Matching on the index, Within caliper: index.
Optimal Full Greedy Full Greedy Pair
On the On R’d S T Mean On the On R’d S T Mean Simul. S
Year Treated Assigned C Max Treated Assigned C Max Eﬀect Error Error
Narrow Caliper
1 0.001 0.010 159 300 4.5 0.033 0.024 166 299 3.8 -0.008 0.017 165
(0.079) (0.062) 669 19.0 (0.088) (0.062) 669 19.0 (0.055) (0.005) 1.65
3 0.199*** 0.205*** 160 268 4.1 0.230*** 0.186*** 167 268 3.2 0.232*** 0.030 166
(0.076) (0.073) 692 18.0 (0.071) (0.067) 692 15.0 (0.067) (0.006) 1.67
5 0.202*** 0.093 148 249 4.4 0.205*** 0.098 151 249 3.5 0.216*** 0.033 153
(0.072) (0.071) 712 15.0 (0.070) (0.070) 712 12.0 (0.072) (0.004) 1.48
7 0.284*** 0.249*** 130 214 3.8 0.278*** 0.246*** 135 214 3.3 0.264*** 0.034 136
(0.090) (0.079) 635 15.0 (0.079) (0.078) 635 12.0 (0.075) (0.004) 1.09
9 0.354*** 0.239*** 99 165 3.9 0.339*** 0.262*** 102 165 3.0 0.310*** 0.040 102
(0.127) (0.101) 465 14.0 (0.104) (0.097) 465 11.0 (0.111) (0.007) 1.06
Broad Caliper
1 -0.017 0.019 167 340 5.1 0.077 0.053 189 339 3.9 0.021 0.025 190
(0.087) (0.072) 878 25.0 (0.079) (0.064) 878 18.0 (0.053) (0.003) 1.31
3 0.162 0.200** 164 322 5.2 0.192** 0.174*** 185 322 3.7 0.235*** 0.029 184
(0.116) (0.087) 865 34.0 (0.090) (0.068) 865 18.0 (0.064) (0.006) 2.26
5 0.192** 0.072 153 301 5.4 0.205*** 0.113* 173 300 3.8 0.236*** 0.024 175
(0.092) (0.078) 874 32.0 (0.063) (0.069) 874 13.0 (0.066) (0.003) 2.92
7 0.248** 0.245*** 134 258 4.9 0.310*** 0.276*** 151 257 3.4 0.290*** 0.044 153
(0.111) (0.091) 788 31.0 (0.088) (0.082) 788 12.0 (0.071) (0.004) 1.80
9 0.356*** 0.253*** 104 195 4.8 0.366*** 0.274*** 118 194 3.2 0.341*** 0.051 116
(0.152) (0.105) 621 27.0 (0.109) (0.093) 621 9.0 (0.107) (0.008) 1.55
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. The weighting schemes
take account of the NLSY sample weights. The ﬁrst columns of the full matching algorithms show estimates of the mean eﬀect of treatment on
the treated while the second show the mean eﬀect on a randomly assigned person. For greedy pair matching, simulation standard deviations
are additionally reported in an own column. Columns denoted by S, T, and C display the number of strata, of treated, and of control units,
respectively. For pair matching all three numbers are equal, simulation standard deviations for S are reported. Finally, columns titled “Mean”
and “Max” show the mean and maximum number of treated units in strata that comprise more than one treated, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Estimated Eﬀects. Matching on the index, Within caliper: Mahalanobis.
Optimal Full Greedy Full Greedy Pair
On the On R’d S T Mean On the On R’d S T Mean Simul. S
Year Treated Assigned C Max Treated Assigned C Max Eﬀect Error Error
Narrow Caliper
1 0.046 0.035 173 300 4.8 0.027 0.024 172 300 3.7 -0.014 0.030 172
(0.083) (0.063) 669 19.0 (0.081) (0.060) 669 19.0 (0.054) (0.005) 1.89
3 0.212*** 0.169*** 173 268 4.3 0.178*** 0.159*** 171 268 3.2 0.154** 0.032 172
(0.074) (0.067) 692 18.0 (0.067) (0.062) 692 16.0 (0.058) (0.004) 1.40
5 0.180*** 0.133* 158 249 4.1 0.177*** 0.093 158 249 3.2 0.126* 0.027 157
(0.069) (0.075) 712 14.0 (0.061) (0.067) 712 10.0 (0.065) (0.004) 1.62
7 0.290*** 0.257*** 141 214 4.3 0.280*** 0.244*** 140 214 3.1 0.215*** 0.037 140
(0.087) (0.081) 635 15.0 (0.076) (0.076) 635 9.0 (0.066) (0.006) 1.24
9 0.312*** 0.282*** 106 165 4.0 0.280*** 0.252*** 104 165 3.1 0.220** 0.042 105
(0.109) (0.103) 465 14.0 (0.100) (0.096) 465 11.0 (0.087) (0.007) 0.92
Broad Caliper
1 0.036 0.055 195 340 5.1 0.005 0.040 207 340 3.5 0.023 0.027 202
(0.074) (0.068) 878 19.0 (0.068) (0.062) 878 15.0 (0.053) (0.003) 2.15
3 0.165* 0.147** 193 322 5.0 0.168** 0.154** 195 322 3.5 0.151*** 0.032 198
(0.092) (0.072) 865 19.0 (0.087) (0.065) 865 16.0 (0.052) (0.003) 1.78
5 0.211*** 0.141* 179 301 4.6 0.207*** 0.130** 186 301 3.2 0.188*** 0.028 185
(0.075) (0.079) 874 18.0 (0.059) (0.068) 874 10.0 (0.062) (0.003) 1.87
7 0.316*** 0.295*** 158 258 4.8 0.260*** 0.259*** 163 254 3.1 0.228*** 0.037 162
(0.098) (0.091) 788 16.0 (0.072) (0.077) 788 9.0 (0.066) (0.006) 1.84
9 0.302*** 0.264*** 121 195 4.5 0.358*** 0.276*** 125 195 3.1 0.199** 0.034 123
(0.118) (0.104) 621 13.0 (0.095) (0.093) 621 7.0 (0.089) (0.007) 1.44
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. The weighting schemes
take account of the NLSY sample weights. The ﬁrst columns of the full matching algorithms show estimates of the mean eﬀect of treatment on
the treated while the second show the mean eﬀect on a randomly assigned person. For greedy pair matching, simulation standard deviations
are additionally reported in an own column. Columns denoted by S, T, and C display the number of strata, of treated, and of control units,
respectively. For pair matching all three numbers are equal, simulation standard deviations for S are reported. Finally, columns titled “Mean”
and “Max” show the mean and maximum number of treated units in strata that comprise more than one treated, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Balance of Covariates, Aggregate Measures.
Optimal Full Greedy Full Greedy Pair
Match Within Caliper
on Caliper Width Mean -1 Math Educ ∆pˆ Mean -1 Math Educ ∆pˆ Mean -1 Math Educ ∆pˆ
p.score p.score narrow 82 90 98 89 -.09 84 89 98 88 -.09 85 90 97 93 -.24
p.score p.score broad 76 89 98 85 -.05 78 87 95 81 -.05 87 91 98 91 -.22
p.score Mahal narrow 81 88 96 85 -.09 84 88 98 87 -.09 86 90 97 91 -.24
p.score Mahal broad 74 87 98 77 -.05 79 87 94 79 -.05 87 90 97 87 -.22
index p.score narrow 81 92 98 91 -.09 85 91 98 88 -.09 87 91 98 92 -.23
index p.score broad 75 90 98 84 -.04 83 90 91 79 -.04 89 91 97 87 -.20
index Mahal narrow 80 89 98 91 -.09 86 91 97 95 -.09 88 91 98 93 -.22
index Mahal broad 80 88 93 77 -.04 85 88 88 77 -.04 85 87 93 85 -.18
The ﬁrst three columns specify the sensitivity parameters. The ﬁrst column of each matching algorithm represents mean overall percent bias reduction,
the second is the mean reduction when the variable born in south is disregarded. The third and fourth display bias reduction in math scores and in
parents’ education, respectively. The ﬁfth column reports the diﬀerence in mean propensity scores between treated units before and after matching.
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are not in the sample for the whole nine-year period after college. In 1994, the last year
in the panel, some individuals – especially younger ones – are just in their, say, seventh
year after college.
The estimates of all tables indicate a clear upward trend in the eﬀects. While the
eﬀect of the bachelor’s degree (in short BA) on BA holders in the ﬁrst year after college
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, it rises up to 35% in the ninth year. Chapter 4
underscores that part of the increase can be explained by the fact that college graduates
accumulate experience more quickly after leaving college than high school graduates.
However, interaction between labor market experience and schooling does not appear to
be existent.
Estimation results for (α, β, γ) are omitted since they would occupy too much space
without gaining further insight. The results can easily be summarized as follows. αˆ
and γˆ are almost always positive in the ten years after college, βˆ oscillates around zero.
Nonetheless, never are they statistically signiﬁcant. Chapter 4 pools all ten years and ﬁnds
statistical signiﬁcance for αˆ and γˆ, i.e. math test scores seem to have some positive impact
on the eﬀect of a bachelor’s degree and individuals who receive their degree more recently
experience a higher eﬀect. In contrast, parents’ education appears to be negligible.
Table 2.6 is dedicated to the balancing properties of the matching algorithms. Since
there are numerous variables and ten years after college, i.e. ten stratiﬁcations, some
aggregate measures of balance are introduced to facilitate assessment. Tables in appendix
C report detailed results. First, an average over all percent bias reductions in each variable
and for each year after college is calculated. Then, the weighted average over all ten years
is reported under the heading “Mean”. The weights correspond to the number of strata in
each year. As can be seen in the appendix tables, the matching algorithms, particularly
the full ones, face severe problems in balancing the variable born in south, actually, they
even tend to worsen its balance. Therefore, the columns headed “-1” report the average
percent bias reduction disregarding born in south.
The third and fourth columns for each algorithm show mean percent bias reductions for
the presumably most important single variables math scores and parents’ education. Math
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scores exhibit the highest t-value in the probit estimation (appendix A). Also, they are
important determinants of wages as documented in other studies (Blackburn & Neu-
mark, 1993, or Murnane, Willett & Levy, 1995). Parents’ education exhibits the
second largest t-value. Finally, the last columns headed ∆pˆ display the propensity score
diﬀerence between treated individuals before and after matching. A negative sign points
to a systematic loss of treated units in the high end of the propensity score distribution
and, thus, to a possible bias in the estimates if the treatment eﬀect is heterogeneous.
Speciﬁc Comparisons
Optimal Vs. Greedy Full. The greedy full algorithm as constructed in this study
achieves to produce a more favorable, i.e. a more uniform, stratiﬁcation. This is expressed
by the mean and maximum number of units in strata consisting of more than one treated
which is smaller for greedy matching. The number of strata is slightly larger in the greedy
case, especially when calipers are broad. This pattern is more pronounced for index score
matching. Though, the estimates are not very distinct. As noted in Gu & Rosenbaum
(1993), this might be because greedy and full use the same individuals even though the
speciﬁc stratiﬁcation diﬀers. As a result, a good greedy algorithm need not be inferior to
the optimal one.14
Surprisingly, overall balance is somewhat superior for greedy full matching, too. The
main reason is that the optimal one faces severe problems in balancing the variable born in
south. Disregarding this variable, balancing success is more or less equal.15 This ﬁnding
is in line with Gu & Rosenbaum (1993) who observe that when it comes to balance,
optimal matching seems to have no advantage over greedy matching. Yet, notice that
optimal matching tends to better balance math scores.
Full Vs. Pair Matching. Greedy pair matching is performed twenty times. The
14Alas, the greedy algorithm as programmed by the author consumes considerably more time than the
optimal – a factor between 50 and 100.
15A weakly signiﬁcant interaction between parents’ education and born in south has been included in the
probit estimation, but improvements were not attained; other interactions were statistically insigniﬁcant.
Moreover, exact matching on born in south reduced the matched sample size to roughly 80%, though,
the number of strata did not diminish much; estimates of the treatment eﬀects increased slightly.
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averages and standard deviations over all twenty repetitions are reported in the tables. It
produces approximately the same number of strata as greedy full matching, i.e. the eﬀec-
tive sample size is constant across algorithms, nevertheless, standard errors are smaller
for pair matching. This is because, in contrast with full matching, stratiﬁcation is most
uniform.
In case of pair matching, there is no reason to distinguish between the two treatment
eﬀect parameters for two reasons. First, there is only one weighting scheme for pair
matching and, second, since the majority of treated and untreated units are not matched,
on a priori grounds, identiﬁcation of the respective population parameters is doubtful
anyway. These doubts are substantiated when one considers ∆pˆ in table 2.6. As expected,
on the one hand, pair matching produces the most favorable balance but, on the other,
the loss of treated units with high propensity scores is dramatic.
This systematic loss may well be a reason why pair matching estimates are generally
lower than the full matching estimates of the eﬀect on the treated. Though, the diﬀerences
are small and statistically insigniﬁcant. Almost exclusively for Mahalanobis-within-caliper
distance are pair matching estimates lower than on-the-treated-eﬀect estimates and some-
times lower than the on-a-randomly-assigned-eﬀect estimates. Thus, the results do not
point to strong heterogeneity in the treatment eﬀects. Similarly, coeﬃcient estimates of
α – as noted above – are positive in all ten years but almost never signiﬁcantly so. In
such a case pair matching seems to be a superior strategy. However, large variation of the
results caused by the inherent randomness of the greedy algorithm should be overcome
by using an optimal pair matching approach. Alternatively, restrictions on the stratum
sizes might be imposed on full matching approaches in order to achieve a more uniform
stratiﬁcation.
Eﬀect on the Treated Vs. Eﬀect on a Randomly Assigned Person. The eﬀect
on a randomly assigned person appears to be lower than the eﬀect on the treated in almost
all speciﬁcations. The diﬀerence is never statistically signiﬁcant and might therefore be
interpreted as only weak evidence in favor of heterogeneous eﬀects. Yet, the results do
not contradict the hypothesis that individuals opt for higher education taking account
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of their expected gains from education inter alia. Results of the eﬀect on a randomly
assigned person are more or less of the same magnitude as results of the greedy pair
matching. When Mahalanobis is within-caliper distance greedy pair matching estimates
are, on average, lower; when the propensity score distance is chosen they are higher.
Narrow Vs. Broad Calipers. Broad calipers produce more strata because less
treated and untreated units have to be dropped. The diﬀerence in the number of strata
is more pronounced when the Mahalanobis distance is used within calipers. Nonetheless,
estimates do not diﬀer systematically and standard errors are not lower for the broad
calipers case because the larger amount of strata is oﬀset by a substantially reduced
uniformity across strata, especially for optimal full matching. It is not oﬀset for pair
matching where standard errors do decrease.
For the full matching algorithms, percent bias reduction is larger for narrow than for
broad calipers. For pair matching, the discrepancy is negligible. However, once born in
south is disregarded, narrow and broad calipers produce an overall balance close to equal.
A clear distinction can be made with respect to ∆pˆ; narrow calipers put more obstacles
on high-score treated individuals in ﬁnding an adequate control which is why ∆pˆ is more
negative.
Within-Caliper Distance: Score Vs. Mahalanobis. While estimation results
of the eﬀect on the treated do not diﬀer much, estimates of the eﬀect on a randomly
assigned person are higher using the Mahalanobis distance. The reason for this divergence
is unclear. Moreover, the Mahalanobis case tends to supply more strata, though based on
the same number of treated and untreated units. This observation is especially evident for
index score matching. As a result, standard errors tend to be lower in the Mahalanobis
case.
Matching on the Propensity Score Vs. on the Index. The most striking dif-
ference is the number of controls used for stratiﬁcation. Index score matching drops
numerous untreated units consistent with table 2.1. For instance, in the ﬁrst year, index
matching utilizes over 200 controls less than propensity score matching. Because of that,
it is dubious whether index matching really identiﬁes the eﬀect on a randomly assigned
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person. Though, a clear distinction between estimates can hardly be established except
for the fact that standard errors of the randomly-assigned-eﬀect estimates are lower for
index matching. The reason is that the mean number of controls in low-score strata,
which typically consist of numerous controls, is smaller for index than for propensity
score matching. With regard to balance there seems to be no discrepancy noteworthy.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter addresses the sensitivity with respect to various decisions that have to be
made in practical implementations of the method of matching. Observational data from
the NLSY79 are employed for illustration. The treatment group comprises individuals
who obtained a bachelor’s degree while controls are drawn from the pool of individuals
with only a high school diploma. It turns out that selection into college is extremely
strong. Thus, bias in the relevant covariates prior to treatment is unusually large and
matching becomes a serious challenge.
Sensitivity of the decision parameters as to the estimated treatment eﬀects appears to
be rather modest. Systematic variation in the estimates caused by variation of the distance
measures between treated and untreated units or by altering matching algorithms is minor
and statistically insigniﬁcant. Therefore, one can generally conclude that the eﬀect of a
bachelor’s degree on BA holders is fairly low immediately after leaving college but rises
during the ﬁrst ten years after college completion. In the ninth year it approaches 30%.
Roughly 80% of the initial bias in the observable covariates is removed by full matching
algorithms and 87% by pair matching. However, the latter produces a matched sample
which excludes many high-score treated individuals.
A distinction is made between the eﬀect of treatment on the treated, i.e. the BA holder,
and the eﬀect on a randomly assigned person. Identiﬁcation of these two parameters is a
matter of applying the appropriate weighting scheme when averaging over single stratum
eﬀects. The two parameters might diﬀer if treatment eﬀects are heterogeneous. Results
suggest that the mean eﬀect on a treated person is somewhat larger than that on an
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average person. Yet, since the deviations are statistically imprecise there is only weak
evidence in favor of systematic heterogeneity. A full matching of all individuals automat-
ically delivers appropriate weighting schemes while additional distributional information
would be necessary for pair matching. Therefore, no distinction is made for the latter.
Pair matching estimates tend to be, on average, slightly lower than estimates of the mean
eﬀect on the treated. Although results are again very imprecise, they are in line with the
overall picture. Pair matching drops countless high-propensity-score treated individuals
and, therefore, yields estimates closer to the randomly-assigned-person estimates which
put more weight on low-score strata.
Alas, heterogeneity is too weak to unanimously favor full matching since its disad-
vantages clearly emerge. Full matching estimates are accompanied by relatively large
standard errors because the full stratiﬁcation is far from being as uniform as pair match-
ing. For example, the more strata consist of a large amount of treated units sharing
only one control the higher estimated standard errors of the on-the-treated-estimates are.
Surprisingly, the greedy full matching algorithm as proposed in this study achieves to
produce more uniformity across strata than its optimal counterpart.
However, greedy algorithms, speciﬁcally greedy pair, yield estimation results that de-
pend on the random initial order of records. This unpleasant disadvantage can easily be
overcome by using an optimal algorithm. The superior uniformity of the special greedy
full algorithm used here might also be copied by an optimal procedure when restrictions
on the maximum number of units within each stratum would be imposed or when the
caliper width would be reduced. See also Ming & Rosenbaum (2000) for a related
discussion. Further note that using the Mahalanobis distance within calipers generates
more strata from the same number of units than using the propensity score distance, in
other words, the ﬁrst constructs a more uniform stratiﬁcation.
Furthermore, matching on the linear index score might be preferred since it drops
numerous untreated units at the low end of the propensity score scale who would all
be used in matching on the propensity score. Dropping them helps generate a more
uniform stratiﬁcation with respect to the estimation of the randomly-assigned-eﬀect. For
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index matching, however, the distribution of matched controls across strata might not be
representative of the initial distribution in the comparison group anymore.
In sum, in ﬁnite samples with strong selection into treatment and substantial het-
erogeneity, there is a trade-oﬀ between bias and variance. To remove bias in covari-
ates between treatment and control group and, speciﬁcally, to maintain similarity of the
matched sample with the initial population, strata tend to be less uniform, thus increasing
the variance. On the other hand, a uniform stratiﬁcation, though, is accompanied by a
considerable reduction of the sample size, so bias might be severe. In contrast, from an
asymptotic point of view, removing bias would be the strictly recommended strategy. In
this study, pair matching has done a good job because heterogeneity does not seem to be
very important. Consequently, heterogeneity should be checked in empirical applications
with strong selection in order to be able to decide among certain matching algorithms.
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Appendix A: The Probit Estimations
Appendix A discusses the estimation of the propensity score by a probit model. Table
2.7 displays the results. The model includes several covariates that reﬂect socioeconomic
background and variables characterizing the high school career. Furthermore, it comprises
two ability variables: scores on math and auto and shop information tests (adjusted for
age). The ﬁrst tend to capture academic while the second tend to capture non-academic
abilities. See also the classiﬁcation in Blackburn & Neumark (1995). Two variables
are generated in the following way. Parents’ education is the mean of the father’s and
mother’s education, it is the mother’s if the father’s is missing and vice versa. The
variable parents’ occupational status is a binary variable indicating the social status of
parents’ occupation – high or low – which is the mean of the mother’s and father’s status.
It is only the father’s if the mother’s is missing and vice versa.
Table 2.7: Probit Estimation Results.
Variables Mean Coeﬀ. t-value P-value
Black 0.263 0.274 1.971 0.049
Hispanic 0.091 0.256 1.443 0.149
Math test scores -0.442 0.098 15.384 0.000
Auto and shop test scores 4.911 -0.018 -2.857 0.004
Attended private school 0.052 0.432 2.397 0.017
Ever expelled or suspended from school 0.272 -0.536 -4.314 0.000
High school curriculum: college preparatory 0.288 0.972 6.392 0.000
High school curriculum: general program 0.509 0.358 2.439 0.015
Parents’ education 11.185 0.154 6.857 0.000
Parents’ occup. status high when resp. was 14 0.129 0.432 2.361 0.018
Number of siblings 3.600 -0.065 -2.796 0.005
Born in the south 0.365 0.346 3.333 0.001
Constant 1.000 -3.142 -9.750 0.000
Observations 1792
χ2(12) 1046.4
Overall p-value 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.518
All variables with “yes/no” answers are dummy variables with 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no”.
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Except for Hispanic all variables are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
Family income is not included because (a) there are countless missing observations and
(b) it is not signiﬁcant at a 70%-level. This surprising result might be explained by the
fact that other socioeconomic background variables seem to capture already the eﬀect
of family income. Furthermore, note that the more variables are included, especially
insigniﬁcant ones, the more missing observations occur which should be avoided in a
data-hungry non-parametric technique such as matching.
Apparently, selection into college is fairly strong conﬁrmed by other studies, too.
Ashenfelter & Rouse (1998a) report that (observed and unobserved) family back-
ground explains about 60% of the variance in schooling attainment andMurnane, Wil-
lett & Levy (1995) assert that math test scores are a strong predictor of subsequent
educational attainment.
Appendix B: An Alternative “One-Step-Model”
Estimation of the parameter vector δ as outlined in this chapter is a two-step approach.
This appendix concentrates on the mean eﬀect of treatment on the treated and presents
a one-step approach to be compared to the two-step approach. It clariﬁes why the latter
is preferred in this chapter.
The Two-Step Approach
In the ﬁrst step, the stratum eﬀects ∆s are estimated for all s according to the following
equation
Rsi = rsi +∆sZsi. (2.8)
rsi is the outcome of individual i in stratum s if there is no treatment eﬀect. It can be
written as the sum of a stratum eﬀect rs and an individual eﬀect r˜si with
∑ns
i=1 r˜si = 0,
thus, rsi = rs + r˜si.
Introduce some useful notation. First, deﬁne a stratum-to-individual-transformation-
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matrix Γ
Γ =


1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 · · · 0
0 · · · 0 1 · · · 1 · · · 0 · · · 0
. . .
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 1 · · · 1


′
of format N×S that contains 1’s in the sth column if individual i, i.e. row i, belongs to
stratum s and 0’s otherwise. Furthermore, deﬁne S×1-vectors r and ∆ consisting of rs
and ∆s, respectively. Let R be an N×1-vector of all individual Rsi ordered by strata,
likewise, r˜ be the N×1-vector of r˜si, and, ﬁnally, let Z be an N×N -diagonal matrix with
diagonal elements Zsi ordered by strata. Then, equation (2.8) can be rewritten as
R = Γr+ ZΓ∆+ r˜,
and
∆ˆ = (Γ′ZMΓZΓ)−1Γ′ZMΓR,
withMΓ being the “residual maker” in each stratum: MΓ = IN−Γ(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′, IN being the
N×N -identity matrix. Deﬁne Q = (Γ′ZMΓZΓ) which turns out to be an S×S-diagonal
matrix with diagonal elements ms(ns−ms)
ns
. It can be shown that ∆ˆs =
ns
ms(ns−ms)(Z
′
sRs −
msR¯s) reproducing equation (2.1).
In the second step, the estimated stratum eﬀects are regressed on (As, Fs, Ys), and a
constant to obtain an estimate for δ. Let (As, Fs, Ys) be measured as deviations from
their overall means. The regression is weighted by stratum weights ωs = ms, ignoring the
NLSY sample weights. Further let W be the S×S-diagonal matrix of weights and H be
the S×4-matrix (1 A F Y), then δ is estimated by
δˆ = (H ′WH)−1H ′W∆ˆ.
The One-Step Approach
A formulation that incorporates all steps in one leads to the following equation
Rsi = rs + (τ + αAs + βFs + γYs)Zsi + r˜si,
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alternatively,
R = Γr+ ZΓHδ + r˜.
An estimate for δ is
δˆ1 = (H
′Γ′ZMΓZΓH)−1H ′Γ′ZMΓR
= (H ′QH)−1H ′Q∆ˆ 	= δˆ
Consistency of the estimates. Since δˆ = (H ′WH)−1H ′WQ−1Γ′ZMΓ(ZΓHδ +
r˜) = δ + (H ′WH)−1H ′WQ−1Γ′Z r˜, δˆ is consistent if 1
S
(H ′WH) does not vanish as S
tends to inﬁnity and if 1
S
H ′WQ−1Γ′Z r˜ tends to zero. WQ−1 is an S×S-diagonal matrix
with elements 1
1−ms/ns which remain ﬁnite provided the relation between treated and
control individuals remains ﬁnite. Likewise, δˆ1 = (H
′QH)−1H ′Γ′ZMΓ(ZΓHδ + r˜) =
δ + (H ′QH)−1H ′Γ′Z r˜; δˆ1 is consistent if 1S (H
′QH) does not vanish and 1
S
H ′Γ′Z r˜ tends
to zero as S →∞.
Variances. Consider δˆ − δ = (H ′WH)−1H ′WQ−1Γ′Z r˜. Note that Γ′Z r˜ is an S×1-
vector of the elements
∑ns
i=1 Zsi(rsi−rs) and V ar (
∑ns
i=1 Zsirsi) =
ms(ns−ms)
ns(ns−1)
∑ns
i=1(rsi−r¯s)2.
Thus,
V ar(δˆ) = (H ′WH)−1H ′WV (δ)WH(H ′WH)−1,
with the S×S-diagonal matrix V (δ) and diagonal elements ns
ms(ns−ms)(ns−1)
∑ns
i=1(rsi− rs)2
as already mentioned in equation (2.6). Analogously, the variance of δˆ1 turns out
V ar(δˆ1) = (H
′QH)−1H ′QV (δ)QH(H ′QH)−1.
Why the Two-Step Estimator Is Preferred? While δˆ weights the strata by the
number of its treated ms, δˆ1 weights each stratum by
ms(ns−ms)
ns
. If ms is either 1 or
ns − 1, the weights become 1 − 1ns which increase with the number of individuals ns in
stratum s irrespective of how many treated units there are. However, when focus is on
the mean eﬀect of treatment on the treated each stratum should be weighted according to
the number of its treated units, consequently, the two-step procedure is to be preferred.
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Appendix C: Detailed Balance of Covariates
Tables 2.8 to 2.11 display the balancing properties for all covariates and for all eight
sensitivity speciﬁcations. They show the means of covariates by treatment status before
and after matching. The latter are weighted averages over all stratiﬁcations of the ten
years after college. The weights correspond to the number of strata in each year. The
means are compared by a conventional t-test under the assumption of equal variances in
both groups. A “1” indicates that the means are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Fractions are
due to averaging. Moreover, the percent bias reduction is shown for each variable and as
an average over all variables. Since the full matching algorithms face severe problems in
balancing the variable born in south, the last row displays the average over all variables
when it is excluded.
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Table 2.8: Balance of Covariates: Matching on the p.score, Within calipers: p.score.
Initially Optimal Full Greedy Full Greedy Pair
C T t C T t % C T t % C T t %
Narrow Caliper
Propensity score 0.11 0.67 0 0.57 0.58 1.00 99 0.57 0.58 1.00 99 0.43 0.43 1.00 100
Index score -1.77 0.61 0 0.17 0.21 1.00 99 0.16 0.21 1.00 98 -0.28 -0.27 1.00 100
Black 0.30 0.16 0 0.15 0.15 1.00 100 0.15 0.15 1.00 100 0.23 0.23 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.10 0.07 1 0.04 0.04 1.00 100 0.04 0.04 1.00 100 0.06 0.06 1.00 100
Age 17.50 17.65 1 17.89 17.85 1.00 70 17.90 17.85 1.00 63 17.82 17.79 1.00 75
Year of high school diploma 79.37 78.74 0 78.57 78.54 1.00 94 78.56 78.54 1.00 95 78.64 78.66 1.00 95
Math test scores -3.95 10.02 0 8.35 8.36 1.00 98 8.20 8.35 1.00 98 5.25 5.02 1.00 97
Auto+shop test scores 3.88 7.98 0 7.95 7.78 1.00 94 8.02 7.79 1.00 94 7.62 6.54 1.00 73
Attended private school 0.03 0.12 0 0.11 0.09 1.00 80 0.11 0.09 1.00 79 0.08 0.08 1.00 83
Expelled or susp. from school 0.33 0.10 0 0.14 0.11 0.71 88 0.16 0.11 0.71 82 0.15 0.14 1.00 94
Curriculum: college prepar. 0.16 0.67 0 0.60 0.57 1.00 93 0.62 0.57 1.00 91 0.49 0.46 1.00 94
Curriculum: general 0.59 0.28 0 0.33 0.37 1.00 86 0.31 0.37 1.00 82 0.41 0.44 1.00 88
Highest grades of parents 10.50 13.21 0 12.44 12.59 1.00 89 12.40 12.60 0.55 88 11.93 12.03 1.00 93
Occupation parents high 0.08 0.29 0 0.24 0.22 1.00 94 0.24 0.23 1.00 92 0.18 0.18 1.00 94
Number of siblings 3.92 2.64 0 2.80 2.75 1.00 90 2.79 2.75 1.00 91 2.93 2.82 1.00 88
Born in south 0.38 0.33 1 0.25 0.30 0.88 -27 0.27 0.30 1.00 18 0.31 0.34 1.00 17
Mean percent bias reduction 82 84 85
– born in south excluded 90 89 90
Broad Caliper
Propensity score 0.11 0.67 0 0.61 0.62 1.00 98 0.59 0.62 1.00 95 0.43 0.45 1.00 98
Index score -1.77 0.61 0 0.27 0.37 1.00 96 0.20 0.37 0.31 93 -0.25 -0.22 1.00 98
Black 0.30 0.16 0 0.17 0.17 1.00 100 0.17 0.17 1.00 100 0.24 0.24 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.10 0.07 1 0.04 0.04 1.00 100 0.04 0.04 1.00 100 0.08 0.08 1.00 100
Age 17.50 17.65 1 17.91 17.89 1.00 73 17.97 17.89 1.00 45 17.83 17.82 1.00 79
Year of high school diploma 79.37 78.74 0 78.57 78.50 1.00 89 78.53 78.50 1.00 93 78.63 78.63 1.00 94
Math test scores -3.95 10.02 0 8.97 9.04 1.00 98 8.34 9.05 0.95 95 5.33 5.24 1.00 98
Auto+shop test scores 3.88 7.98 0 7.14 7.63 1.00 88 7.20 7.65 1.00 89 7.34 6.44 1.00 78
Attended private school 0.03 0.12 0 0.10 0.10 1.00 78 0.11 0.10 1.00 78 0.08 0.08 1.00 83
Expelled or susp. from school 0.33 0.10 0 0.13 0.11 0.83 89 0.14 0.11 0.71 86 0.14 0.15 1.00 93
Curriculum: college prepar. 0.16 0.67 0 0.65 0.63 1.00 94 0.65 0.63 1.00 94 0.50 0.47 1.00 94
Curriculum: general 0.59 0.28 0 0.29 0.32 1.00 88 0.28 0.32 1.00 84 0.40 0.43 1.00 90
Highest grades of parents 10.50 13.21 0 12.36 12.76 0.37 85 12.25 12.76 0.37 81 11.88 12.10 1.00 91
Occupation parents high 0.08 0.29 0 0.23 0.24 1.00 91 0.24 0.24 1.00 93 0.18 0.17 1.00 93
Number of siblings 3.92 2.64 0 2.79 2.76 1.00 90 2.77 2.76 1.00 91 2.93 2.82 1.00 88
Born in south 0.38 0.33 1 0.23 0.32 0.11 -99 0.25 0.32 0.76 -37 0.32 0.34 1.00 38
Mean percent bias reduction 76 78 87
– born in south excluded 89 87 91
For reasons of parsimony, weighted averages over all ten years after college are shown. Weights correspond to the number of strata in each year after
college. C denotes the control or comparison units while T represents treated units, t indicates whether a t-test accepts balance of covariates (t = 1),
and % represents the percent bias reduction. The last two rows report the simple average over all single percent bias reductions excluding those of the
propensity and index score.
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Table 2.9: Balance of Covariates: Matching on the p.score, Within calipers: Mahalanobis.
Initially Optimal Full Greedy Full Greedy Pair
C T t C T t % C T t % C T t %
Narrow Caliper
Propensity score 0.11 0.67 0 0.57 0.58 1.00 99 0.57 0.58 1.00 98 0.43 0.43 1.00 99
Index score -1.77 0.61 0 0.17 0.21 1.00 98 0.15 0.21 1.00 98 -0.30 -0.27 1.00 99
Black 0.30 0.16 0 0.15 0.15 1.00 100 0.15 0.15 1.00 100 0.23 0.23 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.10 0.07 1 0.04 0.04 1.00 100 0.04 0.04 1.00 100 0.06 0.06 1.00 100
Age 17.50 17.65 1 17.89 17.85 1.00 69 17.92 17.84 1.00 49 17.82 17.77 1.00 63
Year of high school diploma 79.37 78.74 0 78.57 78.54 1.00 94 78.55 78.54 1.00 96 78.63 78.68 1.00 91
Math test scores -3.95 10.02 0 8.83 8.36 1.00 96 8.19 8.38 1.00 98 5.31 5.04 1.00 97
Auto+shop test scores 3.88 7.98 0 8.44 7.78 1.00 84 7.99 7.77 1.00 93 7.82 6.56 0.98 69
Attended private school 0.03 0.12 0 0.09 0.09 1.00 80 0.11 0.09 1.00 78 0.07 0.08 1.00 83
Expelled or susp. from school 0.33 0.10 0 0.15 0.11 0.71 86 0.15 0.11 0.71 83 0.16 0.14 1.00 93
Curriculum: college prepar. 0.16 0.67 0 0.62 0.57 1.00 89 0.61 0.57 1.00 91 0.48 0.46 1.00 95
Curriculum: general 0.59 0.28 0 0.32 0.37 0.88 83 0.32 0.37 1.00 83 0.44 0.44 1.00 94
Highest grades of parents 10.50 13.21 0 12.23 12.59 0.37 85 12.36 12.59 0.45 87 11.82 12.04 1.00 91
Occupation parents high 0.08 0.29 0 0.20 0.22 1.00 89 0.24 0.22 1.00 93 0.17 0.17 1.00 94
Number of siblings 3.92 2.64 0 2.88 2.75 0.78 87 2.85 2.75 1.00 88 2.77 2.82 1.00 93
Born in south 0.38 0.33 1 0.25 0.30 0.88 -10 0.27 0.30 0.88 34 0.31 0.33 1.00 35
Mean percent bias reduction 81 84 86
– born in south excluded 88 88 90
Broad Caliper
Propensity score 0.11 0.67 0 0.60 0.62 1.00 95 0.58 0.62 0.88 93 0.42 0.45 1.00 95
Index score -1.77 0.61 0 0.21 0.36 0.89 93 0.16 0.36 0.13 91 -0.33 -0.20 1.00 95
Black 0.30 0.16 0 0.17 0.17 1.00 100 0.17 0.17 1.00 100 0.24 0.24 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.10 0.07 1 0.04 0.04 1.00 100 0.04 0.04 1.00 100 0.08 0.08 1.00 100
Age 17.50 17.65 1 17.95 17.89 1.00 61 17.97 17.89 1.00 45 17.85 17.82 1.00 68
Year of high school diploma 79.37 78.74 0 78.57 78.50 1.00 88 78.53 78.50 1.00 94 78.63 78.62 1.00 93
Math test scores -3.95 10.02 0 8.94 9.04 1.00 98 8.24 9.04 0.95 94 4.96 5.36 1.00 97
Auto+shop test scores 3.88 7.98 0 7.73 7.63 1.00 95 7.52 7.63 1.00 96 7.32 6.48 1.00 79
Attended private school 0.03 0.12 0 0.08 0.10 1.00 78 0.11 0.10 0.88 77 0.07 0.08 1.00 82
Expelled or susp. from school 0.33 0.10 0 0.13 0.11 0.83 90 0.14 0.11 0.71 87 0.14 0.15 1.00 94
Curriculum: college prepar. 0.16 0.67 0 0.68 0.63 1.00 90 0.64 0.63 1.00 95 0.47 0.48 1.00 96
Curriculum: general 0.59 0.28 0 0.26 0.32 0.76 79 0.29 0.32 1.00 88 0.44 0.43 1.00 93
Highest grades of parents 10.50 13.21 0 12.14 12.76 0.17 77 12.18 12.76 0.36 79 11.75 12.11 0.90 87
Occupation parents high 0.08 0.29 0 0.20 0.24 0.80 80 0.23 0.24 1.00 91 0.17 0.18 1.00 93
Number of siblings 3.92 2.64 0 2.89 2.76 0.89 89 2.80 2.76 1.00 91 2.82 2.81 1.00 93
Born in south 0.38 0.33 1 0.23 0.32 0.00 -92 0.25 0.32 0.77 -35 0.32 0.34 1.00 45
Mean percent bias reduction 74 79 87
– born in south excluded 87 87 90
For reasons of parsimony, weighted averages over all ten years after college are shown. Weights correspond to the number of strata in each year after
college. C denotes the control or comparison units while T represents treated units, t indicates whether a t-test accepts balance of covariates (t = 1),
and % represents the percent bias reduction. The last two rows report the simple average over all single percent bias reductions excluding those of the
propensity and index score.
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Table 2.10: Balance of Covariates: Matching on the index, Within calipers: index.
Initially Optimal Full Greedy Full Greedy Pair
C T t C T t % C T t % C T t %
Narrow Caliper
Propensity score 0.11 0.67 0 0.57 0.58 1.00 99 0.56 0.58 1.00 97 0.43 0.44 1.00 98
Index score -1.77 0.61 0 0.18 0.21 1.00 99 0.14 0.21 1.00 97 -0.26 -0.23 1.00 99
Black 0.30 0.16 0 0.16 0.16 1.00 100 0.16 0.16 1.00 100 0.24 0.24 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.10 0.07 1 0.05 0.05 1.00 100 0.05 0.05 1.00 100 0.08 0.08 1.00 100
Age 17.50 17.65 1 17.90 17.89 1.00 82 17.92 17.89 1.00 74 17.84 17.83 1.00 79
Year of high school diploma 79.37 78.74 0 78.56 78.50 1.00 91 78.57 78.50 1.00 89 78.62 78.61 1.00 94
Math test scores -3.95 10.02 0 8.34 8.27 1.00 98 8.09 8.27 1.00 98 5.26 5.25 1.00 98
Auto+shop test scores 3.88 7.98 0 7.73 7.58 1.00 92 7.73 7.58 1.00 92 7.40 6.47 1.00 76
Attended private school 0.03 0.12 0 0.10 0.10 1.00 84 0.11 0.10 1.00 82 0.08 0.08 0.99 83
Expelled or susp. from school 0.33 0.10 0 0.13 0.12 0.95 90 0.14 0.12 0.83 90 0.14 0.15 1.00 93
Curriculum: college prepar. 0.16 0.67 0 0.61 0.58 1.00 93 0.61 0.58 1.00 93 0.50 0.47 1.00 93
Curriculum: general 0.59 0.28 0 0.32 0.36 0.88 85 0.32 0.36 1.00 85 0.40 0.44 1.00 88
Highest grades of parents 10.50 13.21 0 12.32 12.53 0.88 91 12.23 12.53 0.45 88 11.88 12.06 1.00 92
Occupation parents high 0.08 0.29 0 0.23 0.23 1.00 95 0.23 0.23 1.00 95 0.18 0.18 1.00 94
Number of siblings 3.92 2.64 0 2.80 2.77 1.00 92 2.79 2.77 1.00 91 2.92 2.84 1.00 91
Born in south 0.38 0.33 1 0.24 0.31 0.58 -59 0.28 0.31 1.00 18 0.33 0.35 1.00 41
Mean percent bias reduction 81 85 87
– born in south excluded 92 91 91
Broad Caliper
Propensity score 0.11 0.67 0 0.61 0.63 1.00 96 0.56 0.63 0.06 87 0.43 0.47 0.98 92
Index score -1.77 0.61 0 0.28 0.38 1.00 96 0.13 0.38 0.00 89 -0.25 -0.13 1.00 95
Black 0.30 0.16 0 0.17 0.17 1.00 100 0.17 0.17 1.00 100 0.23 0.23 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.10 0.07 1 0.06 0.06 1.00 100 0.06 0.06 1.00 100 0.09 0.09 1.00 100
Age 17.50 17.65 1 17.92 17.91 1.00 78 17.96 17.91 1.00 56 17.81 17.81 1.00 82
Year of high school diploma 79.37 78.74 0 78.55 78.47 1.00 87 78.53 78.48 1.00 92 78.64 78.61 1.00 94
Math test scores -3.95 10.02 0 9.09 9.19 1.00 98 7.95 9.19 0.55 91 5.48 5.93 1.00 97
Auto+shop test scores 3.88 7.98 0 7.34 7.71 1.00 91 7.84 7.72 1.00 97 7.74 6.75 1.00 76
Attended private school 0.03 0.12 0 0.10 0.10 1.00 76 0.10 0.10 1.00 86 0.08 0.08 0.99 85
Expelled or susp. from school 0.33 0.10 0 0.12 0.11 0.83 88 0.13 0.11 0.76 91 0.14 0.15 1.00 94
Curriculum: college prepar. 0.16 0.67 0 0.66 0.63 1.00 94 0.63 0.63 1.00 97 0.50 0.49 1.00 97
Curriculum: general 0.59 0.28 0 0.29 0.32 1.00 89 0.30 0.32 1.00 93 0.42 0.43 1.00 94
Highest grades of parents 10.50 13.21 0 12.31 12.75 0.29 84 12.18 12.76 0.25 79 11.85 12.17 0.82 87
Occupation parents high 0.08 0.29 0 0.23 0.24 1.00 93 0.23 0.24 1.00 93 0.18 0.18 1.00 94
Number of siblings 3.92 2.64 0 2.77 2.79 1.00 91 2.75 2.78 1.00 92 2.92 2.80 0.99 86
Born in south 0.38 0.33 1 0.22 0.32 0.00 -118 0.27 0.32 1.00 -5 0.33 0.34 1.00 59
Mean percent bias reduction 75 83 89
– born in south excluded 90 90 91
For reasons of parsimony, weighted averages over all ten years after college are shown. Weights correspond to the number of strata in each year after
college. C denotes the control or comparison units while T represents treated units, t indicates whether a t-test accepts balance of covariates (t = 1),
and % represents the percent bias reduction. The last two rows report the simple average over all single percent bias reductions excluding those of the
propensity and index score.
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Table 2.11: Balance of Covariates: Matching on the index, Within calipers: Mahalanobis.
Initially Optimal Full Greedy Full Greedy Pair
C T t C T t % C T t % C T t %
Narrow Caliper
Propensity score 0.11 0.67 0 0.56 0.58 1.00 97 0.55 0.58 1.00 95 0.43 0.45 1.00 96
Index score -1.77 0.61 0 0.15 0.21 1.00 98 0.11 0.21 1.00 96 -0.27 -0.21 1.00 98
Black 0.30 0.16 0 0.16 0.16 1.00 100 0.16 0.16 1.00 100 0.23 0.23 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.10 0.07 1 0.05 0.05 1.00 100 0.05 0.05 1.00 100 0.08 0.08 1.00 100
Age 17.50 17.65 1 17.91 17.89 1.00 79 17.93 17.89 1.00 72 17.85 17.82 1.00 71
Year of high school diploma 79.37 78.74 0 78.60 78.50 1.00 84 78.55 78.50 1.00 92 78.62 78.62 1.00 95
Math test scores -3.95 10.02 0 8.48 8.27 1.00 98 7.86 8.27 1.00 97 5.39 5.39 1.00 98
Auto+shop test scores 3.88 7.98 0 8.20 7.58 1.00 84 7.76 7.57 1.00 92 7.46 6.51 0.99 76
Attended private school 0.03 0.12 0 0.08 0.10 1.00 83 0.11 0.09 1.00 82 0.08 0.09 1.00 81
Expelled or susp. from school 0.33 0.10 0 0.13 0.12 0.83 91 0.14 0.12 0.82 90 0.15 0.15 1.00 95
Curriculum: college prepar. 0.16 0.67 0 0.63 0.58 0.88 89 0.60 0.58 1.00 95 0.46 0.47 1.00 96
Curriculum: general 0.59 0.28 0 0.30 0.36 0.88 80 0.32 0.37 1.00 86 0.45 0.44 1.00 94
Highest grades of parents 10.50 13.21 0 12.18 12.53 0.37 86 12.22 12.53 0.37 88 11.85 12.07 1.00 92
Occupation parents high 0.08 0.29 0 0.21 0.23 1.00 91 0.23 0.23 1.00 95 0.17 0.18 1.00 93
Number of siblings 3.92 2.64 0 2.89 2.77 1.00 89 2.78 2.77 1.00 93 2.74 2.83 1.00 92
Born in south 0.38 0.33 1 0.26 0.31 0.88 -29 0.28 0.31 1.00 17 0.33 0.35 1.00 48
Mean percent bias reduction 80 86 88
– born in south excluded 89 91 91
Broad Caliper
Propensity score 0.11 0.67 0 0.56 0.63 0.05 87 0.53 0.63 0.00 83 0.42 0.49 0.05 87
Index score -1.77 0.61 0 0.13 0.38 0.00 89 0.05 0.38 0.00 86 -0.29 -0.07 0.14 91
Black 0.30 0.16 0 0.17 0.17 1.00 100 0.17 0.17 1.00 100 0.22 0.22 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.10 0.07 1 0.06 0.06 1.00 100 0.06 0.06 1.00 100 0.08 0.08 1.00 100
Age 17.50 17.65 1 17.97 17.91 1.00 62 17.98 17.91 1.00 52 17.83 17.80 1.00 76
Year of high school diploma 79.37 78.74 0 78.55 78.47 1.00 88 78.51 78.47 1.00 94 78.64 78.61 1.00 94
Math test scores -3.95 10.02 0 8.28 9.19 1.00 93 7.52 9.19 0.00 88 5.39 6.31 0.99 93
Auto+shop test scores 3.88 7.98 0 8.40 7.71 1.00 83 8.01 7.72 1.00 92 7.76 6.87 1.00 78
Attended private school 0.03 0.12 0 0.09 0.10 1.00 78 0.10 0.10 1.00 85 0.07 0.09 1.00 77
Expelled or susp. from school 0.33 0.10 0 0.12 0.11 0.88 93 0.14 0.11 0.82 90 0.12 0.15 1.00 87
Curriculum: college prepar. 0.16 0.67 0 0.64 0.63 1.00 99 0.58 0.63 0.88 90 0.43 0.50 0.96 86
Curriculum: general 0.59 0.28 0 0.30 0.32 1.00 94 0.34 0.32 1.00 93 0.48 0.42 0.98 80
Highest grades of parents 10.50 13.21 0 12.12 12.75 0.00 77 12.14 12.75 0.13 77 11.80 12.21 0.59 85
Occupation parents high 0.08 0.29 0 0.21 0.24 1.00 87 0.22 0.24 1.00 93 0.16 0.19 0.98 85
Number of siblings 3.92 2.64 0 2.87 2.79 1.00 91 2.73 2.79 1.00 93 2.83 2.81 1.00 94
Born in south 0.38 0.33 1 0.26 0.32 0.93 -30 0.29 0.32 1.00 37 0.35 0.34 1.00 59
Mean percent bias reduction 80 85 85
– born in south excluded 88 88 87
For reasons of parsimony, weighted averages over all ten years after college are shown. Weights correspond to the number of strata in each year after
college. C denotes the control or comparison units while T represents treated units, t indicates whether a t-test accepts balance of covariates (t = 1),
and % represents the percent bias reduction. The last two rows report the simple average over all single percent bias reductions excluding those of the
propensity and index score.
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An End
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Together with Christoph M. Schmidt
Abstract. Propensity score matching is a prominent strategy to reduce imbalance in
observational studies. However, if imbalance is considerable and the control reservoir is
small, either one has to match one control to several treated units or, alternatively, discard
many treated persons. The ﬁrst strategy tends to increase standard errors of the estimated
treatment eﬀects while the second might produce a matched sample that is not anymore
representative of the original one. As an alternative approach, this chapter argues to
carefully reconsider the selection equation upon which the propensity score estimates are
based. Often, all available variables that rule the selection process are included into the
selection equation. Yet, it would suﬃce to concentrate on only those exhibiting a large
impact on the outcome under scrutiny, as well. This would introduce more stochastic
noise making treatment and comparison group more similar. We assess the advantages
and disadvantages of the latter approach in a simulation study.
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3.1 Introduction
In contrast to a randomized experiment, in an observational study the treatment and
the comparison group usually diﬀer systematically in terms of their observable and un-
observable covariates. Yet, appropriate weighting schemes may provide for a convincing
evaluation strategy. In particular, balancing all observable covariates by the method of
matching allows the identiﬁcation of the mean eﬀect of treatment if the remaining unob-
servable covariates are irrelevant. Usually, the number of covariates is high, thus making
exact matching – in all likelihood – impossible. Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) suggest
to alternatively balance the one-dimensional propensity score, which is the conditional
probability to participate in treatment given all relevant covariates. They show that this
strategy, on average, achieves overall balance, thus circumventing the curse of dimension-
ality.
However, if treatment and comparison group diﬀer to a considerable extent, i.e. if selec-
tion into treatment is remarkably strong, achieving an acceptable balance will be diﬃcult.
A full matching using all treated and untreated units in the sample might produce many
strata consisting of one control and more than one treated unit. Generally, one would
like to achieve a stratiﬁcation which is more uniform. Uniform stratiﬁcations tend to
produce smaller standard errors of the matching estimates. See, for instance, Chapter 2
and Dehejia & Wahba (1998) whose matching is far from producing a uniform strati-
ﬁcation because treated units with high propensity scores hardly ﬁnd adequate controls.
Alternatively, pair matching tends to discard the majority of treated individuals at the
high end of the propensity score scale. As a result, it restricts evaluation of the treatment
eﬀect to individuals with low and medium propensity scores. If eﬀects are diﬀerent for
diﬀerent locations on the propensity score scale pair matching estimates will be biased.
This chapter argues to carefully reconsider the selection equation upon which the
propensity score estimates are based. It is common practice to include all available vari-
ables that might rule the selection process, with the objective of capturing the selection
decision precisely. Yet, we will argue in this chapter that, if selection turns out to be ex-
tremely strong, one should better concentrate on only those variables with a large impact
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on both the selection and the outcome under scrutiny. This procedure increases the ran-
dom part of the participation process – the whole approach rests on suﬃcient randomness
being retained after deriving individuals’ propensity score. Alas, a consistent estimation
of the propensity score might require including into the selection equation variables which
rule the selection process but which are excluded from or only play a minor role in the
outcome equation.
In contrast to our arguments, current applied research emphasizes the importance of
consistent estimation. For instance, Lechner (1999, 2000) performs and recommends
several speciﬁcation tests to examine whether a probit model is adequate for describing
the selection decision. Chapter 2 includes into the probit model several variables that
might determine the selection. Heckman, Ichimura & Todd (1997: section 8) choose
predictor variables to maximize the within-sample correct prediction rates. Although a
thorough understanding of the selection process might in itself be an important contribu-
tion, it is not the main objective of propensity score matching for identifying the mean
eﬀect of treatment. At best, it is a side eﬀect. What is to be achieved by propensity
score matching is balance of all relevant covariates as reﬂected, for example, in Dehejia
& Wahba’s (1998) pragmatic estimation strategy concerning the selection equation.
To put it otherwise, there is a trade-oﬀ between a consistent estimation of the selection
equation that probably balances irrelevant variables, too, and a pragmatic – but probably
inconsistent – estimation that concentrates on balancing the relevant variables only. We
assess this trade-oﬀ in a simulation study relying on the mean squared error criterion. The
next section discusses matching as an evaluation strategy and, in particular, outlines the
idea behind propensity score matching. Section 3 presents the data generating processes
and the dimensions of the simulation study while section 4 explains the algorithm used for
matching. Section 5 is dedicated to results for some interesting parameter constellations
and the last section summarizes the ﬁndings and oﬀers recommendations for applied
research.
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3.2 The Matching Approach
In this section, the framework and the idea of propensity score matching are brieﬂy
discussed. Rosenbaum (1995), Heckman, LaLonde & Smith (1999), and Schmidt
(1999) provide a thorough overview of estimation strategies via matching. Let R1i denote
the potential response of individual i under the treatment state and R0i the potential
response if i receives no treatment. Furthermore, letDi denote a binary variable indicating
treatment status, thus, Ri = DiR
1
i +(1−Di)R0i is the observed outcome. This framework
has become known as the potential outcome approach to causality suggested by Roy
(1951), Rubin (1974, 1977), and Holland (1986). It requires that the response of an
individual be independent of the decisions of all other individuals. This implies that there
are only two potential outcomes, namely R0i and R
1
i , one for the personal state Di = 0,
and one for Di = 1, respectively. There are no further potential outcomes depending on
the assignment of any other individual. This requirement is often referred to as stable
unit treatment value assumption (sutva, see Rubin, 1986).
The individual treatment eﬀect is δi = R
1
i −R0i which, however, is not observable since
either R1i or R
0
i is missing. Alternatively, one might focus on the mean eﬀect of treatment
on the treated individuals
IE(δi|Di = 1) = IE(R1i |Di = 1)− IE(R0i |Di = 1). (3.1)
Yet, while the ﬁrst expectation IE(R1i |Di = 1) can be identiﬁed in the subsample of the
treatment group, the counterfactual expectation IE(R0i |Di = 1) is not identiﬁable without
invoking further assumptions.
Somehow one has to rely on the untreated units (Di = 0) of the comparison group to
obtain information on the counterfactual outcome of the treated in the no-treatment state.
A simple replacement of IE(R0i |Di = 1) by IE(R0i |Di = 0) is unlikely to be the appropriate
strategy, though, since treated and untreated units tend to diﬀer considerably in their
characteristics that determine the outcome if they themselves select into treatment. An
ideal randomized experiment solves this problem, see Heckman (1996) or Schmidt,
Baltussen & Sauerborn (1999). It generates a treatment and a control group by a
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randomization process ensuring exogenous selection into treatment and thus resulting, on
average, in balance of all covariates between treatment and control group, in particular
those determining outcome.
In contrast, in an observational study, where self-selection into treatment is typically
non-negligible, matching tries to mimic ex post a randomized experiment by stratifying
the sample of treated and untreated units with respect to covariates Xi that rule both the
selection into treatment and the outcome under study. Such a stratiﬁcation eliminates
selection bias provided all variables Xi are observed and balanced. In this case, each
stratum would represent a separate small randomized experiment and simple diﬀerences
between treated and controls would provide an unbiased estimate of the treatment eﬀect.
This technique does not require linearity, parametric, or distributional assumptions.
Formally, assume that the response R0i is conditionally independent of Di given Xi
yielding IE(R0i |Xi, Di = 1) = IE(R0i |Xi, Di = 0). Moreover, assume IP(Di = 0|Xi = x) >
0 for all x which guarantees that, with positive probability, there are untreated units for
each x. The data generating processes of the simulation presented in the next section are
such that these requirements for matching will be fulﬁlled. The conditional mean response
of the treated under no treatment for a given X can thus be estimated by the conditional
mean response of the untreated under no treatment. The overall estimated mean eﬀect is
the weighted average over all stratum eﬀects. The stratum weights are proportional to
the number of treated units in the stratum in order to identify IE(δi|Di = 1).
However, in a ﬁnite sample balancing X is diﬃcult or even impossible if the vector
of observables is of high dimension. To escape this curse of dimensionality, Rosenbaum
& Rubin (1983) suggest to alternatively use the conditional probability to participate
in treatment p(x) = IP(Di = 1|Xi = x), the propensity score, for purposes of stratifying
the sample. They show that if R0i is independent of Di given Xi, R
0
i and Di are also
independent given p(Xi). Matching treated and untreated units with the same propensity
scores and placing them into one stratum means that the decision whether to participate
or not is random in such a stratum. The probability of participation in this stratum
equals the propensity score. Alas, some disadvantages accompany this strategy. First, the
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propensity score itself has to be estimated. Second, since it is a continuous variable exact
matches will hardly be achieved and a certain distance between treated and untreated
units has to be accepted nonetheless. Prominent candidates measuring the distance are
the diﬀerence in propensity scores or the Mahalanobis metric (Rubin, 1980).
The Idea Behind Propensity Score Matching
Let there be three kinds of covariates X, Y , and Z characterizing individuals. Generally,
both potential outcomes and the participation probability depend on all three variables.
For reasons of clarity of the argument further assume that Y and Z are binary and let
all considerations to follow be conditional on X. In sum, R0 = R0(Y, Z), R1 = R1(Y, Z),
and p = p(Y, Z).
There are four cells
Z = 0 Z = 1
Y = 0 n00 n01
Y = 1 n10 n11
each comprising njk individuals, j, k ∈ {0, 1}. For the sake of notational convenience,
abbreviate cell-wise expectations as follows
R1jk = IE(R
1|Y = j, Z = k,D = 1)
R0jk = IE(R
0|Y = j, Z = k,D = 1) = IE(R0|Y = j, Z = k,D = 0),
∆jk = R
1
jk − R0jk, and pjk denotes the propensity score in the corresponding cell. As a
result, the mean eﬀect ∆ (conditional on X) can be written
∆ =
1
nt
(∆00 p00 n00 +∆01 p01 n01 +∆10 p10 n10 +∆11 p11 n11) , (3.2)
nt denotes the total number of treated individuals, nt =
∑
pjknjk.
Selection on Z only. If the propensity score merely depends on Z, p00 = p10 = p.0
and p01 = p11 = p.1. This implies that Y can be expected to be already balanced and
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that cells with the same value of Z can be combined. Deﬁning n.k = n0k + n1k and the
eﬀect in the combined cell ∆.k = (∆0k n0k +∆1k n1k)/n.k, equation (3.2) reduces to
∆ =
1
nt
(∆.0 p.0 n.0 +∆.1 p.1 n.1) . (3.3)
The combination of cells that share the same propensity score is the very advantage of
propensity score matching with regard to exact covariate matching. On the one hand,
this means that individuals with diﬀerent characteristics might be matched, here with
diﬀerent values of Y . As a result, in ﬁnite samples where Y may still be unbalanced the
combined-cell-speciﬁc estimates of the treatment eﬀect may deviate from the true value.
On the other hand, combination of cells avoids that cells comprising only treated or only
untreated units have to be dropped. This would give rise to both larger variance of the
estimates and possibly a bias if the treatment eﬀect is heterogeneous and the loss of cells
is systematic.
Angrist & Hahn (1999) assess this bias-variance trade-oﬀ both theoretically and
by means of a simulation study. They argue that the very virtue of propensity score
estimation emerges when cells are ﬁnite. If cell sizes themselves increased beyond all
bounds propensity score matching would not be advantageous to exact matching, see
Hahn (1998).
Exclusion Restriction of Z. A symmetric special case arises if the outcome does
not but the selection does vary with Z. Consequently, cells with the same value of Z
could be combined even though they are subject to a diﬀerent selection process, i.e.
their propensity score diﬀers. Analogously to above, it follows that ∆00 = ∆01 = ∆0.
and ∆10 = ∆11 = ∆1., implying that imbalance of Z has no eﬀect on the estimation of
the outcome and that cells with the same value of Y can be combined without loss of
information. Let nk. = nk0 + nk1 and pk. = (pk0nk0 + pk1nk1)/nk., equation (3.2) can be
reduced to
∆ =
1
nt
(∆0. p0. n0. +∆1. p1. n1.) . (3.4)
If both cases are fulﬁlled, i.e. the outcome depends on Y and the selection process
is ruled by Z only, all four cells can be combined to one and ∆ is just the diﬀerence
between the unconditional responses of treated and untreated persons in the combined
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cell (merely deﬁned by X). This point reﬂects the fact that solely covariates which rule
both the outcome and the selection into treatment need to be balanced by matching.
Consequently, the question is raised whether the propensity score depending on X and Z
is the right measure to match upon or whether it might be better replaced by the marginal
propensity score depending solely on X. Matching on the latter would not unnecessarily
balance Z. Therefore, one could concentrate on the balance of X. This would probably
result in a more uniform stratiﬁcation of the sample. That is, one control would not be
matched to an overwhelmingly large number of treated persons.
In other words, omitting irrelevant variables increases randomness of the selection
process and diminishes its deterministic part. For example, if selection were completely
determined by certain known variables the propensity score of treated units would be 1
and that of untreated 0. Consequently, no reasonable strategy whatsoever would be able to
match controls to any given treated person. In contrast, the more variables determining
the selection process can be regarded as stochastic noise because their impact on the
outcome variable is negligible, the more randomness will enter the process and the easier
treated individuals will ﬁnd adequate controls. One might equate the Pseudo R2 of a
probit model as reﬂecting the degree of the selection determination.
3.3 The Data Generating Processes
As above, let Ri denote the outcome of individual i, i = 1, ..., n, and Di the binary
treatment indicator. On average, there will be 150 treated individuals and between 300
and 900 comparison units. The latter number is variable such that ﬁnding adequate
controls is more or less diﬃcult. The outcome is a linear function of confounding covari-
ates, (X1, X2, Y1, Y2, Z1, Z2), an individual treatment eﬀect δi, and normally distributed
stochastic noise εi ∼ N (0, 9)
Ri = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + β3Y1i + β4Y2i + β5Z1i + β6Z2i + δiDi + εi. (3.5)
The selection equation depends on the same covariates
Di = 1[α0 + α1X1i + α2X2i + α3Y1i + α4Y2i + α5Z1i + α6Z2i + ηi > 0] (3.6)
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where 1, the indicator function, is 1 if its argument holds and zero otherwise, and η ∼
N (0, 1) is standard normal.
The coeﬃcients of the Z-variables β5, β6 in the outcome equation (3.5) are compara-
tively small and, likewise, the same is assumed for those of the Y -variables in the selection
equation (3.6), α3, α4. This means that Y tends to be already partly balanced between
treated and untreated units and, furthermore, although Z will be highly unbalanced its
impact on the outcome is minor. The X-variables are the strongest predictors of both
the outcome and the selection and most eﬀort should therefore be spent on balancing
them. The simulation aims at examining the relative performance of the matching esti-
mator when the propensity score is estimated by means of a probit model including all
variables (X,Y, Z) and when based on the most relevant variables X only. Furthermore,
the treatment eﬀect δi depends on i reﬂecting heterogeneity in the following manner
δi = γ0 + γ1X1i + γ2X2i + γ3Y1i + γ4Y2i + γ5Z1i + γ6Z2i.
Depending on the parameter setting self-selection into treatment plays a more or less
important role resulting in more or less severe imbalance of covariates. If Y and Z are
of minor relevance, merely X should actively be balanced by matching on IP(D = 1|X).
However, IP(D = 1|X,Y, Z) follows a probit speciﬁcation in accordance with equation
(3.6)
IP(D = 1|X,Y, Z) = Φ(α0 + α1X1 + α2X2 + α3Y1 + α4Y2 + α5Z1 + α6Z2),
where Φ is the cumulative normal density function. Thus, a probit estimation using co-
variates X, Y , and Z – henceforth called the full probit – would yield consistent estimates
of individual propensity scores but matching on them would unnecessarily balance Z,
as well. On the other hand, a misspeciﬁed probit estimation merely on X – henceforth
called the partial probit – would indeed use only the most relevant variables but might
yield inconsistent estimates of IP(D = 1|X). The choice to proceed as if a probit model
held might therefore be one reason for bias in estimates of the mean treatment eﬀect.1
1Note, though, that consistent estimation of the coeﬃcients α in the probit model are not of any
interest. Furthermore, see Yatchew & Griliches (1984) for a discussion of speciﬁcation errors in
probit models.
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In general, the functional form of IP(D = 1|X) = IE(IE(D|X,Y, Z)|X) does not follow a
probit speciﬁcation
IP(D = 1|X) =
∫
Φ(α0 + α1X1 + α2X2 + α3y1 + α4y2 + α5z1 + α6z2) f(Y,Z)|X(y, z) d(y, z)
where f(Y,Z)|X is the conditional density of (Y1, Y2, Z1, Z2) given X.2 Another source of
bias arises if the impact of Y and Z on the outcome and on the selection are not zero.
In consequence, the questions of this chapter are (i) whether neglecting to balance
(Y, Z) produces a bias which is oﬀset by a larger variance of the estimates of the full
model, and (ii) whether the functional speciﬁcation error in estimating IP(D = 1|X) by
a probit model causes severe problems. We assess the trade-oﬀ on the basis of the mean
squared error criterion.
The described setup allows to perform simulations along ﬁve dimensions. First, the
impact of Z on R and of Y on D may be altered. To this end, β5, β6 and α3, α4 are
varied between 0 and 0.1 while the remaining α- and β-coeﬃcients are set equal to 1, and
the constant β0 equals 0. This strategy allows an exploration of the question whether
near exclusion restrictions carry the same implications as genuine exclusion restrictions.
Second, the average number of comparison units in the sample is gradually increased from
300 to 900 while the average number of treated is ﬁxed at 150 by accordingly adjusting
the constant α0. Thereby, we address the issue by how much the described trade-oﬀ is
altered as more and more comparison observations become available.
Third, the deterministic part of the selection equation is successively weakened which
means that all α-coeﬃcients except for α0 are simultaneously reduced until they reach 25%
of their original value. This shows how the degree of selection determination inﬂuences
the stratiﬁcation results. Fourth, eﬀects δi may be homogeneous or heterogeneous cor-
responding to whether γ = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) or γ = (0.5, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25).
The homogeneous case presents an interesting benchmark to compare the full and partial
probit model. Pair matching might be an unbiased and a more eﬃcient evaluation strat-
2Since it is not easy to solve the integral analytically the true values are calculated by ways of an
auxiliary Monte Carlo simulation: 200 times adequate (Y,Z)’s are generated and IP(D = 1|X,Y =
y, Z = z) is calculated for each iteration inserting the given (Y,Z) = (y, z). The mean over all iterations
is an approximation to IP(D = 1|X).
Chapter 3: The Propensity Score: A Means to An End 57
egy than full matching when eﬀects are homogeneous. Yet, in this study, the choice of
the matching algorithm will not be explored.
Finally, the distribution of (X1, X2, Y1, Y2, Z1, Z2) is varied. In a basic model all six
variables are independently and identically (iid) standard normal implying that omission
of (Y, Z) from the probit model does not bias propensity score estimates because the
omitted variables are perfectly absorbed in normally distributed stochastic noise. To
avoid this favorable aspect, Z will alternatively be distributed in an odd fashion. Several
alternatives have been investigated but those maintaining independence between Z and
X and reducing to an exchange of the distribution of Z have been unable to produce
biased propensity score estimates.3
Apparently, the probit model seems quite insensitive to misspeciﬁcation of the error
distribution as far as the overall ﬁt is concerned and coeﬃcients are of no interest. Yet,
as soon as independence of X and Z is abandoned omission of Z leads to heteroskedastic
errors of the selection equation and to arbitrarily large biased propensity score estimates,
up to estimates that are almost constant for all values of X. One speciﬁcation that
is presented below – called alternative model – deﬁnes (X1, X2, Y1, Y2) as iid uniformly
distributed random variables with mean zero and variance one. In contrast, Zj will follow
the functional form
Zj = Uj exp(−µXj), j = 1, 2, (3.7)
where Uj is a uniform random variable in the unit interval and µ = 1.35. In addition, Zj is
standardized to have mean zero and variance one in each iteration of the simulation. This
is necessary to ensure that selection due to Z is normalized and comparable to the basic
model.4 Furthermore, interactions between Z and X are introduced into the selection
equation (3.6) such that it becomes
Di = 1[α0 + α1X1i + α2X2i + α3Y1i + α4Y2i + α5Z1i + α6Z2i +
α7X1iZ1i + α8X1iZ2i + α9X2iZ1i + α10X2iZ2i + ηi > 0]
3Even very asymmetric strange densities of Z failed to generate inconsistencies.
4If Z has high variance it will strongly determine selection. To normalize its impact with respect to
the basic model the variance is required to be 1.
Chapter 3: The Propensity Score: A Means to An End 58
Table 3.1: The Simulation Setup.
Distribution Parameters
Variable Basic Alternative∗ Outcome Selection
Constant – – 1 α0 (adjusted)
X1 N (0, 1) U [−0.5, 0.5] β1 = 1 α1 = 1
X2 N (0, 1) U [−0.5, 0.5] β2 = 1 α2 = 1
X1X2 – – β12 ∈ {0, 1} 0
Y1 N (0, 1) U [−0.5, 0.5] β3 = 1 α3 ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.10}
Y2 N (0, 1) U [−0.5, 0.5] β4 = 1 α4 ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.10}
Y1Y2 – – β34 ∈ {0, 1} 0
Z1 N (0, 1) U1 exp(−µX1) β5 ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.10} α5 = 1
Z2 N (0, 1) U1 exp(−µX1) β6 ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.10} α6 = 1
Z1Z2 – – β56 ∈ {0, 1} 0
X1Z1 – – 0 α7 ∈ {0, 1}
X1Z2 – – 0 α8 ∈ {0, 1}
X2Z1 – – 0 α9 ∈ {0, 1}
X2Z2 – – 0 α10 ∈ {0, 1}
Di – – δi see below
U1 – U [0, 1] 0 0
U2 – U [0, 1] 0 0
εi N (0, 9) N (0, 9) 1 1
ηi N (0, 1) N (0, 1) 1 1
Size of the control reservoir ∈ {300, 600, 900}
Size of the treatment group: 300
Importance of the deterministic part ∈ {0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00}
δi = γ0 + γ1X1i + γ2X2i + γ3Y1i + γ4Y2i + γ5Z1i + γ6Z2i and
γ ∈ {(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0.5, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)}
µ = 1.35
∗ Furthermore, all variables are standardized to have mean zero and variance 1.
Omission of Z might lead to severe misspeciﬁcation problems which, however, can
substantially be alleviated by adding higher order terms of X into the probit speciﬁcation.
The conditional expectation of Zj given X1, X2 is a function of X1, X2
IE(Zj|X1, X2) = f(X1, X2). (3.8)
Hence, inclusion of higher order terms of (X1, X2) approximates a Taylor expansion of
f(X1, X2) such that, again, almost only the stochastic part of Z will be absorbed by the
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error term of the model. Three alternative probit models will therefore be speciﬁed to
demonstrate this issue. The ﬁrst model consists of linear terms in X only, the second one
includes an interaction X1X2, and the third one further adds quadratic terms in X.
Other interesting features consider (i) whether asymmetry of the parameters (β1, β2) =
(0.5, 2) or (ii) whether interaction terms in the outcome equation as follows
R = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β12X1X2 + β3Y1 + β4Y2 + β34Y1Y2
+ β5Z1 + β6Z2 + β56Z1Z2 + ε (3.9)
might cause additional problems. To keep the presentation of the alternative model simple
only a certain parameter constellation of the basic model will be considered more closely:
a medium impact of Y on R and Z on D, i.e. with coeﬃcients α3 = α4 = β5 = β6 = 0.05,
a medium size of the control reservoir (600), and a selection determination of 0.75. The
setup is summarized in table 3.1.
3.4 The Matching Algorithm
Consider the basic speciﬁcation retaining independence between X and Z, with Z having
no impact on the outcome R, and Y none on selection D but all other α and β-coeﬃcients
are 1, and, furthermore, where there are 600 comparison units. This constellation already
motivates the use of the special matching algorithm presented below. The columns un-
der the heading full probit of table 3.2 compare the absolute frequencies of treated and
untreated individuals by propensity score intervals. Obviously, the distribution is very
unfavorable for matching at the boundaries. In eﬀect, the full probit model successfully
separates the treated from the untreated. Unfortunately, high predictive ability of the
model implies diﬃculties in ﬁnding adequate controls for high propensity score treated in-
dividuals. The picture improves substantially if Z (and Y ) are omitted from the selection
equation. Estimation results of the partial probit are presented in the last two columns
of the table. Apparently, the diﬀerence in the distributions of the estimated propen-
sity scores for treated and untreated is less extreme than in the full probit. Therefore,
matching can be expected to be much easier.
Chapter 3: The Propensity Score: A Means to An End 60
Table 3.2: Distribution of Treated and Untreated Individuals.
Estimated Full Probit Partial Probit
Propensity score untreated treated untreated treated
0.0 ≤ pˆ < 0.1 459.58 6.80 293.39 12.41
0.1 ≤ pˆ < 0.2 49.59 8.69 135.02 23.67
0.2 ≤ pˆ < 0.3 29.39 9.77 75.58 24.86
0.3 ≤ pˆ < 0.4 19.88 9.86 45.08 23.71
0.4 ≤ pˆ < 0.5 14.29 10.74 25.49 20.54
0.5 ≤ pˆ < 0.6 10.11 12.48 14.16 16.63
0.6 ≤ pˆ < 0.7 7.18 13.47 6.93 12.65
0.7 ≤ pˆ < 0.8 5.22 15.83 3.01 9.11
0.8 ≤ pˆ < 0.9 3.04 18.90 1.01 4.98
0.9 ≤ pˆ ≤ 1.0 1.46 43.50 0.07 1.70
Mean propensity score 0.09 0.65 0.15 0.38
Observations 600 150 600 150
The means are averages over 100 iterations. Comparison of number of treated and untreated individuals
by certain propensity score intervals.
After estimation of individual propensity scores a distance between treated and un-
treated individuals has to be deﬁned because exact matching on the continuous score
is impossible. Here a propensity score caliper approach is pursued (Cochran & Ru-
bin, 1973). A small pool of potential controls is generated for each treated unit by
excluding all untreated units whose propensity score distance to the chosen treated ex-
ceeds a certain caliper ε. Within the caliper, the distances from treated individual to
potential control is deﬁned in terms of the Mahalanobis metric based on variables W
consisting of the estimated propensity score and all matching covariates, either (X,Y, Z)
or X for the full or partial speciﬁcation, respectively. It is a weighted Euclidean distance
d(wt, wc) = (wt − wc)′V −1(wt − wc), where indices t, c represent the treated and the po-
tential control units, respectively. V is the pooled covariance matrix of W which serves
to norm the vectors. In sum, the distance is
d(wt, wc) =


∞ if |pt − pc| > ε
(wt − wc)′V −1(wt − wc) else.
(3.10)
An inﬁnite distance indicates that matching is forbidden.
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Table 3.3: Speciﬁcation of Caliper Width ε.
Basic Model Alternative Model
Selection Full Probit Partial Probit Full Partial Probit
Determ. 300 600 900 300 600 900 Probit Order
0.25 .030 .020 .010 .015 .010 .005 .03 1 .002
0.50 .040 .030 .020 .030 .015 .010 2 .010
0.75 .050 .040 .030 .040 .020 .010 3 .010
1.00 .060 .050 .040 .050 .025 .010
The ﬁrst column of the basic model presents the factors which the α-coeﬃcients of the selection equation
are multiplied with. The next columns headed by the size of the control reservoir display the critical
ε. The ﬁrst column of the alternative model shows the caliper width used in the full probit, the second
shows whether no interactions (1), interactions (2), and additionally squares (3) are included in the partial
probit, and the last displays ε.
Matching using the Mahalanobis distance is discussed in Rubin (1980). Gu &
Rosenbaum (1993) perform simulations to compare three distance measures. Fur-
thermore, propensity score calipers are discussed in Rosenbaum & Rubin (1985) and
Rosenbaum (1989). Calipers help substantially reduce the number of potential controls
and, thus, considerably accelerate the matching algorithm and, what is more, they pre-
vent that too distant individuals are being matched. The critical ε is chosen such that
there are enough but not too many potential controls in the vicinity of each treated which
otherwise would considerably slow down the algorithm without improving results. Table
3.3 summarizes the choices of the critical ε. The results may depend on the choice of ε. A
small ε will come with a loss of many treated (and untreated) individuals. On the other
hand, however, it increases similarity of the matched units.
The ﬁnal decision is how to implement the chosen matching criteria, in other words,
how the distances between treated units and controls is to be minimized. A stratiﬁcation
producing small strata is preferable in order to ensure that the distance between the units
within a stratum is not too large and stratum members are very similar to each other.
This yields strata with either one treated and one or more controls or one control and
more than one treated unit. It turns out that strata with very high propensity scores
contain more than one treated and strata with low scores consist of a large number of
controls.
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In this study, optimal full matching as proposed by Rosenbaum (1991) is imple-
mented. It minimizes the overall distances between treated and controls in that it works
backwards and rearranges already matched units if an unmatched treated would better
be matched to an already used untreated. In such a case, the existing match is broken up
and its treated is available for matching again.5 The strata will be non-overlapping, i.e.
individuals are not members of more than one stratum, which facilitates the calculation
of variances.6 Optimal full matching can easily be transformed into a minimum cost ﬂow
problem, a special case of linear network optimization.7
Matching produces diﬀerent strata in terms of number of treated and controls per
stratum. Some might be very extreme comprising numerous treated units and only one
control. It is they who substantially increase the variance of the estimated mean eﬀect
of treatment on the treated. On the other hand, strata with one treated but countless
controls will work in the opposite direction but receive less weight. Therefore, an aggregate
measure assessing the uniformity of a given stratiﬁcation with respect to a benchmark
stratiﬁcation is helpful. To this end, suppose all estimated stratum treatment eﬀects have
the same variance, the following formula measures variance inﬂation due to unfavorable
stratiﬁcation8
1
(
∑S
s=1ms)
2
S∑
s=1
m2s
(1− 1/ns)2
where ms indicates the number of treated units and ns the number of all individuals in
stratum s = 1, ..., S.
In order to make the formula meaningful it ought to be compared to a benchmark
stratiﬁcation which is deﬁned as follows. Let all treated units get their own stratum
with exactly one control. Therefore, redeﬁne m˜s˜ = 1 and n˜s˜ = 2 for all s˜ = 1, ..., S˜
with S˜ =
∑S
s=1ms, yielding a variance inﬂation of 4/
∑S
s=1ms. The ratio of the two
5This is in contrast to so-called greedy algorithms which do not generally achieve a minimum, see
Rosenbaum (1991).
6Statistical inference is described in Rosenbaum (1995) and adapted to this setup in Chapter 2.
However, non-overlapping strata are not necessary if diﬀerent techniques are used, see Quade (1981) or
Heckman, Ichimura & Todd (1998).
7Bertsekas (1991) discusses linear network optimization and provides FORTRAN-algorithms for
minimum cost ﬂow problems. Furthermore, there is an operations research procedure called netflow in
SAS for these kinds of problems.
8See Chapter 2 or Rosenbaum (1995) for the deduction of the general variance formula.
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expressions yields a relative variance inﬂation factor denoted κ2
κ2 =
1
4
∑S
s=1ms
S∑
s=1
m2s
(1− 1/ns)2 . (3.11)
For example, pair matching produces κ = 1, 1-k-matching, i.e. one treated and k controls
share a common stratum, leads to κ = 0.5 (1+1/k), k-1-matching has κ = (k+1)/(2
√
k).
Note that the benchmark stratiﬁcation can in general never be achieved since all treated
who are used in the optimal stratiﬁcation would have to ﬁnd an own control. This would
only be possible if there are no high propensity score treated units or else if several high
propensity score treated individuals were matched to medium score controls which is either
ruled out by a caliper approach or which otherwise would compare the incomparable. As
such, κ incorporates neither the balance of covariates after matching nor how many treated
units remain unmatched but only the uniformity of the stratiﬁcation.
As outlined in the introduction, pair matching might be more eﬃcient than full match-
ing. What is more, if the treatment eﬀect is homogeneous pair matching estimates are
unbiased. Nevertheless, pair matching is disregarded in this study even in the case of
homogeneous eﬀects. The principal aim is to shed more light on the estimation of the
propensity score when selection is strong. The homogeneous case is for illustrative pur-
poses only and serves as a valuable benchmark.
Finally, matching should produce balance of all important covariates implying that at
least their means for treated and controls be approximately equal. Therefore, to verify
balance, simple t-tests of the hypothesis of equal means under equal variances are per-
formed for each of the six variables j = 1, ..., 6. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected
at a 5% signiﬁcance level let tj = 1 and zero otherwise. Then, for an overall measure of
balance, deﬁne the aggregate balance τ as
τ =
∑6
j=1 βj tj∑6
j=1 βj
, (3.12)
the β’s being the coeﬃcients of the outcome equation (3.5). Weighting by β takes into
account that imbalance of the less important variables Z would cause less problems than
that of X and Y .9
9Percent bias reduction has also been examined. Yet, results were quite unsatisfactory because a
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3.5 Results
Each simulation is performed 100 times and mean estimation results over all iterations
are presented and discussed for the parameter constellations mentioned above. Variability
across simulations is reﬂected by simulation standard errors which, however, are not
presented in the tables below for reasons of clarity. Figure 3.1 shows propensity score
estimation results of the basic model with true and estimated scores on the vertical axis
and the true ones on the horizontal axis. The data are taken from the constellation where
the critical coeﬃcients of Y and Z are 0.1, with 600 untreated individuals, and with
selection determination of 0.75.
Apparently, the estimates of both the full and the partial speciﬁcation are unbiased.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 go into the estimation and stratiﬁcation results of the full and partial
model. The ﬁrst three columns characterize the simulation scenario. The ﬁrst column
reports the values of the coeﬃcients β5, β6, α3, and α4, the second the size of the control
reservoir, and the third shows the factor the α-coeﬃcients of the selection equation are
multiplied with. The lower this factor the larger the randomness of the selection process
and the less severe self-selection is. The next four columns report the bias and the
rmse in the homogeneous and the heterogeneous case. The remaining columns are self-
explanatory.
The most striking result is that matching on the propensity score estimated by the full
probit model produces almost always unbiased estimates of the mean eﬀect of treatment
on the treated while the bias of the partial probit matching rises to roughly 40% when
the impacts of Y and Z are largest. Nevertheless, root mean squared errors of the latter
are markedly lower when selection determination is highest. As selection determination
successively increases, the full model puts an increasingly heavy burden upon treated
individuals in ﬁnding appropriate controls, a fact reﬂected in the diminishing number
of strata and the growing number of lost treated individuals. For instance, full probit
matching ends with roughly 57 strata if selection determination is highest and the control
negative percent bias reduction is basically unbounded. If balance before matching is already given the
denominator in the formula is close to zero. On the other hand, percent bias reduction is at most +100%.
Therefore, the mean reduction turned out to be rather low in each single iteration.
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Figure 3.1: Basic Model, Full Probit and Partial Probit
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1
True and estimated propensity scores on the vertical axis versus true
scores on the horizontal. The ﬁgures represent one iteration of the
simulation study, the full model on the top, the partial one on the
bottom.
reservoir is smallest. By contrast, partial probit matching still produces around 101 strata
under these circumstances. That is, stratiﬁcation in the latter case is more uniform as
can also be seen from its lower value of κ which never surpasses 0.92 whereas full probit
matching even surpasses κ = 1. However, the diﬀerence in rmse decreases for a more
extensive control reservoir.
Furthermore, the partial probit estimates are unbiased if the omitted variables Y and
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Table 3.4: Basic Model, Full Probit.
Eﬀects Stratiﬁcation
Scenario Homogeneous Heterogeneous No of Lost κ ∆P- Bal.
(a) (b) (c) Bias rmse Bias rmse strata tr’d score τ
0.00 300 0.25 -0.01 0.37 -0.04 0.50 129.97 3.36 0.84 -0.02 1.00
0.50 -0.08 0.57 -0.14 0.67 97.15 8.99 0.97 -0.05 0.96
0.75 0.09 0.79 0.03 0.84 73.58 13.10 1.14 -0.05 0.82
1.00 0.15 1.15 0.11 1.16 56.49 11.34 1.36 -0.04 0.60
600 0.25 0.03 0.34 0.01 0.41 143.34 3.22 0.71 -0.03 1.00
0.50 0.03 0.43 -0.02 0.43 115.43 9.17 0.80 -0.07 0.99
0.75 -0.01 0.56 -0.05 0.51 89.35 12.04 0.95 -0.06 0.90
1.00 0.05 0.88 -0.00 0.79 72.28 15.59 1.10 -0.06 0.72
900 0.25 0.03 0.30 -0.00 0.34 141.79 4.58 0.66 -0.04 1.00
0.50 -0.00 0.39 -0.05 0.37 122.68 9.96 0.74 -0.08 0.99
0.75 0.01 0.46 -0.04 0.40 100.08 15.10 0.86 -0.09 0.92
1.00 -0.01 0.61 -0.06 0.51 81.95 17.82 0.99 -0.09 0.79
0.05 300 0.25 -0.01 0.36 -0.04 0.48 128.32 4.02 0.84 -0.02 1.00
0.50 0.09 0.52 0.05 0.58 98.90 8.18 0.98 -0.04 0.96
0.75 0.07 0.78 0.02 0.82 73.53 12.51 1.15 -0.05 0.85
1.00 0.16 1.15 0.11 1.15 57.15 13.50 1.34 -0.05 0.59
600 0.25 -0.01 0.35 -0.03 0.42 142.70 3.06 0.71 -0.03 1.00
0.50 0.02 0.42 -0.03 0.43 116.97 8.19 0.82 -0.06 0.99
0.75 0.04 0.56 -0.02 0.52 90.68 13.99 0.94 -0.08 0.91
1.00 -0.02 0.81 -0.08 0.71 72.17 17.17 1.09 -0.07 0.68
900 0.25 -0.04 0.32 -0.08 0.38 141.98 4.63 0.66 -0.05 1.00
0.50 0.04 0.38 -0.01 0.35 122.73 10.51 0.74 -0.09 0.99
0.75 0.09 0.43 0.03 0.36 98.23 14.25 0.86 -0.09 0.92
1.00 0.10 0.71 0.03 0.57 79.78 18.32 0.99 -0.09 0.79
0.10 300 0.25 0.03 0.38 0.01 0.51 129.60 3.43 0.85 -0.02 1.00
0.50 0.09 0.52 0.05 0.57 96.04 8.77 0.98 -0.04 0.97
0.75 0.09 0.80 0.03 0.82 72.43 13.22 1.15 -0.05 0.79
1.00 0.22 0.93 0.16 0.93 58.69 14.34 1.32 -0.05 0.63
600 0.25 -0.01 0.36 -0.04 0.45 143.86 3.26 0.71 -0.03 1.00
0.50 -0.07 0.46 -0.11 0.46 116.51 7.92 0.81 -0.06 0.98
0.75 0.14 0.55 0.07 0.48 90.84 13.78 0.95 -0.07 0.88
1.00 0.03 0.69 -0.03 0.61 73.88 18.28 1.07 -0.08 0.75
900 0.25 0.00 0.30 -0.04 0.34 140.43 4.84 0.66 -0.05 1.00
0.50 -0.01 0.44 -0.06 0.41 121.32 10.77 0.74 -0.09 1.00
0.75 0.09 0.48 0.02 0.40 100.14 15.97 0.86 -0.10 0.97
1.00 0.09 0.68 0.02 0.54 80.22 18.47 0.99 -0.09 0.77
The results are averages over all 100 iterations. The ﬁrst block represents the scenario: (a) value of the
coeﬃcients β5, β6, α3, α4, (b) size of control reservoir, (c) selection determination. The next block reports
bias and rmse for the homogeneous and the heterogeneous case. The last block shows stratiﬁcation
results: the number of strata and of lost treated units, the stratiﬁcation measure κ, the diﬀerence in true
propensity scores of treated units after and before matching, and the aggregate balance τ .
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Table 3.5: Basic Model, Partial Probit.
Eﬀects Stratiﬁcation
Scenario Homogeneous Heterogeneous No of Lost κ ∆P- Bal.
(a) (b) (c) Bias rmse Bias rmse strata tr’d score τ
0.00 300 0.25 0.01 0.40 -0.01 0.54 129.07 2.92 0.82 -0.01 0.96
0.50 -0.05 0.49 -0.07 0.56 117.00 4.36 0.85 -0.02 0.93
0.75 0.03 0.46 0.01 0.48 107.81 4.24 0.89 -0.01 0.93
1.00 0.06 0.45 0.05 0.46 101.21 4.46 0.92 -0.01 0.90
600 0.25 0.04 0.39 0.04 0.47 144.00 2.24 0.69 -0.01 0.95
0.50 0.05 0.42 0.03 0.42 130.61 5.02 0.71 -0.03 0.94
0.75 -0.02 0.44 -0.04 0.40 124.04 6.19 0.74 -0.02 0.94
1.00 -0.01 0.39 -0.02 0.35 120.12 6.36 0.76 -0.02 0.92
900 0.25 0.00 0.32 -0.01 0.37 143.61 3.16 0.63 -0.02 0.95
0.50 0.00 0.37 -0.02 0.35 137.36 5.66 0.66 -0.03 0.95
0.75 0.02 0.35 -0.00 0.30 130.95 8.91 0.69 -0.03 0.94
1.00 -0.03 0.40 -0.04 0.33 125.78 11.50 0.70 -0.03 0.92
0.05 300 0.25 0.04 0.34 0.04 0.45 128.47 2.95 0.81 -0.01 0.94
0.50 0.18 0.46 0.19 0.51 116.53 3.52 0.86 -0.01 0.91
0.75 0.14 0.50 0.13 0.52 108.82 4.67 0.89 -0.01 0.90
1.00 0.18 0.51 0.16 0.50 101.76 4.48 0.91 -0.01 0.87
600 0.25 0.04 0.39 0.04 0.47 143.15 2.35 0.68 -0.01 0.94
0.50 0.12 0.39 0.11 0.39 134.06 5.59 0.72 -0.03 0.91
0.75 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.34 123.44 6.57 0.74 -0.02 0.91
1.00 0.18 0.44 0.14 0.38 120.77 6.40 0.75 -0.02 0.87
900 0.25 0.02 0.31 0.01 0.36 143.88 3.13 0.63 -0.02 0.93
0.50 0.20 0.42 0.17 0.38 137.84 5.33 0.66 -0.03 0.93
0.75 0.20 0.42 0.15 0.35 129.33 9.10 0.68 -0.04 0.90
1.00 0.30 0.48 0.23 0.38 124.34 12.18 0.69 -0.03 0.89
0.10 300 0.25 0.19 0.46 0.24 0.60 129.41 2.85 0.82 -0.01 0.90
0.50 0.32 0.50 0.34 0.55 115.86 4.19 0.85 -0.02 0.87
0.75 0.33 0.56 0.32 0.57 107.64 4.46 0.89 -0.01 0.84
1.00 0.42 0.65 0.41 0.64 103.05 3.53 0.91 -0.01 0.83
600 0.25 0.14 0.38 0.15 0.46 144.53 2.49 0.68 -0.01 0.92
0.50 0.24 0.42 0.22 0.40 132.97 4.84 0.71 -0.02 0.86
0.75 0.41 0.56 0.35 0.49 125.63 6.26 0.74 -0.02 0.84
1.00 0.44 0.60 0.37 0.51 121.74 6.22 0.76 -0.02 0.82
900 0.25 0.17 0.35 0.18 0.39 142.11 3.56 0.63 -0.02 0.88
0.50 0.29 0.48 0.25 0.43 134.63 5.81 0.66 -0.03 0.86
0.75 0.38 0.52 0.30 0.43 131.07 9.05 0.68 -0.03 0.85
1.00 0.41 0.57 0.31 0.44 123.81 11.76 0.70 -0.03 0.83
The results are averages over all 100 iterations. The ﬁrst block represents the scenario: (a) value of the
coeﬃcients β5, β6, α3, α4, (b) size of control reservoir, (c) selection determination. The next block reports
bias and rmse for the homogeneous and the heterogeneous case. The last block shows stratiﬁcation
results: the number of strata and of lost treated units, the stratiﬁcation measure κ, the diﬀerence in true
propensity scores of treated units after and before matching, and the aggregate balance τ .
Chapter 3: The Propensity Score: A Means to An End 68
Z do not have an impact on the selection or outcome equation, respectively. However,
there is an increasing bias if their impact increases. Note that there appears to be also a
weak upward bias in the full probit model if selection determination is highest, speciﬁcally
in the homogeneous case. This bias arises due to the remaining imbalance expressed by
a τ of around 0.6. An additional bias of opposite direction emerges in the heterogeneous
case partly oﬀsetting the initial bias. This is because many high propensity score treated
units who tend to experience a higher eﬀect in the heterogeneous case are discarded by
the matching algorithm. Furthermore, the rmse in the heterogeneous case seems to be
as large as or larger than in the homogeneous case. Yet, it is smaller for high selection
determination and for large control reservoir. This ﬁnding might be explained by the
additional variability of a heterogeneous δi. Since δi depends on the observable covariates,
its variability diminishes as selection caused by the observables becomes more important.
As far as balancing success is concerned, no strategy surpasses the other in all scenarios.
If selection determination is weak full probit always achieves perfect balance. However,
its performance diminishes quickly as selection determination is growing. On the other
hand, partial probit’s balancing success starts worse but does not reduce as fast as full
probit’s. Part of this ﬁnding is explicable by the choice of the caliper width ε. It is wider
for strong selection (see table 3.3), hence, treated individuals might choose controls with a
relatively low propensity score. For the same reason, τ deteriorates faster in the full than
in the partial probit model. However, a constant ε for all scenarios would have produced
a large casualty list of treated units in the full model.
In spite of non-constant ε, the full probit loses more treated units such that the relative
diﬀerence in the true full propensity scores between treated individuals before matching
and the remaining treated after matching ∆P.score is more pronounced than in the partial
probit. The negative signs show that treated individuals are lost in the high end of
the propensity score scale. However, while partial probit matching never exceeds 3%,
full probit matching even reaches 10%. Note, however, that the number of lost treated
increases with the size of the control reservoir. This counterintuitive result arises because
of decreasing caliper widths, see table 3.3.
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In sum, partial probit produces a better overall performance than full probit for the
examined parameter constellations. Alas, if the coeﬃcients of Y and Z grew above the
0.1 considered here, full probit could be expected to be the preferred strategy. Moreover,
if there is no strong selection into treatment full probit matching is not at a disadvantage,
in contrast, it even sometimes outperforms partial probit. Yet, strong selection as in
Dehejia & Wahba (1998) or Chapter 2 calls for a careful assessment of the importance
of the variables included in the selection equation.
The basic model seems to be overly optimistic as far as the distributions of Y and
Z are concerned. The top panel of ﬁgure 3.2 presents propensity score estimates under
the alternative partial probit model. Apparently, it underestimates propensity scores for
individuals with high IP(D = 1|X) and overestimates for those with low scores. This is
in contrast to the next two pictures which present estimated propensity scores built on
probit models with higher order terms. Pictures of the full probit are not presented for
they are virtually identical to those of the basic model.
One might ask whether the order of treated and untreated units with regard to their
estimated biased propensity scores would be similar to the order of individuals in accor-
dance with their true scores IP(D = 1|X). In this case, treated and untreated would
hardly change their ranks within the sample. As a result, stratiﬁcation might be similar
to that if the true scores were used for matching and the biased propensity score estimates
would not be a source of bias in the matching estimates. However, as illustrated in table
3.6, the mean rank of treated units has diminished considerably for the alternative model
with no higher order terms implying that a large number of untreated and treated units
must have interchanged their ranks. Alas, once higher order terms are taken into account
– particularly interaction between X1 and X2 – there is no diﬀerence in mean ranks worth
mentioning anymore.
Table 3.7 presents simulation results for the alternative model in simulation scenario
(0.05, 600, 0.75) for the full and the partial probit. Consider ﬁrst the partial probit results.
Surprisingly, they are still better than the comparable ones of the full probit basic model,
though worse than those of the partial probit basic model. Interactions in the outcome
equation (3.9) lead to an increase of the rmse and produce a larger bias if no higher order
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Figure 3.2: Alternative Model, Partial Probit With and Without Higher Order
Terms
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True and estimated propensity scores on the vertical axis versus true
scores on the horizontal. The ﬁgures represent one iteration of the
simulation study. The ﬁrst picture shows results when no interactions
are included; the second contains interactions, the third additionally
contains squares in X.
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Table 3.6: Mean Ranks.
Full probit Partial probit
untreated treated untreated treated
Basic Model
True propensity score 313.59 625.75 332.14 550.78
Estimated propensity score 313.28 627.01 331.79 552.19
Alternative Model
True propensity score 329.87 557.76 335.14 536.65
Estimated, without higher order terms 328.67 562.54 367.40 407.94
Estimated, w/ interactions 328.67 562.54 336.59 530.82
Estimated, w/ inter. & squares 328.67 562.54 335.43 535.44
The results are mean ranks in the treatment and in the comparison group. They are further averaged
over all iterations.
terms in the probit model are accounted for. Yet, this pattern disappears once they are
included. Asymmetry in the coeﬃcients (β1, β2) = (0.5, 2) instead of (1, 1) of the response
equation does not at all alter the results which is why they are omitted. In contrast to
the basic model, heterogeneous eﬀects lead to substantially worse estimation results in
that biases and rmses are markedly larger than in the homogeneous case.
These still surprisingly favorable results in spite of severe misspeciﬁcations expressed
in the ﬁrst picture of ﬁgure 3.2 might be explained by the fact that within the propensity
score calipers the Mahalanobis distance, which is not misspeciﬁed, still matches the correct
individuals. To explore this hypothesis all results are repeated replacing the Mahalanobis
distance by the propensity score distance within calipers. The results are also shown
in table 3.7. They are fairly similar to the previous results with one notable exception:
the bias and rmse are markedly larger in case interactions in the response model are
introduced but none in the probit model.
For the sake of comparability, the table displays estimates of the full probit model,
as well. The most striking result is that it achieves an almost perfect overall balance τ .
This unexpected ﬁnding, however, may partly be explained by the fact that a considerable
number of high propensity score treated units is lost facilitating balancing the variables of
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Table 3.7: Alternative Model.
Eﬀects Stratiﬁcation
Homogeneous Heterogeneous No of Lost κ ∆P- Bal.
Bias rmse Bias rmse strata tr’d score τ
Full Probit
Mahalanobis distance within calipers
– no interactions in outcome equation
0.08 0.48 0.05 0.80 118.82 13.51 0.74 -0.12 0.98
– with interactions in outcome equation
0.11 0.53 0.11 0.87 118.82 13.51 0.74 -0.12 0.98
Propensity score distance within calipers
– no interactions in outcome equation
0.08 0.51 0.06 0.84 113.16 13.51 0.75 -0.12 0.98
– with interactions in outcome equation
0.07 0.56 0.04 0.92 113.16 13.51 0.75 -0.12 0.98
Partial Probit
Mahalanobis distance within calipers
– no interactions in outcome equation
1 0.14 0.43 0.23 0.72 134.37 0.50 0.72 -0.00 0.91
2 0.16 0.47 0.24 0.78 128.72 7.82 0.72 -0.05 0.92
3 0.19 0.49 0.30 0.81 128.16 6.58 0.73 -0.04 0.93
– with interactions in outcome equation
1 -0.33 0.56 -0.55 0.94 134.37 0.50 0.72 -0.00 0.91
2 -0.06 0.48 -0.13 0.81 128.72 7.82 0.72 -0.05 0.92
3 -0.03 0.48 -0.07 0.80 128.16 6.58 0.73 -0.04 0.93
Propensity score distance within calipers
– no interactions in outcome equation
1 0.13 0.42 0.21 0.71 140.85 0.50 0.71 -0.00 0.92
2 0.12 0.49 0.17 0.81 127.86 7.82 0.73 -0.05 0.92
3 0.18 0.47 0.27 0.77 126.94 6.58 0.73 -0.04 0.92
– with interactions in outcome equation
1 -0.80 0.95 -1.34 1.58 140.85 0.50 0.71 -0.00 0.92
2 -0.10 0.52 -0.21 0.88 127.86 7.82 0.73 -0.05 0.92
3 -0.05 0.46 -0.11 0.78 126.94 6.58 0.73 -0.04 0.92
The means are averages over all 100 iterations for scenario (0.05, 600, 0.75) of table 3.5. The ﬁrst column
refers to the partial probit model, 1: no higher order terms, 2: interactions, 3: interactions and squares.
The ﬁrst block reports bias and rmse for the homogeneous and the heterogeneous case. The last block
shows stratiﬁcation results: the number of strata and of lost treated units, the stratiﬁcation measure κ,
the diﬀerence in true propensity scores of treated units after and before matching, and the aggregate
balance τ . Interactions in outcome equation means that (β12, β34, β56) = (1, 1, 1).
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the remaining sample. As a result, the superior balance is accompanied by an unfavorably
∆P.score of 12% making the matched sample less representative. Similarly, κ is almost as
small as in the partial probit model because it merely reports uniformity of the realized
stratiﬁcation given the number of lost treated units. Finally, using a propensity score
distance within calipers does not alter the results except for slightly increased rmse. In
sum, the partial probit does not do worse than the full probit even if the partial probit
model is severely misspeciﬁed. Including higher order terms into the selection equation
might be a way to alleviate problems caused by omission of variables which are correlated
with the included ones.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates propensity score matching when selection into treatment is re-
markably strong and thus the treatment and comparison group diﬀer considerably in their
observable covariates. In such a scenario, matching adequate units is demanding. To alle-
viate this problem, we suggest to carefully reconsider the selection equation with respect
to variables that might play a subordinate role in the outcome equation. Omission of these
variables helps increase the randomness of the selection process and reduce the variance of
the matching estimates. However, their omission from the selection equation might lead
to inconsistent propensity score estimates and hence biased matching estimates. This
study assesses the bias-variance trade-oﬀ in a simulation resting on the mean squared
error criterion.
To this end, we presuppose existence of variables Z which strongly inﬂuence the se-
lection decision but which, on the other hand, do not or do only weakly determine the
outcome under scrutiny. For a large enough sample size, speciﬁcation tests of the probit
model would then recommend the inclusion of Z to consistently estimate the propensity
score. Likewise, we introduce variables Y which are relevant to the outcome but irrelevant
to the participation decision. Matching on a propensity score estimate based on Z and Y
will balance Z at the expense of balance of the variables most relevant for both the out-
come and the selection. Moreover, unnecessary eﬀort is spent to remove small imbalance
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in the variable Y . In consequence, (i) some treated have to be systematically discarded
from the sample because they do not ﬁnd adequate controls and, (ii) more treated have
to share one control, a fact that reduces uniformity of the stratiﬁcation and thus increases
standard errors.
In eﬀect, the results show that matching on inconsistent estimates of the propensity
score, i.e. those achieved when Z (and Y ) are excluded, produces estimation results of the
mean eﬀect of treatment that are often better in terms of the rmse than those achieved by
matching on estimates that rest on all covariates relevant for the selection. This remains
true even if Z shows some impact on the outcome as long as this impact is limited. Drake
(1993) points to a similar direction in concluding that misspecifying the propensity score
results in smaller biases than misspecifying the response model. Therefore, we recommend
to only include variables into the selection equation that are highly signiﬁcant. Variables
with low signiﬁcance levels are obvious candidates for exclusion even if they might play
a role in the outcome equation. Moreover, if established research suggests that certain
variables Z are irrelevant to the outcome under study they should solely be included into
the selection equation if there are other strong reasons for doing so.
If, nevertheless, imbalance of some variables seems to be inacceptable after matching,
an additional linear regression adjustment might be pursued with presumably less cost
than balancing all the remaining variables in advance. If misspeciﬁcation of the propen-
sity score seems to be inacceptable, one might additionally take account of statistically
signiﬁcant higher order terms of those variables included in the selection equation. A
sensitivity analysis that compares partial models with the full model might be a way to
assess diﬀerent approaches, see e.g. Heckman, Ichimura & Todd (1997: section 13)
or Chapter 4. In sum, the main criterion of success for matching remains the balance of
the relevant covariates and not the proper estimation of the selection equation. This aim
is easily obtained by a full probit model only if selection determination is low and/or the
control reservoir is large but in several applied situations it might be better obtained by
a partial model.
Chapter 4
Evaluating the Eﬀect of
Postsecondary Education
June 1999/October 2000
Abstract. This chapter uses the statistical technique of matching on the propensity score
to evaluate the eﬀect of the associate’s, the bachelor’s, and graduate degrees on hourly
wages for men and women during the ﬁrst ten years after college completion. Moreover,
it discusses heterogeneity in the eﬀects ruled by ability and family background. Selection
into college education turns out to be extremely strong, notably for the bachelor’s and the
graduate degrees. As a result, bias in observable covariates prior to matching is immense.
An optimal full matching algorithm is implemented to address this issue. Furthermore,
sensitivity with respect to the speciﬁcation of the selection equation is investigated. All
results are compared to conventional OLS estimation which allows (i) to verify the lin-
ear speciﬁcation of the earnings equation and (ii) to bring out the determinants of why
matching and OLS estimates diﬀer.
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4.1 Introduction
The debate on the subject of identiﬁcation of the returns to education has a long tradition
in labor economics. Mincer (1974) speciﬁed a theoretical model where log earnings are
a linear function of education, labor market experience, and experience square. Numerous
studies have estimated the coeﬃcient of the schooling variable by least squares techniques,
see Willis (1986), Ashenfelter & Rouse (1998b), and Card (1999) for a compre-
hensive overview. This chapter investigates the return to college degrees by means of
the nonparametric technique of matching. To this end, a somewhat diﬀerent concept of
the return to education is introduced, namely the eﬀect of college education on earnings
which takes account of the eﬀect of education on labor market experience, as well.
The ideal setup for identifying the eﬀect of schooling on earnings would be a ran-
domized experiment with a treatment group that receives education and a control group
that is refused access to education. For obvious reasons, however, such randomization is
impossible and one has to rely on observational studies. In an observational study, individ-
uals themselves decide whether to participate in treatment or not, thus self-selection into
treatment poses a major problem. Matching treated and untreated individuals with re-
spect to all observable variables that both determine the selection into college and exhibit
an impact on earnings removes systematic observable diﬀerences between the treatment
and the comparison group. In balancing these variables matching mimics a randomized
experiment provided the relevant variables are observed. Matching on the probability to
participate in treatment, the propensity score, is an alternative whenever the covariates
are high dimensional, see Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983).
This chapter performs matching on the propensity score to evaluate the eﬀect of the
associate’s, the bachelor’s, and graduate degrees on hourly wages for men and women
during the ﬁrst ten years after college completion. Graduate degrees subsume master’s,
professional, and doctoral degrees. Heterogeneity in the eﬀects ruled by ability and family
background is explicitly modeled and discussed. Selection into college education turns
out to be extremely strong, notably for the bachelor’s and the graduate degrees. As
a result, bias in observable covariates prior to matching is immense. The optimal full
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matching algorithm proposed byRosenbaum (1991) is implemented to address this issue.
A full matching seems to be most suitable when it comes to evaluate the mean eﬀect of
treatment on the treated (see also Chapter 2). Furthermore, sensitivity with respect to
propensity score estimation as discussed in Chapter 3 is being investigated. All results are
compared to conventional OLS estimation which allows (i) to verify the linear speciﬁcation
of the earnings equation and (ii) to bring out the determinants of why matching and OLS
estimates deviate.
The structure of the remainder is as follows. The second section elucidates the estima-
tion strategies applied in this chapter. Section 3 describes their practical implementation,
speciﬁcally the matching algorithm, and presents the data drawn from the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. Finally, results for all three college degrees are presented
and discussed in section 4. Section 5 summarizes the ﬁndings and concludes. The appen-
dices are dedicated to the estimation of the propensity score, to a more detailed description
of the statistical tools, and to estimation results for the graduate degrees.
4.2 Estimation Strategies
Identifying the eﬀect of college education is primarily a question of identifying a causal
relationship between earnings and education which requires specifying a counterfactual
state of the world. Individuals who opted for post-secondary education, henceforth al-
ternatively called treatment, have to be compared to themselves had they not opted for
post-secondary education. Given a certain outcome measure, frequently the hourly rate
of pay, the diﬀerence in outcomes between both states is the individual eﬀect of the treat-
ment. Several strategies have been proposed to address this identiﬁcation problem, see,
for example, Angrist & Krueger (1999) for an overview.
A formal description helps illuminate the idea. Concentrating on the hourly rate of pay
as response variable, education can be considered as an investment into human capital
that, on average, increases wages. Indeed, there is strong international evidence of a
positive correlation between schooling and earnings (see e.g. Psacharopoulos, 1994).
Chapter 4: Evaluating the Eﬀect of Postsecondary Education 78
However, there is a long and ongoing debate on whether this correlation is an expression
of a causal relationship between education and earnings or whether it is spurious, see
the discussion in Griliches & Mason (1972) and Griliches (1977). Confounding
variables might substantially mislead the causal interpretation of the education-earnings
relationship. For instance, family background might be an important determinant of the
choice of the amount of education but might also be a direct component of the earnings
equation. The same holds for personal innate earnings abilities which might even more
so determine both the selection into higher education and wages. Describing schooling as
a dummy variable S taking the value 1 if a certain amount of education is acquired and
0 if not, the earnings equation can be summarized as follows
R = f(S,E(S), F, A) (4.1)
where F and A denote family background and abilities, respectively, and E(S) represents
labor market experience measuring cumulative training on the job as a further investment
into human capital. It will itself depend on the schooling decision in that E tends to be
lower for a certain point in time if more schooling is acquired.
Prior to the schooling decision there are two potential states
R1 = f(S = 1, E(S = 1), F, A) (4.2)
denoting potential earnings when the amount of education S = 1 would be acquired, and
R0 = f(S = 0, E(S = 0), F, A) (4.3)
denoting potential earnings in case S = 0 would be chosen. Hence, the individual eﬀect
of education equals R1−R0. This framework has become known as the potential outcome
approach to causality suggested by Roy (1951), Rubin (1974, 1977), and Holland
(1986). It requires that the response of an individual be independent of the schooling
decisions of all other individuals. This implies that there are only two potential outcomes,
namely R0 and R1, one for the personal state S = 0, and one for S = 1, respectively. There
are no further potential outcomes depending on the assignment of any other individual.
This requirement is often referred to as stable unit treatment value assumption (sutva,
see Rubin, 1986).
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Unfortunately, only one of the two potential responses can ever be observed, and the
individual treatment eﬀect R1−R0 cannot be identiﬁed without imposing extraordinarily
strong assumptions as, for example, a constant treatment eﬀect for everybody. Therefore,
focus will be on the mean eﬀect of education on those who opted for college education
IE(R1 −R0|S = 1) = IE(R1|S = 1)− IE(R0|S = 1).
The conditional expectation IE(R1|S = 1) is identiﬁed in the subsample of treated in-
dividuals. However, the counterfactual IE(R0|S = 1) is merely identiﬁed when further
assumptions are invoked. One is referred to as the conditional independence assump-
tion. If all covariates F and A that determine both the outcome under scrutiny and
the selection into schooling are known, R0 is independent of S given (F,A), yielding
IE(R0|F,A, S = 1) = IE(R0|F,A, S = 0). The conditional mean response of the educated
S = 1, if they had opted for S = 0, can thus be inferred for given (F,A) from the condi-
tional mean response of the less educated individual S = 0, who are observed in schooling
level S = 0.
However, if some variable in equation (4.1) cannot be observed, which is usually the
case for A, the conditional independence assumption might be invalid. The literature
suggests three distinct methods to cope with this problem. First, the instrumental vari-
ables technique is a prominent – though often statistically imprecise – way to address
this issue (see e.g. Angrist & Krueger, 1991, Card, 1995a). A second approach rests
on comparing education and earnings levels between individuals who are supposed to be
equal with respect to unobserved A. This idea is best implemented in twin studies but
suﬀers particularly from measurement error in the schooling variable (see e.g. Griliches,
1979, Ashenfelter & Krueger, 1994). Third, some observed ability measures as, for
instance, scores on mathematical ability tests are explicitly included into equation (4.1).
However, these variables might themselves be prone to either endogeneity or measurement
error (see e.g.Griliches & Mason, 1972,Griliches, 1977, Blackburn & Neumark,
1995, Murnane, Willett & Levy, 1995, Chapter 5).
This chapter combines the second and third approach but does not consider the special
econometric problems that occur with these strategies. It rather focuses on the functional
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form of f by comparing three estimation methods: a conventional linear model, and two
variants of the matching approach, a pure matching and a regression adjusted matching.
Recently, the statistical method of matching has found widespread attention in econo-
metrics, especially for evaluating active labor market programs. For a discussion, see e.g.
Heckman, LaLonde & Smith (1999). Rosenbaum (1995) summarizes the statistical
literature. Usually, the parameter of interest is the mean eﬀect of treatment on the treated,
which in this study translates to the mean eﬀect of college education on those individuals
who went to college.
Matching
Matching tries to mimic ex post a randomized experiment by stratifying the sample of
treated and untreated units with respect to the relevant covariates (F,A) that rule the se-
lection into treatment as well as the outcome under study.1 As a result, matching balances
the relevant covariates between treatment and comparison group to achieve comparabil-
ity. In other words, selection into treatment can be considered to have been random
within each stratum deﬁned by (F,A). In contrast, in a true randomized experiment all
covariates are a priori balanced up to stochastic deviations.
Although the data used in this study provide detailed information on F and A, fur-
ther complications emerge in practice. It is almost impossible to match individuals with
exactly the same covariates whenever (F,A) is of high dimension. To escape this curse
of dimensionality, Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) suggest to use the one-dimensional
conditional probability to participate in treatment p(f, a) = IP(S = 1|(F,A) = (f, a)),
the propensity score, on which to stratify the sample instead. They show that if R0 is
independent of S given (F,A), R0 and S are also independent given p(F,A). Matching
treated and untreated units with the same propensity score and putting them into one
stratum means that the decision whether to go to college or not can be considered as
having been random in the stratum. With probability p(F,A) members of a given stra-
1In this study, the strata will be non-overlapping, i.e. individuals cannot be in more than one stratum,
which facilitates statistical inference. However, this is not necessary if diﬀerent techniques are used in
case of overlapping strata, see Quade (1981) or Heckman, Ichimura & Todd (1998).
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tum attend college and with probability 1− p(F,A) they do not. Section 3 discusses the
practical problems arising from the stratiﬁcation speciﬁc to this study and appendix B
provides a brief framework for statistical inference which is established in Rosenbaum
(1995) and adapted to this setup in Chapter 2.
The mean eﬀect of college education is estimated by a weighted average over all stratum
eﬀects. The stratum weight corresponds to the number of treated individuals within the
stratum multiplied by their sample weights provided by the data set. The resulting
estimate will be labeled the pure matching estimate. However, it turns out that balance
of covariates is not always fully achieved which is why the pure matching estimate might
still be biased. Therefore, an additional regression adjustment is made based on the
stratum as unit of observation. Let
Rt = α0 + α1Ft + α2At + δ(Ft, At) + εt, (4.4)
Rc = α0 + α1Fc + α2Ac + εc
be the wage of the treated t and the control c, respectively, in a certain stratum. δ(Ft, At)
denotes the treatment eﬀect which may vary with F and A.
If overall balance is not achieved, the diﬀerence between Rt and Rc keeps on depending
systematically on the unbalanced covariates
∆R = α1∆F + α2∆A+ δ(Ft, At) + ∆ε,
with ∆F = Ft − Fc, and analogously ∆A, ∆ε. Further assume
δ(Ft, At) = δ0 + δ1(Ft − F¯t) + δ2(At − A¯t) (4.5)
where bars denote the respective mean over all treated units. The mean eﬀect of college
education is thus captured by δ0. Finally, a regression of ∆R on diﬀerences in the covari-
ates and on the level of the treated units’ covariates is supposed to remove any bias due
to incomplete balance if linearity holds. Note that linear regression after matching might
be less prone to functional form misspeciﬁcations since linearity is only required to bridge
remaining small diﬀerences in the variables.2 What is more, heterogeneity in the eﬀect
2A linear Taylor approximation between two points of a well-behaved function is the more accurate
the closer two values of the function are.
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of college education can be investigated by assessing the statistical signiﬁcance of δ1 and
δ2. For this latter reason, pure matching, too, is followed by an additional regression on
the level variables Ft and At, see also Chapter 2. Since in this study strata will contain
either one treated and one or more controls or one control and more than one treated,
(Rt, Ft, At) and (Rc, Fc, Ac) of equation (4.4) are understood as averages over the treated
and untreated individuals within strata, respectively.
OLS Regression
Reconsider equation (4.1). In a linear model, it specializes to
R = γ0 + β(F,A) S + α1E(S) + α2E
2(S) + γ1F + γ2A+ ε. (4.6)
Analogously to equation (4.5), the treatment coeﬃcient β depends linearly on F and A.
Yet, it does not identify the mean eﬀect of college education, R1 − R0, for treatment
also acts through accumulated experience E(S). Individuals tend to acquire less labor
market experience while they attend college. If they do work while being enrolled their
acquired experience might be less valuable because many college students work part-time
or during vacations without much training on the job. As such, experience acquired
while being enrolled at college might diﬀer from experience gained in the labor market
after education is completed. Hence, usual work experience E(S) is distinguished from
experience acquired while being enrolled at college EC(S).
Furthermore, since experience is a cumulative measure, missing information in certain
years would accumulate at the end of the sample period. Therefore, missing value indi-
cators mis(S) and misC(S) for E(S) and EC(S), respectively, are introduced in equation
(4.6) counting the number of years with missing information up to the year under scrutiny.
Finally, the experience-earnings proﬁle for high school and college graduates might diﬀer,
which is taken into account by adding interaction terms between experience and schooling.
In sum, equation (4.6) extends to
R = γ0 + β(F,A)S + α1E(S) + α2E
2(S) + α3EC(S) + α4E
2
C(S)
+ α5S · E(S) + α6S · E2(S) + α7S · EC(S) + α8S · E2C(S) (4.7)
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+ α9 mis(S) + α10 misC(S) + γ1F + γ2A+ ε.
The mean eﬀect of college education can thus be estimated by
R¯1 − R¯0 = βˆ(F¯ , A¯) + αˆ1 (E¯(1)− E¯(0)) + αˆ2 (E2(1)− E2(0))
+ αˆ3 (E¯C(1)− E¯C(0)) + αˆ4 (E2C(1)− E2C(0))
+ αˆ5 E¯(1) + αˆ6 E2(1) + αˆ7 E¯C(1) + αˆ8 E2C(1) (4.8)
+ αˆ9 (mis(1)−mis(0)) + αˆ10 (misC(1)−misC(0)).
Bars denote means over the treated subsample except for the experience variables in the
no-treatment state which are averages over all untreated units because the OLS framework
does not provide suitable counterfactual averages.
4.3 The Practical Implementation
The Data
The data are taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) admin-
istered by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The NLSY is a sample of 12,686 youths ﬁrst
interviewed in 1979 when they were aged between 14 and 22 and re-interviewed annually
until 1994. A detailed description of the data is given by the NLS Handbook (1997) and
the NLSY79 User’s Guide (1997). For this study, data on wages are extracted until 1994
for men and women; the military subsample is skipped.3 Oversampling of Non-whites
and economically disadvantaged Whites suggests the use of the sample weights of 1979.
The outcome measure is the hourly rate of pay inﬂated to 1996 dollars using the US
consumer price index and transformed into logarithms. To eliminate outliers, all values
below $1 are set equal to $1 and maximum or minimum wages of observations whose wages
oscillate enormously across years are removed.4 In particular, the data contain numerous
3The self-employed are kept. Kane & Rouse (1995) who also use the NLSY report that their results
are not sensitive to the exclusion of self-employed.
4For example, an hourly wage of $5 in one year, $1000 in the second, and again $5 in the third
seems more likely to reﬂect inconsistencies in the calculation of the hourly wage by the NLSY than
real fundamental economic changes which is why $1000 would be removed. See e.g. the NLSY79 User’s
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variables about the socioeconomic background, the high school careers of respondents,
and labor force status (since 1975). The latter is used to generate a measure of actual
experience based on weeks worked per year. What is more, the NLSY provides information
on some ability measures collected in 1980 when 94.3% of all respondents participated in
tests to update the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) consisting of
ten diﬀerent test scores. Since respondents participated in the tests at diﬀerent ages the
scores are adjusted by regressing the raw scores on age dummies and using the residuals
subsequently, analogous to Blackburn & Neumark (1993).
In terms of the formal setup, treated individuals are those who obtained a college
degree and left college immediately thereafter. Those who attempted to continue or start
college to obtain a (further) degree but eventually dropped out before achieving it are
neither considered as treated nor as potential control units and are removed. Potential
controls are individuals with only a high school diploma who never attended college. High
school dropouts and individuals with a general educational development are removed from
the sample.
Matching
Three college degrees are evaluated: the associate’s degree (AA) which is obtained at
two-year colleges, the bachelor’s degree (BA) which is usually obtained after four years at
college and the graduate degrees (MA) which, for example, include the master’s, doctoral
and professional degrees. Unfortunately, the number of persons in the latter group remains
too low to draw sensible statistical inference.
The year in which respondents receive their high school diploma marks the beginning
of the treatment phase of those who went to college.5 In turn, the year in which the
treated units receive their college degree marks the end. An exception is the graduate
group which also contains individuals who continued college beyond a graduate degree
Handbook (1997: p. 266): “... the calculation procedure [...] produces, at times, extremely low and
extremely high pay rate values.”
5A considerable number of individuals do not start college right after ﬁnishing high school. Roughly
45% wait more than one year. This means that they are compared with their controls for a period that
comprises more than merely the time at college.
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but then dropped out. These college dropouts are kept in order not to reduce the sample
size even more and because this group comprises various degrees of diﬀerent time lengths
anyway. Within a stratum, treated and controls are ideally supposed to ﬁnish high school
in the same year and to be of the same age and race. After high school, the control starts
to work and gain labor market experience while the treated is allowed to either go to
college right away, interrupt it for a while or even start to work a certain amount of time
before ﬁnally attending college. Moreover, individuals of the same stratum should have
similar propensity scores.
The propensity score is estimated by ways of a probit model. Although such a paramet-
ric approach to modeling the selection equation seems to dilute the idea of matching as
being nonparametric, the speciﬁcation of the selection equation is in fact of minor impor-
tance as long as the estimated propensity score achieves to balance all relevant covariates.
Albeit, it is of major importance which covariates are really required to be included in the
selection equation. Chapter 3 suggests not to include all the possibly numerous variables
that might determine the selection, even if they are statistically signiﬁcant, but to con-
sider only those that are relevant for the outcome as well. Above all, in samples with a
relatively low number of adequate untreated units there is a trade-oﬀ between balancing
the most important variables and consistent speciﬁcation of the selection equation. Bal-
ancing irrelevant variables might well be at the expense of balancing the important ones.
In this context, “adequate units” means untreated persons with similarly high propensity
scores as the treated.
Because of that, this chapter oﬀers two distinct speciﬁcations, a broad and a narrow
probit model. The ﬁrst comprises several variables describing F and A which are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in the probit estimation while the latter uses only one variable for
each F and A, namely parents’ education6 as family background and math test scores of
the ASVAB as ability measure. The probit estimations are discussed in appendix A. Yet,
matching will be pursued with respect to the index or probits Φ−1(pˆ), where Φ is the cu-
mulative normal density function, in place of the estimated propensity score pˆ. The index
6Parents’ education is deﬁned as the mean of father’s and mother’s education. It is mother’s if father’s
is missing and vice versa.
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is linear in (F,A) and might better reﬂect the diversity of individuals at the boundaries
than pˆ which is constrained to the unit interval, see also the discussion in Chapter 2.
Table 4.1 presents the distribution of treated and untreated individuals by certain in-
dex intervals. Obviously, the probit models for the decision to take up a bachelor’s or a
graduate degree clearly separates the college from the high school graduates. Unfortu-
nately, this high predictive ability of the probit model also implies that it will be diﬃcult
to ﬁnd enough controls for treated individuals characterized by high propensity scores.
The picture diﬀers for members of the group with an AA who are more resembling to the
high school graduates; therefore, they will be easier to match. Moreover, although the
narrow and broad probit model do not diﬀer much with regard to the estimated mean
propensity scores it is evident that the broad model produces an even less favorable prior-
distribution than the narrow one. What is more, the broad one has to rely on a smaller
sample size for it depends on more covariates coming with more missing observations.
Once the propensity score has been estimated, a distance between treated and un-
treated individuals has to be deﬁned. Within cells characterized by race, sex, age, and
the high school graduation year, a propensity score caliper approach is pursued.7 Only
individuals of the same age, one year younger or one year older are allowed to be matched.
Similarly, only those who receive their high school degree in the same year, one year ear-
lier or later than the treated might become potential controls. Exact matches on these
variables would be preferable, but would substantially reduce the number of potential
controls. Furthermore, only individuals of the same race and sex are matched. Three
races are distinguished, Blacks, Hispanics, and Non-black/Non-hispanics, subsequently
called Whites. Results are presented separately for men and women, but not for races 8.
Within these cells a pool of potential controls is generated for each treated by excluding
all untreated units who exceed an index score caliper ε. The ﬁnal decision of who becomes
an actual control will then be made by minimizing the index score distance. Thus, the
7Propensity score calipers are discussed in Rosenbaum & Rubin (1985: 3) and Rosenbaum (1989:
3.4).
8Apart from the inacceptable reduction of the sample size if one considered Blacks and Hispanics
separately, Ashenfelter & Rouse (1998b) ﬁnd that there is little variability in the estimates of the
return to schooling (annual earnings) by race.
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Table 4.1: Distribution of the Estimated Index Score.
AA BA MA
Estimated Narrow Broad Narrow Broad Narrow Broad
Index C T C T C T C T C T C T
Men
[−6.50 , −5.00) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 3 0
[−5.00 , −3.50) 0 0 0 0 11 0 39 0 378 1 320 1
[−3.50 , −2.50) 0 0 0 0 173 3 288 2 511 3 504 4
[−2.50 , −1.75) 163 6 310 7 446 12 408 7 264 5 256 3
[−1.75 , −1.00) 1100 96 829 77 449 42 310 34 163 12 140 10
[−1.00 , −0.25) 228 68 199 64 263 68 188 50 85 16 64 9
[−0.25 , +0.50) 3 3 10 7 113 114 75 86 38 39 36 32
[+0.50 , +1.50) 0 0 0 0 30 208 30 178 6 72 2 67
[+1.50 , +2.50) 0 0 0 0 1 43 4 85 0 22 0 30
[+2.50 , +3.50] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
Mean index -1.37 -1.10 -1.43 -1.04 -1.51 0.32 -1.77 0.61 -2.74 0.39 -2.72 0.59
Mean p. score 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.62 0.11 0.67 0.04 0.64 0.04 0.69
Observations 1494 173 1348 155 1396 458 1342 450 1462 170 1325 156
Women
[−6.50 , −5.00) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 10 0
[−5.00 , −3.50) 0 0 0 0 9 0 10 0 293 0 296 0
[−3.50 , −2.50) 0 0 7 0 172 2 237 2 524 1 527 1
[−2.50 , −1.75) 230 9 271 6 420 15 444 9 392 7 319 8
[−1.75 , −1.00) 943 96 799 87 508 44 417 34 166 18 152 12
[−1.00 , −0.25) 367 101 318 88 281 84 203 76 105 33 78 24
[−0.25 , +0.50) 18 29 33 36 131 133 76 86 34 31 28 34
[+0.50 , +1.50) 0 0 0 2 33 212 37 169 5 39 7 31
[+1.50 , +2.50) 0 0 0 0 0 33 2 94 0 21 0 27
[+2.50 , +3.50] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 1
Mean index -1.29 -0.89 -1.32 -0.82 -1.45 0.27 -1.63 0.56 -2.60 0.11 -2.66 0.29
Mean p. score 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.24 0.14 0.61 0.12 0.65 0.05 0.54 0.04 0.57
Observations 1558 235 1428 219 1469 495 1426 483 1541 150 1417 138
Comparison of the number of untreated (C) and treated (T) individuals by certain estimated index score intervals.
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distance is deﬁned as
d(xt,xc) =


∞ if |p(xt)− p(xc)| > ε
|p(xt)− p(xc)| else,
(4.9)
where xt and xc denote the matching covariates, and p(·) represents the index score for
given covariates. An inﬁnite distance indicates that matching is forbidden. The caliper
width ε will be set equal to 0.2 for the associate’s degree and to 0.4 for the other degrees.
The latter caliper width lies close to 0.3 which has been chosen as the narrow width in
Chapter 2. A comparatively narrow width is advantageous when it comes to balance of
covariates but might drop many treated individuals who do not ﬁnd controls within their
caliper. Yet, results for male BA holders in Chapter 2 indicate that the loss of treated
units does not lead to adverse consequences. Note that no calipers might allow arbitrarily
large distances between treated and controls, and, moreover, matching algorithms would
consume substantially more time.9
After having constructed the pool of potential controls appropriate wages serving as
the counterfactual wage of the treated person are assigned. The time span between the
year in which the treated unit receives the college degree and the high school diploma –
the treatment phase – is added to the year in which his or her potential controls receive
their high school diploma. The result is considered as the counterfactual year in which his
or her potential controls would have received a college degree. Note that the treatment
phase is not necessarily just the years at college because the treated individual might have
interrupted education for a while. Figure 4.1 illustrates the procedure. The counterfactual
outcome one year after treatment is the wage of the potential control one year after his
hypothetical end of college. If wage information is missing the potential control is dropped
for that year after treatment but is still used for other years. If the wage of the treated
is missing the treated is removed, too. Ten years after college will be examined and each
year will be stratiﬁed separately such that individuals who are removed in some year due
to missing wage information may still be available in other years.
9In each step of the algorithm every treated would have to be compared to the whole control reservoir.
Given a caliper, the treated has to be compared to only a small number of suitable untreated units.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the Evaluation Procedure.
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The ﬁrst diagram demonstrates the optimal case when treated and control individuals receive their high
school diploma in the same year. The second indicates how things change when there is one year diﬀerence.
Additionally, a model is estimated which pools all years after college, i.e. δ0 in equation
(4.5) remains diﬀerent in each year but δ1 and δ2 are restricted to be time-invariant.
10
Moreover, the year in which the treated individual obtained the college degree has an
impact on the eﬀect of college if there is a general (positive or negative) trend in the returns
to education in the economy as a whole. Therefore, the treatment eﬀect in equation (4.5)
will additionally depend on the year, YC , in which the college degree is obtained, so
δ = δ(F,A, YC).
The ﬁnal decision regarding the matching procedure is that on the implementation of
the chosen matching criteria. The question is how the overall distance between treated and
controls is minimized. In this study, optimal full matching as proposed by Rosenbaum
(1991) is used. First, fullmatching means that all treated and, in particular, all untreated
individuals who have ﬁnite distances to treated units and for whom information on all
10Coeﬃcients of the other covariates in OLS estimations are also restricted to be constant over time.
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variables is available are used for stratiﬁcation. The size of the strata is as small as
possible to ensure that the distance of the units within a stratum is not too large. This
yields strata with either one treated and one or more controls or one control and more
than one treated unit. In the end, strata with very high propensity scores tend to contain
more than one treated and strata with low scores tend to consist of a large number of
controls.
In contrast, pairmatching that produces strata with exactly one treated and one control
would force individuals to ﬁnd exactly one partner to be matched to, which, in this
study, might produce a long casualty list of treated (and also untreated) units who do
not ﬁnd a match within the cells and the propensity score calipers. As a result, the
matched sample might be extremely distinct from the original sample and the estimate
of the population mean eﬀect might be biased.11 Moreover, if untreated individuals were
dropped eﬃciency would be reduced. On the other hand, full matching gives each stratum
a weight according to the number of treated persons in the stratum in order to identify
the mean eﬀect of treatment on the treated. Since a few strata contain many treated
units in case of the bachelor’s and graduate degrees, the overall variance increases. Under
these circumstances, full matching estimates are less biased at the expense of reduced
eﬃciency.
Second, optimal matching means that the sum of distances between treated and un-
treated individuals is eﬀectively minimized. In many applications, a so-called greedy
procedure is used. In the case of greedy pair matching, for example, a treated unit would
be randomly chosen and the closest untreated would be searched in the control reservoir
and matched to the treated. The resulting pair would then be removed and the proce-
dure would restart. The outcome of matching would be determined by the random order
of records in the sample. Rosenbaum (1991) shows in a simple but extreme exam-
ple how greedy matching might produce a stratiﬁcation with an arbitrarily large overall
distance. In contrast, an optimal procedure also works backwards and rearranges previ-
ously matched units if necessary. It can easily be transformed into a minimum cost ﬂow
11However, Chapter 2 ﬁnds that for male BA holders this bias seems to be relatively small.
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problem.12 Finally, optimal full matching produces non-overlapping strata facilitating
statistical inference.
OLS Regression
Since a conventional cross-sectional OLS estimator would be an inappropriate comparison
to the matching estimator presented above, individuals and their wages are taken from the
stratiﬁed samples produced by matching. Then, each year after college can separately be
investigated by OLS, as well. The coeﬃcient β in equation (4.7) will additionally depend
on the year, YC , when the college degree was received and, moreover, equation (4.7) will
be augmented by the regressor year in which the high school diploma was received to
make it comparable to matching. Results presented in the next section report both the
mean coeﬃcient estimate βˆ(F¯ , A¯, Y¯C) for the treatment group and the estimated eﬀect
(4.8) resting on two diﬀerent weighting schemes. The ﬁrst one utilizes the weights each
observation receives in the matching estimation, the second one utilizes the conventional
OLS weights. In addition, both schemes are adjusted by NLSY sample weights of 1979.
The two weighting schemes help investigate why OLS and matching estimates might
deviate.
4.4 Results
First, balancing properties after matching are discussed for all college degrees and for
both probit models. They are presented in tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. Since there are ten
diﬀerent stratiﬁcations, one for each year after college, means after matching are weighted
averages over all these years. The weights correspond to the number of strata. The means
are compared by a conventional t-test under the assumption of equal variances in both
groups. A “1” indicates that the means are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Fractions are due
12Bertsekas (1991) discusses linear network optimization and provides fortran-algorithms for min-
imum cost ﬂow problems. Furthermore, there is an operations research procedure called netflow in sas for
these kinds of problems. Gu & Rosenbaum (1993) examine the performance of optimal full matching
in a simulation study.
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Table 4.2: Balance of Covariates, AA.
Men Women
Before After Before After
Year After College C T t C T t % C T t C T t %
Narrow Probit Model
Propensity score 0.10 0.15 0 0.15 0.15 1.00 98 0.12 0.21 0 0.19 0.20 1.00 98
Index score -1.37 -1.10 0 -1.10 -1.10 1.00 97 -1.29 -0.89 0 -0.95 -0.95 1.00 98
Black 0.29 0.21 1 0.22 0.22 1.00 100 0.24 0.30 1 0.25 0.25 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.13 0.18 1 0.19 0.19 1.00 100 0.14 0.14 1 0.13 0.13 1.00 100
Age 17.56 17.61 1 17.85 17.83 1.00 42 17.84 17.71 1 17.92 17.86 1.00 58
Year of high school diploma 79.42 79.14 1 78.80 78.77 1.00 90 78.86 78.76 1 78.53 78.50 1.00 65
Math test scores -4.14 1.17 0 1.15 1.23 1.00 98 -4.56 0.84 0 0.59 0.62 1.00 98
Highest grades of parents 10.29 10.94 0 10.89 10.97 1.00 78 10.21 11.13 0 11.05 11.14 1.00 89
Average percent bias reduction 85 85
Broad Probit Model
Propensity score 0.09 0.17 0 0.16 0.16 1.00 99 0.12 0.24 0 0.22 0.22 1.00 98
Index score -1.43 -1.04 0 -1.08 -1.07 1.00 98 -1.32 -0.82 0 -0.89 -0.88 1.00 98
Black 0.30 0.22 1 0.23 0.23 1.00 100 0.25 0.31 1 0.25 0.25 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.10 0.14 1 0.13 0.13 1.00 100 0.12 0.12 1 0.12 0.12 1.00 100
Age 17.49 17.65 1 17.89 17.90 1.00 86 17.80 17.68 1 17.90 17.84 1.00 45
Year of high school diploma 79.42 78.98 1 78.70 78.66 1.00 90 78.87 78.79 1 78.55 78.52 1.00 47
Math test scores -3.97 1.64 0 0.95 1.36 1.00 93 -4.50 1.07 0 0.77 0.74 1.00 96
Auto+shop test scores 3.85 6.94 0 7.37 6.89 1.00 84 -5.31 -3.65 0 -3.43 -3.73 1.00 82
Attended private school 0.03 0.05 1 0.05 0.04 1.00 63 0.04 0.06 1 0.08 0.06 0.94 -1
Expelled or susp. from school 0.33 0.20 0 0.21 0.19 1.00 79 0.18 0.10 0 0.10 0.09 1.00 79
Curriculum: college prepar. 0.16 0.34 0 0.31 0.34 1.00 83 0.16 0.35 0 0.30 0.37 0.89 65
Curriculum: general 0.59 0.52 1 0.56 0.47 0.94 -18 0.60 0.51 1 0.55 0.47 0.76 11
Highest grades of parents 10.49 11.21 0 11.06 11.12 1.00 88 10.32 11.25 0 11.22 11.18 1.00 90
Occupation parents high 0.08 0.15 0 0.14 0.13 1.00 81 0.07 0.13 0 0.12 0.12 1.00 82
Number of siblings 3.92 3.59 1 3.65 3.44 1.00 36 4.02 3.61 1 3.65 3.54 1.00 67
Born in south 0.38 0.28 1 0.29 0.31 1.00 70 0.40 0.35 1 0.33 0.33 1.00 67
Average percent bias reduction 74 67
For reasons of parsimony, weighted averages over all ten years after college are shown. Weights correspond to the number of strata in each year after
college. C denotes the control or comparison units while T represents treated units, t indicates whether a t-test accepts balance of covariates (t = 1), and
% represents the percent bias reduction. The last row report the simple average over all single percent bias reductions excluding those of the propensity
and index score.
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Table 4.3: Balance of Covariates, BA.
Men Women
Before After Before After
Year After College C T t C T t % C T t C T t %
Narrow Probit Model
Propensity score 0.13 0.61 0 0.55 0.56 1.00 97 0.14 0.59 0 0.57 0.57 1.00 98
Index score -1.51 0.32 0 0.10 0.15 1.00 97 -1.45 0.27 0 0.17 0.20 1.00 98
Black 0.29 0.16 0 0.15 0.15 1.00 100 0.24 0.19 0 0.17 0.17 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.13 0.09 0 0.06 0.06 1.00 100 0.14 0.07 0 0.05 0.05 1.00 100
Age 17.56 17.63 1 17.73 17.73 1.00 72 17.84 17.82 1 18.10 18.08 1.00 -11
Year of high school diploma 79.36 78.77 0 78.71 78.65 1.00 91 78.83 78.49 0 78.21 78.18 1.00 90
Math test scores -4.11 9.84 0 9.29 9.08 1.00 98 -4.55 8.10 0 8.17 7.83 1.00 97
Highest grades of parents 10.30 13.06 0 12.13 12.61 0.12 82 10.22 12.84 0 12.36 12.83 0.12 82
Average percent bias reduction 91 76
Broad Probit Model
Propensity score 0.11 0.67 0 0.59 0.60 1.00 98 0.12 0.65 0 0.60 0.61 1.00 99
Index score -1.77 0.61 0 0.22 0.27 1.00 98 -1.63 0.56 0 0.31 0.34 1.00 98
Black 0.30 0.16 0 0.17 0.17 1.00 100 0.26 0.19 0 0.18 0.18 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.10 0.07 1 0.06 0.06 1.00 100 0.12 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 1.00 100
Age 17.50 17.65 1 17.90 17.87 1.00 77 17.79 17.79 1 18.03 18.02 1.00 –
Year of high school diploma 79.37 78.74 0 78.57 78.51 1.00 90 78.85 78.51 0 78.32 78.22 1.00 72
Math test scores -3.95 10.02 0 8.59 8.58 1.00 98 -4.50 8.35 0 7.62 7.67 1.00 98
Auto+shop test scores 3.88 7.98 0 7.55 7.54 1.00 95 -5.31 -1.60 0 -2.32 -1.45 0.79 76
Attended private school 0.03 0.12 0 0.11 0.10 1.00 80 0.04 0.13 0 0.11 0.09 0.88 65
Expelled or susp. from school 0.33 0.10 0 0.12 0.12 0.95 88 0.18 0.06 0 0.04 0.06 1.00 90
Curriculum: college prepar. 0.16 0.67 0 0.63 0.60 1.00 94 0.16 0.59 0 0.56 0.55 1.00 95
Curriculum: general 0.59 0.28 0 0.31 0.35 1.00 87 0.60 0.33 0 0.36 0.37 1.00 91
Highest grades of parents 10.50 13.21 0 12.31 12.59 0.46 89 10.32 12.95 0 12.31 12.72 0.38 84
Occupation parents high 0.08 0.29 0 0.23 0.23 1.00 95 0.07 0.32 0 0.26 0.27 1.00 96
Number of siblings 3.92 2.64 0 2.78 2.76 1.00 91 4.02 2.91 0 3.32 2.94 0.30 64
Born in south 0.38 0.33 1 0.24 0.31 0.88 -49 0.40 0.37 1 0.36 0.36 0.93 -25
Average percent bias reduction 81 77
For reasons of parsimony, weighted averages over all ten years after college are shown. Weights correspond to the number of strata in each year after
college. C denotes the control or comparison units while T represents treated units, t indicates whether a t-test accepts balance of covariates (t = 1), and
% represents the percent bias reduction. The last row report the simple average over all single percent bias reductions excluding those of the propensity
and index score. For women, the bias reduction in age could not be calculated because of an almost diminishing denominator.
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Table 4.4: Balance of Covariates, MA.
Men Women
Before After Before After
Year After College C T t C T t % C T t C T t %
Narrow Probit Model
Propensity score 0.04 0.64 0 0.48 0.51 1.00 94 0.05 0.54 0 0.38 0.39 1.00 97
Index score -2.74 0.39 0 -0.19 -0.07 1.00 96 -2.60 0.11 0 -0.47 -0.41 1.00 98
Black 0.29 0.08 0 0.09 0.09 1.00 100 0.24 0.10 0 0.05 0.05 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.13 0.09 1 0.05 0.05 1.00 100 0.14 0.10 1 0.06 0.06 1.00 100
Age 17.58 18.05 1 17.79 17.85 1.00 86 17.85 18.20 1 18.61 18.60 1.00 91
Year of high school diploma 79.24 78.29 0 78.53 78.48 1.00 93 78.77 78.05 0 77.72 77.66 1.00 92
Math test scores -4.01 14.00 0 12.21 12.61 1.00 98 -4.51 11.05 0 8.49 8.72 1.00 98
Highest grades of parents 10.31 14.12 0 12.47 12.82 1.00 91 10.22 13.75 0 12.97 13.08 1.00 95
Average percent bias reduction 95 96
Broad Probit Model
Propensity score 0.04 0.69 0 0.44 0.46 1.00 96 0.04 0.57 0 0.41 0.42 1.00 97
Index score -2.72 0.59 0 -0.38 -0.29 1.00 97 -2.66 0.29 0 -0.36 -0.29 1.00 97
Black 0.30 0.06 0 0.07 0.07 1.00 100 0.26 0.11 0 0.06 0.06 1.00 100
Hispanic 0.10 0.07 1 0.04 0.04 1.00 100 0.12 0.07 1 0.05 0.05 1.00 100
Age 17.51 17.96 1 18.40 18.28 1.00 73 17.80 18.24 1 18.48 18.45 1.00 94
Year of high school diploma 79.27 78.40 0 78.12 78.08 1.00 91 78.81 77.97 0 77.88 77.77 1.00 86
Math test scores -3.86 14.20 0 10.26 11.35 1.00 94 -4.47 10.89 0 8.39 8.50 1.00 99
Auto+shop test scores 4.00 9.38 0 7.90 8.95 1.00 78 -5.29 -0.78 0 -0.74 -1.19 1.00 90
Attended private school 0.03 0.14 0 0.07 0.05 1.00 83 0.04 0.13 0 0.10 0.16 1.00 39
Expelled or susp. from school 0.33 0.07 0 0.17 0.15 1.00 88 0.18 0.02 0 0.03 0.03 1.00 95
Curriculum: college prepar. 0.16 0.81 0 0.67 0.67 1.00 97 0.16 0.70 0 0.56 0.61 1.00 92
Curriculum: general 0.58 0.17 0 0.26 0.29 1.00 90 0.60 0.25 0 0.38 0.31 1.00 80
Highest grades of parents 10.51 14.27 0 12.15 12.31 1.00 92 10.32 13.82 0 12.98 13.03 1.00 97
Occupation parents high 0.08 0.41 0 0.31 0.22 0.75 73 0.07 0.35 0 0.26 0.28 1.00 94
Number of siblings 3.91 2.31 0 2.99 2.51 1.00 70 4.02 2.72 0 3.26 2.80 1.00 65
Born in south 0.38 0.27 0 0.17 0.21 1.00 68 0.40 0.33 1 0.32 0.28 1.00 3
Average percent bias reduction 85 81
For reasons of parsimony, weighted averages over all ﬁve years after college are shown. Weights correspond to the number of strata in each year after
college. C denotes the control or comparison units while T represents treated units, t indicates whether a t-test accepts balance of covariates (t = 1), and
% represents the percent bias reduction. The last row report the simple average over all single percent bias reductions excluding those of the propensity
and index score.
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to averaging. Moreover, the percent bias reduction is shown for each variable and as an
average over all variables. For the associate’s degree, overall bias reduction amounts to
85% for the narrow and to roughly 70% for the broad model. For male BA holders, the
reductions are 91% in the narrow and 81% in the broad model; for female BA holders
both numbers are roughly 77%. For the graduate degrees, bias reduction amounts to 95%
in the narrow and to 83% in the broad model. Apparently, percent bias reduction is larger
for higher college degrees. This is because initial biases are markedly more pronounced
for these degrees.
Furthermore, although the broad models achieve less overall bias reduction than the
narrow models, math scores are sometimes as well balanced in the broad as in the narrow
model, and, surprisingly, the broad one achieves a superior balance in parents’ education.
That is, the broad model is as successful with respect to balancing as the narrow one.
The only disadvantage remains that it rests on less observations. In all cases the mean
propensity score of matched treated individuals is lower than the original mean of the
unmatched indicating that treated individuals at the high end of the propensity score
scale have been lost. As expected, this feature is more pronounced in the narrow than in
the broad model. Finally, notice that even after matching covariates of control units are
on average less favorable than those of treated units. Thus, regression adjustment after
matching seems to be a useful tool to further smooth these diﬀerences.
Second, estimation results are discussed thoroughly for the associate’s and the bach-
elor’s degrees for men and women, and, moreover, for the narrow and the broad probit
models. Tables 4.5 to 4.12 present matching and OLS estimates for the ﬁrst ten years
after college completion. Results for the graduate degrees are relegated to the appendix.
They are not very reliable due to small sample size and due to a small common support of
treatment and comparison group. Since δˆ0 is rarely close to 0, the estimates reported in
the tables are retransformed as exp(δˆ0)− 1. For the sake of comparability, equally trans-
formed OLS estimates of Kane & Rouse (1995), who also investigate college degrees
using the NLSY, are reported in the tables, too.
All estimations have been repeated replacing the propensity score distance within
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calipers in equation (4.9) by the Mahalanobis metric. Chapter 2 ﬁnds favorable prop-
erties of the latter distance measure for male BA holders. However, this could not be
generalized. Balance of covariates in the Mahalanobis case turned out to be less advan-
tageous, and the stratiﬁcation to be even less uniform than in the present version. For
that reason, standard errors remained high although more strata were produced from the
same number of treated and control units.
Associate’s Degree
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 are dedicated to men’s results. First note that stratiﬁcation by optimal
full matching has produced almost only 1-k-strata, i.e. strata consisting of one treated and
one or more controls. “k” is supposed to indicate that the number of controls is variable
but at least 1. This structure is responsible for the relatively low ratio of standard errors
between matching and OLS estimates compared to the bachelor’s degree, where numerous
strata contain more than one treated. Furthermore, the number of strata diminishes over
the years. This is because many individuals are not in the sample for the whole ten-year
period after college. In 1994, the last year in the panel, some individuals – especially
younger ones – are just in their, say, seventh year after college.
The eﬀect of the AA on men’s wages seems to increase with years after college for
both the pure and the regression adjusted matching. There appears to be no systematic
diﬀerence between the two estimates. In contrast, OLS coeﬃcient estimates resting on
the stratum weighting scheme do not show a clear time trend. This picture changes when
labor market experience is taken into account to calculate the eﬀect of the degree. Then,
OLS results are more in line with the matching results: though being smaller, the eﬀect
seems to increase, too. Based on the conventional OLS weighting scheme the estimates
of the eﬀects are even smaller than those using stratum weights. This suggests that
OLS might generally identify a parameter that is diﬀerent from what matching identiﬁes.
However, in comparison with Kane & Rouse (1995) the conventional OLS coeﬃcient
estimates are already rather small.
As far as interaction between experience and schooling is concerned, there seems to
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Table 4.5: Treatment Eﬀects, Men, AA, Narrow Probit Model.
OLS Stratiﬁcation
Matching Stratum Weighted Convent. Weighted S T Mean
Year Pure Adjusted Coeﬀ. Eﬀect Coeﬀ. Eﬀect C Max
1 0.068 0.065 0.131*** 0.067*** 0.136** 0.027 132 134 3.0
(0.056) (0.056) (0.038) (0.026) (0.060) (0.045) 1146 3.0
2 0.021 0.025 0.118*** 0.019 0.038 -0.020 134 136 3.0
(0.053) (0.053) (0.037) (0.025) (0.050) (0.039) 1146 3.0
3 0.028 0.064 0.040 0.029 0.038 0.008 131 134 3.0
(0.055) (0.062) (0.036) (0.026) (0.053) (0.043) 1090 4.0
4 0.041 0.065 0.083** 0.060** 0.061 0.053 123 126 4.0
(0.059) (0.063) (0.036) (0.026) (0.059) (0.050) 1087 4.0
5 0.076 0.079 0.218*** 0.067** 0.061 0.001 114 117 2.5
(0.065) (0.070) (0.043) (0.029) (0.058) (0.047) 1043 3.0
6 0.103* 0.111* 0.163*** 0.073*** 0.162*** 0.061 110 110 2.0
(0.062) (0.063) (0.038) (0.027) (0.065) (0.052) 1055 2.0
7 0.161** 0.115 0.255*** 0.126*** 0.187*** 0.096* 101 103 2.0
(0.070) (0.078) (0.047) (0.033) (0.070) (0.057) 1027 2.0
8 0.111* 0.096 0.132*** 0.085*** 0.143** 0.092 88 91 2.5
(0.063) (0.081) (0.045) (0.033) (0.071) (0.061) 976 3.0
9 0.172** 0.209** 0.134*** 0.151*** 0.169** 0.143** 73 75 3.0
(0.075) (0.117) (0.043) (0.035) (0.080) (0.074) 858 3.0
10 0.210*** 0.219*** 0.187*** 0.150*** 0.187** 0.120* 64 65 2.0
(0.078) (0.079) (0.044) (0.035) (0.084) (0.075) 778 2.0
Kane & Rouse (1995) 0.230
(0.049)
Heterogeneity, Pooled Model
Year 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.006*** 0.007
degree (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005)
Math -0.006*** -0.005** -0.007*** -0.004***
scores (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Educ 0.013* 0.010 0.014*** 0.011*
parents (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *:
10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Stratum weighted denotes the weighting scheme that corresponds to
matching and conventionally weighted denotes the usual OLS weighting. All weighting takes
account of the NLSY sample weights. The last three columns reﬂect stratiﬁcation results; S:
number of strata, T: number of treated, and C: number of control units. The last three rows
report pooled model estimates of variables which might drive heterogeneity. The critical ε is set
equal to 0.2.
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Table 4.6: Treatment Eﬀects, Men, AA, Broad Probit Model.
OLS Stratiﬁcation
Matching Stratum Weighted Convent. Weighted S T Mean
Year Pure Adjusted Coeﬀ. Eﬀect Coeﬀ. Eﬀect C Max
1 0.088 0.027 0.099** 0.043 0.112* -0.010 117 117 –
(0.071) (0.065) (0.045) (0.031) (0.064) (0.047) 946 –
2 -0.010 0.007 0.120*** -0.020 0.057 -0.034 118 118 –
(0.057) (0.053) (0.043) (0.028) (0.055) (0.042) 922 –
3 0.023 0.044 0.063 0.037 0.028 0.016 118 118 –
(0.063) (0.066) (0.042) (0.031) (0.057) (0.048) 935 –
4 0.055 0.065 0.064* 0.065** 0.065 0.052 112 112 –
(0.061) (0.069) (0.040) (0.029) (0.064) (0.053) 933 –
5 0.084 0.097 0.152*** 0.071** 0.109* 0.060 102 102 –
(0.069) (0.081) (0.041) (0.030) (0.067) (0.056) 901 –
6 0.100 0.126* 0.195*** 0.082*** 0.132** 0.061 97 97 –
(0.073) (0.077) (0.045) (0.031) (0.068) (0.056) 888 –
7 0.163** 0.059 0.227*** 0.126*** 0.158** 0.091 93 93 –
(0.074) (0.084) (0.050) (0.036) (0.073) (0.062) 880 –
8 0.111* 0.164** 0.157*** 0.130*** 0.087 0.082 83 83 –
(0.067) (0.085) (0.050) (0.039) (0.071) (0.064) 810 –
9 0.126* 0.185** 0.166*** 0.102*** 0.138* 0.087 68 68 –
(0.081) (0.093) (0.048) (0.037) (0.079) (0.071) 694 –
10 0.086 0.152 0.091* 0.062 0.098 0.079 58 58 –
(0.106) (0.124) (0.050) (0.040) (0.086) (0.079) 622 –
Kane & Rouse (1995) 0.230
(0.049)
Heterogeneity, Pooled Model
Year 0.018*** 0.013* 0.008*** 0.016***
degree (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Math -0.004 -0.002 -0.003*** -0.002
scores (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Educ 0.011 0.006 0.016*** 0.026***
parents (0.009) (0.016) (0.004) (0.007)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *:
10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Stratum weighted denotes the weighting scheme that corresponds to
matching and conventionally weighted denotes the usual OLS weighting. All weighting takes
account of the NLSY sample weights. The last three columns reﬂect stratiﬁcation results; S:
number of strata, T: number of treated, and C: number of control units. The last three rows
report pooled model estimates of variables which might drive heterogeneity. The critical ε is set
equal to 0.2.
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be no evidence for it to be of any importance. If interaction between experience and
education is omitted, OLS results hardly change. This means that experience of college
graduates is not rewarded any more than experience of high school graduates. Rather, the
data reveal that the increasing eﬀect can partly be attributed to a faster accumulation of
experience after college on the part of AA holders than of high school graduates. Besides,
heterogeneity in the treatment eﬀect is detected for the pooled model, whose results are
presented in the last three rows of the tables. Math scores lower the eﬀect of two-year
college education while parents’ education has only a weakly signiﬁcantly positive impact.
However, for each single year after college – not shown in the tables –, the coeﬃcients
are not statistically signiﬁcant even though the signs almost always coincide with the
signs of the pooled models’ estimates. A time trend in the eﬀect captured by year of the
college degree obviously plays an important role conﬁrming rising returns to education
as recently reported in the literature, see e.g. Bound & Johnson (1992), Katz &
Murphy (1992), or Levy & Murnane (1992).
Results based on the broad model are similar in structure, estimates of the ninth and
tenth year tend to be somewhat smaller. As expected, the number of strata diminishes.
This is because there are more missing observations when more covariates are included,
but obviously not because there are more strata containing at least two treated units.
For the bachelor’s degree, the latter will be a main reason for reduction of the number of
strata in the broad model.
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 present results for women. The most striking diﬀerence to the results
for men are markedly higher estimates which are even comparable to estimates for male
BA holders. Kane & Rouse (1995) attribute the high results for female AA holders to
the nursing degree which considerably increases their estimate based on data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972. Based on the NLSY their
estimate is more or less in accordance with the corresponding OLS estimates in this study.
However, returns to college are generally found to be higher for women than for men, see
for instance Ashenfelter & Rouse (1998b).
A clear time trend in women’s estimates does not emerge. In contrast to men, pure
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Table 4.7: Treatment Eﬀects, Women, AA, Narrow Probit Model.
OLS Stratiﬁcation
Matching Stratum Weighted Convent. Weighted S T Mean
Year Pure Adjusted Coeﬀ. Eﬀect Coeﬀ. Eﬀect C Max
1 0.185*** 0.233*** 0.156*** 0.191*** 0.206*** 0.184*** 179 183 3.0
(0.052) (0.062) (0.039) (0.028) (0.061) (0.047) 1212 4.0
2 0.259*** 0.264*** 0.107*** 0.224*** 0.219*** 0.217*** 167 170 2.5
(0.058) (0.070) (0.038) (0.030) (0.064) (0.050) 1193 3.0
3 0.217*** 0.171*** 0.133*** 0.188*** 0.129** 0.157*** 163 166 2.5
(0.067) (0.069) (0.039) (0.031) (0.055) (0.046) 1187 3.0
4 0.401*** 0.413*** 0.359*** 0.370*** 0.320*** 0.320*** 151 153 3.0
(0.070) (0.078) (0.049) (0.037) (0.070) (0.058) 1179 3.0
5 0.362*** 0.342*** 0.293*** 0.303*** 0.236*** 0.281*** 149 150 2.0
(0.077) (0.085) (0.044) (0.034) (0.063) (0.054) 1122 2.0
6 0.282*** 0.247*** 0.268*** 0.258*** 0.244*** 0.272*** 135 135 –
(0.069) (0.073) (0.040) (0.032) (0.068) (0.060) 1087 –
7 0.311*** 0.318*** 0.195*** 0.276*** 0.239*** 0.273*** 121 122 2.0
(0.077) (0.104) (0.043) (0.035) (0.070) (0.060) 1032 2.0
8 0.179*** 0.137* -0.015 0.158*** 0.033 0.163*** 98 99 2.0
(0.073) (0.082) (0.036) (0.033) (0.060) (0.059) 930 2.0
9 0.269*** 0.279*** 0.043 0.251*** 0.070 0.248*** 85 85 –
(0.085) (0.095) (0.038) (0.036) (0.071) (0.072) 851 –
10 0.298*** 0.314*** 0.077* 0.290*** 0.154** 0.291*** 80 80 –
(0.099) (0.115) (0.047) (0.043) (0.084) (0.081) 768 –
Kane & Rouse (1995) 0.206
(0.044)
Heterogeneity, Pooled Model
Year -0.005 -0.004 -0.023*** -0.023***
degree (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Math 0.002 0.003 0.003*** 0.001
scores (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Educ 0.015** 0.014 0.004 0.007
parents (0.006) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *:
10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Stratum weighted denotes the weighting scheme that corresponds to
matching and conventionally weighted denotes the usual OLS weighting. All weighting takes
account of the NLSY sample weights. The last three columns reﬂect stratiﬁcation results; S:
number of strata, T: number of treated, and C: number of control units. The last three rows
report pooled model estimates of variables which might drive heterogeneity. The critical ε is set
equal to 0.2.
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Table 4.8: Treatment Eﬀects, Women, AA, Broad Probit Model.
OLS Stratiﬁcation
Matching Stratum Weighted Convent. Weighted S T Mean
Year Pure Adjusted Coeﬀ. Eﬀect Coeﬀ. Eﬀect C Max
1 0.230*** 0.242*** 0.188*** 0.199*** 0.173*** 0.163*** 169 171 2.0
(0.061) (0.062) (0.042) (0.030) (0.060) (0.047) 1051 2.0
2 0.288*** 0.290*** 0.083** 0.227*** 0.176*** 0.180*** 156 159 2.5
(0.066) (0.072) (0.041) (0.033) (0.059) (0.047) 1008 3.0
3 0.197*** 0.145** 0.083** 0.162*** 0.128** 0.160*** 152 156 2.0
(0.059) (0.065) (0.041) (0.032) (0.059) (0.050) 1009 2.0
4 0.336*** 0.382*** 0.263*** 0.311*** 0.263*** 0.274*** 138 142 2.0
(0.077) (0.091) (0.048) (0.037) (0.071) (0.059) 988 2.0
5 0.335*** 0.326*** 0.207*** 0.273*** 0.165*** 0.231*** 138 139 2.0
(0.069) (0.083) (0.042) (0.033) (0.062) (0.054) 945 2.0
6 0.387*** 0.363*** 0.231*** 0.355*** 0.183*** 0.285*** 124 124 –
(0.091) (0.087) (0.046) (0.041) (0.067) (0.063) 916 –
7 0.403*** 0.376*** 0.168*** 0.327*** 0.217*** 0.253*** 109 110 2.0
(0.090) (0.093) (0.048) (0.041) (0.075) (0.065) 861 2.0
8 0.197** 0.126 -0.015 0.176*** 0.013 0.089 91 91 –
(0.093) (0.087) (0.044) (0.040) (0.066) (0.061) 745 –
9 0.197** 0.159* -0.007 0.162*** 0.057 0.134** 80 80 –
(0.087) (0.095) (0.044) (0.041) (0.072) (0.068) 677 –
10 0.242*** 0.193** 0.023 0.202*** 0.089 0.188*** 75 75 –
(0.100) (0.107) (0.050) (0.045) (0.081) (0.076) 631 –
Kane & Rouse (1995) 0.206
(0.044)
Heterogeneity, Pooled Model
Year 0.005 0.009 -0.016*** -0.018***
degree (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Math 0.005** 0.005* 0.006*** 0.001
scores (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Educ 0.018** 0.017 -0.001 0.003
parents (0.007) (0.013) (0.004) (0.006)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *:
10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Stratum weighted denotes the weighting scheme that corresponds to
matching and conventionally weighted denotes the usual OLS weighting. All weighting takes
account of the NLSY sample weights. The last three columns reﬂect stratiﬁcation results; S:
number of strata, T: number of treated, and C: number of control units. The last three rows
report pooled model estimates of variables which might drive heterogeneity. The critical ε is set
equal to 0.2.
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and adjusted matching as well as OLS eﬀect estimates are all fairly similar. Surprisingly,
they are even not lower than the OLS coeﬃcient estimates indicating that labor market
experience is either negatively rewarded or that women with an AA have more experience
than high school graduates. Inspecting the data more closely reveals that although labor
market experience is smaller for college-educated women, it is larger when it is augmented
by experience acquired while being enrolled at school. This fact is further emphasized by
an even higher return to the latter experience. This rather strange pattern might explain
why women’s estimates of the eﬀect are extraordinarily high. Their OLS coeﬃcient esti-
mates, however, would be more akin to men’s AA results. Moreover, heterogeneity in the
eﬀects is not supported by the data except for some negative time trend statistically sig-
niﬁcant only for OLS estimation and except for a signiﬁcant impact of parents’ education
in pure matching only. Note that stratiﬁcation produced again almost always 1-k-strata.
Almost all OLS coeﬃcient estimates of the broad model are slightly smaller than those
of the narrow model. OLS eﬀect estimates of the broad model tend to be smaller than
matching estimates. Furthermore, conventionally weighted OLS eﬀect estimates are lower
than the stratum weighted ones. In contrast to the narrow model, heterogeneity in the
eﬀects appears to be driven by the math scores. Finally, the number of strata is only
reduced a little indicating that the additional covariates in the broad model do not have
a great impact on selection into college.
Bachelor’s Degree
Estimation results for male BA holders are summarized in tables 4.9 and 4.10. As for the
associate’s degree, the eﬀects seem to increase over time reaching 30% to 40%. Regres-
sion adjusted matching estimates are, on average, higher than the pure matching ones
suggesting that there might still be a certain downward bias in the latter.
OLS coeﬃcient estimates do not show an increase with years after college; however,
once labor market experience is taken into account a certain trend in the eﬀects reappears.
This means that at the beginning experience is either rewarded more than in late years
or that college-educated individuals tend to successively accumulate more labor market
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Table 4.9: Treatment Eﬀects, Men, BA, Narrow Probit Model.
OLS Stratiﬁcation
Matching Stratum Weighted Convent. Weighted S T Mean
Year Pure Adjusted Coeﬀ. Eﬀect Coeﬀ. Eﬀect C Max
1 0.028 0.071 0.186** 0.015 0.302*** 0.029 206 364 5.3
(0.092) (0.090) (0.081) (0.024) (0.087) (0.036) 971 28.0
2 0.153* 0.217*** 0.431*** 0.135*** 0.420*** 0.119*** 206 367 5.7
(0.084) (0.083) (0.086) (0.026) (0.086) (0.037) 973 28.0
3 0.209** 0.241** 0.695*** 0.240*** 0.494*** 0.203*** 201 352 5.4
(0.104) (0.115) (0.098) (0.029) (0.089) (0.042) 967 26.0
4 0.213** 0.258** 0.568*** 0.219*** 0.348*** 0.188*** 205 343 5.5
(0.107) (0.123) (0.075) (0.027) (0.074) (0.039) 959 22.0
5 0.229*** 0.275*** 0.118 0.487*** 0.298*** 0.247*** 195 322 5.7
(0.082) (0.105) (0.077) (0.049) (0.073) (0.044) 931 24.0
6 0.281*** 0.309** 0.399*** 0.271*** 0.396*** 0.228*** 183 306 5.8
(0.122) (0.154) (0.067) (0.032) (0.080) (0.045) 896 22.0
7 0.341*** 0.419** 0.349*** 0.279*** 0.339*** 0.267*** 169 279 5.6
(0.150) (0.195) (0.066) (0.032) (0.075) (0.046) 833 20.0
8 0.420*** 0.565*** 0.633*** 0.600*** 0.424*** 0.301*** 146 247 5.4
(0.193) (0.247) (0.122) (0.061) (0.091) (0.054) 758 19.0
9 0.261** 0.327*** 0.434*** 0.299*** 0.504*** 0.293*** 118 200 5.6
(0.132) (0.125) (0.091) (0.042) (0.110) (0.061) 649 21.0
10 0.301** 0.321*** 0.491*** 0.301*** 0.416*** 0.295*** 94 157 5.8
(0.138) (0.141) (0.108) (0.044) (0.119) (0.069) 488 16.0
Kane & Rouse (1995) 0.403
(0.043)
Heterogeneity, Pooled Model
Year 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.025*** 0.017***
degree (0.011) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004)
Math 0.009*** 0.005* 0.008*** 0.004***
scores (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Educ -0.011 0.026 0.040*** -0.004
parents (0.010) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *:
10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Stratum weighted denotes the weighting scheme that corresponds to
matching and conventionally weighted denotes the usual OLS weighting. All weighting takes
account of the NLSY sample weights. The last three columns reﬂect stratiﬁcation results; S:
number of strata, T: number of treated, and C: number of control units. The last three rows
report pooled model estimates of variables which might drive heterogeneity. The critical ε is set
equal to 0.4.
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Table 4.10: Treatment Eﬀects, Men, BA, Broad Probit Model.
OLS Stratiﬁcation
Matching Stratum Weighted Convent. Weighted S T Mean
Year Pure Adjusted Coeﬀ. Eﬀect Coeﬀ. Eﬀect C Max
1 -0.001 0.002 0.183** -0.019 0.326*** -0.030 162 316 4.6
(0.081) (0.078) (0.083) (0.024) (0.096) (0.035) 754 22.0
2 0.160** 0.188** 0.630*** 0.190*** 0.508*** 0.097** 162 307 4.8
(0.080) (0.079) (0.122) (0.033) (0.107) (0.041) 801 20.0
3 0.183** 0.234*** 0.288*** 0.159*** 0.391*** 0.214*** 163 287 4.4
(0.079) (0.087) (0.082) (0.029) (0.093) (0.045) 756 23.0
4 0.188*** 0.238*** 0.365*** 0.223*** 0.385*** 0.196*** 159 284 4.5
(0.078) (0.083) (0.085) (0.032) (0.089) (0.046) 794 20.0
5 0.202*** 0.207*** 0.287*** 0.204*** 0.341*** 0.187*** 150 267 4.5
(0.074) (0.081) (0.061) (0.029) (0.079) (0.044) 785 20.0
6 0.232*** 0.215*** 0.275*** 0.209*** 0.368*** 0.223*** 145 252 4.7
(0.085) (0.078) (0.064) (0.032) (0.085) (0.050) 720 19.0
7 0.279*** 0.292*** 0.403*** 0.242*** 0.363*** 0.260*** 133 227 3.9
(0.093) (0.091) (0.079) (0.036) (0.085) (0.052) 707 19.0
8 0.288*** 0.251** 0.487*** 0.293*** 0.458*** 0.282*** 119 206 4.3
(0.107) (0.121) (0.097) (0.044) (0.106) (0.061) 573 19.0
9 0.357*** 0.431*** 0.380*** 0.291*** 0.484*** 0.286*** 102 175 4.2
(0.134) (0.154) (0.103) (0.051) (0.119) (0.067) 529 17.0
10 0.422*** 0.477*** 0.726*** 0.434*** 0.512*** 0.270*** 74 138 4.0
(0.162) (0.178) (0.137) (0.052) (0.137) (0.074) 425 16.0
Kane & Rouse (1995) 0.403
(0.043)
Heterogeneity, Pooled Model
Year 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.007** 0.007
degree (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
Math 0.006** 0.009** 0.010*** 0.004***
scores (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Educ 0.005 0.021 0.014*** -0.001
parents (0.011) (0.022) (0.004) (0.005)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *:
10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Stratum weighted denotes the weighting scheme that corresponds to
matching and conventionally weighted denotes the usual OLS weighting. All weighting takes
account of the NLSY sample weights. The last three columns reﬂect stratiﬁcation results; S:
number of strata, T: number of treated, and C: number of control units. The last three rows
report pooled model estimates of variables which might drive heterogeneity. The critical ε is set
equal to 0.4.
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experience than high school graduates. A closer inspection of the data reveals that the
diﬀerence in labor market experience (acquired while not enrolled at college) between
BA holders and high school graduates is 3.65 years in the ﬁrst year after college and
decreases monotonically to 2.28 in the tenth year. Thus, the bachelor’s degree has a
direct eﬀect on the growth of experience which might be explained by a lower probability
to get unemployed or by a distinct labor supply behavior of highly educated individuals.
A comparison of estimates with and without interaction between experience and schooling
exhibits almost no diﬀerences. Therefore, they are omitted.
Further note that the OLS estimates of the eﬀect are relatively similar to the matching
estimates, but with roughly three to four times lower standard errors. This is because the
eﬀective sample size of matching corresponds to the number of strata while OLS relies on
all treated and untreated units together. What is more, since stratum eﬀects are weighted
according to the number of treated they comprise, variances are larger if the stratiﬁcation
is not very uniform. This is conﬁrmed by the mean and maximum number of treated
units in strata with more than one treated. Speciﬁcally, the latter reason leads to a high
standard error ratio between matching and OLS estimates.
Interestingly, OLS eﬀect estimates resting on the stratum weighting scheme are higher
than those resting on the conventional weights. This might conﬁrm the ﬁnding in An-
grist & Krueger (1999) although OLS in this study does not build on a saturated
linear model. They show that due to diﬀerent weighting schemes matching and a satu-
rated linear model estimated by OLS produce diﬀerent estimates if the treatment eﬀect is
heterogeneous. Indeed, heterogeneity plays an important role in the eﬀect of the bache-
lor’s degree: scores on the math test tend to signiﬁcantly increase the eﬀect. Yet, parents’
education seems to have no clearly directed impact on the eﬀects. In addition, the row
labeled “Year degree” shows that there is a clear time trend in the eﬀects of the bachelor’s
degree in that individuals who obtained their degree more recently experience a higher
eﬀect of their education.
All results of the broad model are somewhat smaller than those of the narrow one which
indicates that the additional covariates of the broad model might have an additional
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impact on earnings. Besides, their impact on selection into college is strong which is
why the number of strata is substantially reduced. Nevertheless, standard errors of the
matching estimates do not increase because stratiﬁcation of the broad model is more
uniform; only those of the OLS estimates are slightly higher than in the narrow model.
Results for women are presented in tables 4.11 and 4.12. Once more they are larger
than men’s. Alas, in contrast to men, there is no clearly increasing trend in the pure
matching eﬀects over the years. There might be some weak positive trend in regression
adjusted estimates which tend to be lower than pure matching estimates in early years.
OLS coeﬃcient estimates exceed the matching estimates by far and do not display a time
pattern while, once experience is accounted for, the resulting OLS eﬀects are smaller and
appear to increase over time. One reason is, as for men, that labor market experience is
accumulated more rapidly by college graduates than by high school graduates. The diﬀer-
ence in experience in the ﬁrst year after college is 3.56 years and diminishes monotonically
to 1.25 – even faster than for men.
Moreover, there is no marked diﬀerence between OLS eﬀects using stratum weights and
eﬀects using conventional weights. This might be explained by the heterogeneity pattern
expressed in the last two rows. While math scores exhibit a positive impact on the eﬀect
of a bachelor’s degree, education of parents seems to have a negative inﬂuence. In sum,
these two opposing interactions might explain the ﬁnding. Furthermore, there is again
strong evidence in favor of a time trend in the eﬀects expressed by the row “Year degree”.
That is, women who received their degree more recently appear to beneﬁt more from
their education. Finally, optimal full matching produced a stratiﬁcation that is hardly
more uniform than men’s stratiﬁcation; the mean and maximum number of treated units
in strata consisting of more than one treated is only somewhat reduced. However, since
there are more treated women more strata are generated.
The broad model produces lower matching but higher OLS coeﬃcient estimates than
the narrow model. By contrast, OLS eﬀect estimates are again lower. Alas, they show
an increase with years after college that appears somewhat more pronounced than the
increase in the matching estimates. Finally, the broad model relies on a smaller sample
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Table 4.11: Treatment Eﬀects, Women, BA, Narrow Probit Model.
OLS Stratiﬁcation
Matching Stratum Weighted Convent. Weighted S T Mean
Year Pure Adjusted Coeﬀ. Eﬀect Coeﬀ. Eﬀect C Max
1 0.221*** 0.163** 0.399*** 0.234*** 0.414*** 0.208*** 242 424 5.2
(0.085) (0.086) (0.087) (0.032) (0.084) (0.042) 1032 30.0
2 0.297*** 0.239*** 0.508*** 0.264*** 0.666*** 0.293*** 234 412 5.2
(0.087) (0.101) (0.076) (0.028) (0.093) (0.044) 1037 28.0
3 0.413*** 0.278*** 0.712*** 0.325*** 0.761*** 0.368*** 230 407 5.2
(0.099) (0.109) (0.088) (0.031) (0.094) (0.046) 1022 26.0
4 0.372*** 0.297*** 0.783*** 0.332*** 0.664*** 0.342*** 222 382 5.2
(0.099) (0.100) (0.082) (0.031) (0.090) (0.048) 984 23.0
5 0.440*** 0.365*** 0.767*** 0.376*** 0.607*** 0.392*** 203 352 4.5
(0.108) (0.130) (0.093) (0.039) (0.093) (0.054) 935 20.0
6 0.515*** 0.542*** 0.918*** 0.465*** 0.710*** 0.406*** 191 345 4.9
(0.141) (0.156) (0.102) (0.043) (0.103) (0.059) 891 25.0
7 0.462*** 0.417*** 0.733*** 0.411*** 0.574*** 0.492*** 185 318 4.7
(0.142) (0.139) (0.095) (0.041) (0.094) (0.062) 825 22.0
8 0.472*** 0.424*** 0.604*** 0.429*** 0.628*** 0.506*** 162 278 5.3
(0.145) (0.155) (0.090) (0.045) (0.108) (0.068) 744 18.0
9 0.569*** 0.565*** 0.566*** 0.599*** 0.737*** 0.665*** 129 205 4.1
(0.163) (0.176) (0.107) (0.058) (0.131) (0.085) 653 10.0
10 0.531*** 0.436** 0.292*** 0.526*** 0.622*** 0.515*** 104 151 4.0
(0.188) (0.215) (0.105) (0.063) (0.142) (0.087) 554 10.0
Kane & Rouse (1995) 0.392
(0.042)
Heterogeneity, Pooled Model
Year 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.011*** 0.012***
degree (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Math 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.011***
scores (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Educ -0.018** -0.042*** -0.030*** -0.006
parents (0.008) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *:
10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Stratum weighted denotes the weighting scheme that corresponds to
matching and conventionally weighted denotes the usual OLS weighting. All weighting takes
account of the NLSY sample weights. The last three columns reﬂect stratiﬁcation results; S:
number of strata, T: number of treated, and C: number of control units. The last three rows
report pooled model estimates of variables which might drive heterogeneity. The critical ε is set
equal to 0.4.
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Table 4.12: Treatment Eﬀects, Women, BA, Broad Probit Model.
OLS Stratiﬁcation
Matching Stratum Weighted Convent. Weighted S T Mean
Year Pure Adjusted Coeﬀ. Eﬀect Coeﬀ. Eﬀect C Max
1 0.223*** 0.189** 0.364*** 0.187*** 0.355*** 0.149*** 201 361 4.8
(0.087) (0.087) (0.097) (0.034) (0.088) (0.041) 806 16.0
2 0.276*** 0.205** 0.621*** 0.235*** 0.588*** 0.235*** 190 349 5.0
(0.089) (0.090) (0.101) (0.032) (0.098) (0.045) 800 18.0
3 0.335*** 0.289*** 0.690*** 0.276*** 0.538*** 0.295*** 184 341 4.8
(0.102) (0.111) (0.104) (0.035) (0.095) (0.048) 786 18.0
4 0.296*** 0.207** 0.775*** 0.245*** 0.517*** 0.235*** 176 326 5.1
(0.097) (0.101) (0.102) (0.033) (0.094) (0.049) 756 16.0
5 0.441*** 0.468*** 0.962*** 0.363*** 0.536*** 0.327*** 164 299 5.1
(0.117) (0.158) (0.138) (0.046) (0.102) (0.057) 709 15.0
6 0.530*** 0.521*** 1.600*** 0.448*** 0.690*** 0.415*** 154 287 5.3
(0.157) (0.171) (0.198) (0.054) (0.118) (0.066) 681 17.0
7 0.354*** 0.386*** 0.851*** 0.307*** 0.402*** 0.354*** 141 265 4.9
(0.128) (0.157) (0.132) (0.044) (0.100) (0.065) 677 17.0
8 0.367*** 0.326** 0.927*** 0.267*** 0.453*** 0.369*** 125 232 4.8
(0.138) (0.158) (0.132) (0.043) (0.114) (0.072) 623 18.0
9 0.664*** 0.507*** 0.954*** 0.599*** 0.613*** 0.613*** 104 179 4.3
(0.167) (0.166) (0.146) (0.063) (0.138) (0.092) 525 17.0
10 0.501*** 0.392** 0.528*** 0.478*** 0.537*** 0.492*** 80 129 4.8
(0.222) (0.191) (0.133) (0.063) (0.161) (0.100) 442 13.0
Kane & Rouse (1995) 0.392
(0.042)
Heterogeneity, Pooled Model
Year 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.006 0.011***
degree (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
Math 0.011*** 0.008** 0.006*** 0.006***
scores (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
Educ 0.001 -0.027* -0.027*** -0.009*
parents (0.010) (0.015) (0.004) (0.005)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *:
10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Stratum weighted denotes the weighting scheme that corresponds to
matching and conventionally weighted denotes the usual OLS weighting. All weighting takes
account of the NLSY sample weights. The last three columns reﬂect stratiﬁcation results; S:
number of strata, T: number of treated, and C: number of control units. The last three rows
report pooled model estimates of variables which might drive heterogeneity. The critical ε is set
equal to 0.4.
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size due to the reasons already mentioned above. On the other hand, its stratiﬁcation is
unequivocally more uniform than that of the narrow model.
Graduate Degrees
Owing to small sample size results are only brieﬂy discussed. Tables are relegated to
appendix C. The eﬀect of a graduate degree is higher than the eﬀect of an AA or of a
BA for both men and women. There is no clear structure in estimation results for men,
e.g. OLS eﬀects do not coincide with matching estimates. In contrast, for women, there
is still the clear relationship between matching and OLS eﬀect estimates.
There is one interesting result worthy of mention. For men, the OLS eﬀect estimate is
larger when the stratum weighting scheme is used in place of conventional OLS weighting.
At the same time, heterogeneity is very strong in that math scores and education of
parents exhibit a signiﬁcantly positive impact on the eﬀect. By contrast, for women,
the positive impact of math scores and the negative impact of parents’ education might
weaken overall heterogeneity. This might explain why there is no systematic diﬀerence
between the stratum weighted and the conventionally weighted OLS eﬀect estimates. This
observation is also in line with results discussed above.
As a general remark, hence, although the linear model estimated by OLS is no saturated
one, the results do not contradict the theoretical ﬁnding that in calculating the mean eﬀect
of treatment, matching puts the most weight on individuals most likely to participate in
treatment while a saturated OLS estimation puts the most weight on individuals with
a participation probability of 1/2 (Angrist & Krueger, 1999). Since those men who
are most likely to attend college also gain most from their education, matching estimates
for men are higher than OLS estimates. For those women who are most likely to attend
college, however, evidence is weak for a larger gain from their education which is why
OLS and matching do not diﬀer much.
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4.5 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter evaluates college education as to its eﬀects in the labor market. It slightly
modiﬁes the concept of the return to education frequently used in the literature. While
college students are enrolled, high school graduates might acquire labor market experi-
ence in the meantime. The control group should therefore comprise individuals with a
higher level of labor market experience than the treatment group. The concept of return
to education would impose equality in the experience levels of treated and controls. Fur-
thermore, after college, there might also be an eﬀect of treatment on the accumulation of
labor market experience. Thus, focus is on the eﬀect of college education on earnings.
In contrast to the existing literature the method of matching is used to estimate the
eﬀects. It relaxes linearity and parametric assumptions on the model. However, even if
alternatively the linear model was augmented by numerous interaction terms up to a fully
saturated linear model to account for an arbitrary functional form, Angrist & Krueger
(1999) show that it would not necessarily identify the same parameter as matching. This is
because matching and OLS implicitly impose a diﬀerent weighting scheme on observations
which might lead to diﬀerent results if the treatment eﬀect is heterogeneous. To assess
the diﬀerence, the matching results are compared to conventional OLS estimation.
Indeed, there seems to be evidence that matching and OLS diﬀer systematically when
heterogeneity in the eﬀect is substantial. The eﬀect of a BA or MA on men’s wages looks
as if it depends signiﬁcantly on ability and parents’ education. The eﬀect of a BA or MA
on women’s wages appears to be positively inﬂuenced by math scores, too, but negatively
by parents’ education. At the same time, matching and OLS estimates diﬀer less for
women than for men. The case for AA is inconclusive.
BA or MA recipients are quite distinct from high school graduates, in other words,
selection into postsecondary education is extremely strong. This fact makes it very diﬃ-
cult to ﬁnd adequate controls for each treated unit. In contrast, individuals with an AA
are much less self-selected which is why matching AA holders is unburdensome. Under
these circumstances, optimal full matching has the advantage for being data-adaptive. It
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keeps almost all treated individuals of the sample and generates suitable strata in accor-
dance with the necessities of the sample. For example, it produces strata with one treated
and a variable number of controls in case of the associate’s degree, while, in case of the
bachelor’s degree, it also produces strata with more than one treated unit. Besides, it
minimizes the total distance between treated and control units.
Albeit, matching is accompanied by considerably larger standard errors than OLS
which, however, has not come as a surprise. As a nonparametric technique matching is
data-hungry; the eﬀective sample size roughly equals the number of strata while for OLS
it is the sum of treated and untreated units that matters. As a further disadvantage, full
matching comes with a rather non-uniform stratiﬁcation. Some strata comprise a large
number of treated units. As a result, estimated standard errors are inﬂated.
Moreover, matching on two diﬀerent propensity score estimates is performed. First,
the propensity score is estimated by a narrow probit model based on ability and parents’
education only, and by a broad probit model augmented by numerous further socioe-
conomic indicators and another ability variable. Yet, results of the two models do not
diﬀer considerably, with the exception that for some degrees matching estimates of the
broad model tend to be slightly lower than estimates of the narrow model. This points
to a possible small upward bias in the latter. In consequence, however, one might argue
that already the two variables parents’ education and math scores capture the abstract
concepts of family background and ability quite well.
The empirical results are along the lines of the existing literature. For men, results
obtained by conventionally weighted OLS are similar to results reported in Kane &
Rouse (1995: table 3). In contrast, for women, results seem to be larger in this study,
speciﬁcally for female BA and MA recipients. What is more, female AA holders experience
a surprisingly large eﬀect, almost as large as that of male BA holders. Nevertheless,
estimates of the eﬀect of college education are generally larger for women than for men,
which is conﬁrmed by this study, as well. Individuals who obtained their degree more
recently experience a higher eﬀect, i.e. there is some general increase as also witnessed in
the literature. Moreover, the eﬀect looks to be increasing during the ﬁrst ten years after
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college completion. Yet, this increase cannot be attributed to an interaction between
experience and education but partly to a faster accumulation of experience for college
graduates.
In sum, the method used in this chapter leads to results that, basically, do not con-
tradict the existing literature which means that the linear approach to the human capital
earnings function appears to adequately capture information provided by the data. What
is more, due to its stronger assumptions OLS estimates are accompanied by consider-
ably lower standard errors. Yet, OLS and matching might identify distinct parameters
if heterogeneity in the eﬀect is systematic in those variables relevant for selection into
treatment.
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Appendix A: The Probit Estimations
Appendix A discusses the estimation of the propensity score by probit models for all three
college degrees. Table 4.13 displays the results. Two models are speciﬁed: a narrow and
a broad one. The broad model includes several covariates that reﬂect socioeconomic back-
ground which is condensed into education of parents in the narrow model. Furthermore,
it comprises two ability variables: scores on math and auto and shop information tests.
The latter is omitted in the narrow model due to its weak explanatory power. Two vari-
ables are generated in the following way. Parents’ education is the mean of the father’s
and mother’s education, it is the mother’s if the father’s is missing, and vice versa. The
variable occupation parents’ high is a binary variable indicating the social status of the
parents’ occupation which is the mean of the mother’s and father’s status. It is only the
father’s if the mother’s is missing, and vice versa.
Although several variables are insigniﬁcant for some degrees; in the broad model they
are not removed for the corresponding degrees to maintain overall comparability. By
contrast, in the narrow model all variables are signiﬁcant. As expected, the coeﬃcients
on math scores and education of parents increase with higher college degrees. This means
that selection into higher degrees is stronger, leading to a more pronounced distinction
between recipients of higher college degrees and high school graduates. Thus, matching
will be a diﬃcult project for the graduate and bachelor’s degrees. This is somewhat
alleviated by the narrow model because several variables that rule selection are omitted.
As discussed in the main text, the omitted variables seem to have only a minor inﬂuence
on the outcome under study and usually they are not even included into typical Mincerian
human capital earnings equations. Further note that the omission of variables increases
the sample size, too.
Other studies also ﬁnd that selection into college is quite strong. Ashenfelter &
Rouse (1998a) report that (observed and unobserved) family background explains about
60% of the variance in schooling attainment and Murnane, Willett & Levy (1995)
assert that math test scores are a strong predictor of subsequent educational attainment.
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Table 4.13: Probit Estimation Results.
Men Women
Variables AA BA MA AA BA MA
Narrow Probit Model
Black 0.119 0.462*** 0.415** 0.598*** 0.811*** 0.597***
Hispanic 0.464*** 0.552*** 0.739*** 0.530*** 0.640*** 0.924***
Math test scores 0.042*** 0.107*** 0.142*** 0.056*** 0.111*** 0.125***
Parents’ education 0.043** 0.155*** 0.182*** 0.060*** 0.153*** 0.250***
Constant -1.735*** -2.874*** -4.256*** -1.858*** -2.797*** -4.865***
Observations 1667 1976 1632 1793 2077 1691
χ2(4) 78.6 943.7 652.4 144.0 952.4 536.8
Overall p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.426 0.598 0.103 0.406 0.530
Broad Probit Model
Black 0.207 0.274** 0.031 0.708*** 0.841*** 0.588**
Hispanic 0.352** 0.256 0.343 0.475*** 0.437** 0.667**
Math test scores 0.035*** 0.098*** 0.117*** 0.050*** 0.110*** 0.117***
Auto+shop test scores 0.005 -0.018*** -0.018* 0.008 -0.007 -0.012
Attended private school 0.096 0.432** 0.204 0.114 0.364** 0.279
Expelled or susp. from school -0.249** -0.536*** -0.151 -0.333** -0.268* -0.548
Curriculum: college prepar. 0.521*** 0.972*** 0.829*** 0.501*** 0.751*** 0.867***
Curriculum: general 0.257** 0.358** 0.254 0.240** 0.231* 0.370
Parents’ education 0.028 0.154*** 0.137*** 0.040** 0.078*** 0.160***
Occupation parents high 0.503** 0.432** 0.736*** 0.377* 1.222*** 0.926***
Number of siblings 0.005 -0.065*** -0.035 -0.014 -0.037* -0.035
Born in south -0.093 0.346*** 0.084 -0.123 0.198** 0.111
Constant -1.877*** -3.142*** -3.867*** -1.796*** -2.469*** -4.314***
Observations 1503 1792 1481 1647 1909 1555
χ2(12) 101.7 1046.4 639.0 169.8 1056.0 531.9
Overall p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.518 0.641 0.132 0.489 0.571
Standard errors are omitted. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *: 10%,
**: 5%, ***: 1%.
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Appendix B: Statistical Inference
Matching generates S strata deﬁned by the covariates Xsi where s = 1, ..., S indicates
the stratum and i = 1, ..., ns the individual in stratum s. Let δs be the treatment eﬀect
in stratum s. Then, the overall mean eﬀect τ =
∑
s ωsδs is the weighted average of the
stratum eﬀects. The weights ωs are proportional to the number of treated units in stratum
s; the number of controls is not taken into account. The variance of δˆs under the null
hypothesis of no treatment eﬀect is
σ2s = V ar(δˆs) =
ns
(ns − 1)2
ns∑
i=1
(rsi − r¯s)2,
where ns is the number of individuals in stratum s, rsi is the log wage of person i, and r¯s
the mean over rsi in stratum s. As a result, the variance of τˆ is
∑S
s=1 ω
2
sσ
2
s . See Chapter
2 for further details.
In case of a constant treatment eﬀect for all individuals it is easy to construct conﬁdence
intervals for the mean eﬀect τ (see Rosenbaum, 1995: chapter 2). Since one advantage
of matching is that, by construction, it allows for heterogeneity in the eﬀect and that it
weights individual eﬀects appropriately (see Angrist & Krueger, 1999) when calcu-
lating the overall mean eﬀect τ , assuming constant eﬀects would impose an unnecessary
restriction. On the other hand, unrestricted heterogeneity in the eﬀects leaves too much
freedom and makes statistical inference impossible. A compromise solution restricts the
variability of the stratum treatment eﬀects δs.
To this end, the stratum eﬀect
δs = δ(Fs, As, YCs) = δ0 + δ1(Fs − F¯s) + δ2(As − A¯s) + δ3(YCs − Y¯Cs) (4.10)
depends on the education of the parents, Fs, on the math scores, As, and on the year
in which the respondent obtained the college degree, YCs. Since there might be more
than one treated unit in a stratum, Fs, As, and YCs are averages over all treated in such
strata. YCs takes into account rising returns to education as suggested in the literature,
e.g. by Bound & Johnson (1992), Katz & Murphy (1992), or Levy & Murnane
(1992).
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The model allows to build asymptotic conﬁdence intervals for δ = (δ0, δ1, δ2, δ3) and
to perform tests whether the mean eﬀect of treatment δ0 is positive and whether there is
heterogeneity, a test for (δ1, δ2, δ3). The asymptotic variance of the estimate δˆ is calculated
by exploiting the sample variability within strata. A (1−α)-conﬁdence region for δ would
be obtained solving (δˆ − δ)′V˜ (δ)−1(δˆ − δ) ≤ χ24,1−α for δ, the parameter under the null
hypothesis. V˜ (δ) denotes the variance of δˆ which depends on δ.13 The procedure is
outlined in Chapter 2.
It turns out that the parameter estimates for (δ1, δ2, δ3) in the ﬁrst ten years after
college are almost always insigniﬁcant although taken together they often exhibit a cer-
tain structure. Therefore, further insight might be obtained by requiring time constant
(δ1, δ2, δ3) but still allowing a time-variant δ0. To this end, all ten years are pooled and
equation (4.10) is augmented to
δsj = δ0,1 d1 j + ...+ δ0,10 d10 j + δ1(Fsj − F¯sj) + δ2(Asj − A¯sj) + δ3(YCsj − Y¯Csj)
with j = 1, ..., 10 indexing the year after college and s = 1, ..., Sj denoting the stratum of
the jth year after college. The indicator variable dkj is one if k = j and zero otherwise.
Appendix C: Results for the Graduate Degrees
Tables 4.14 and 4.15 present estimation results for the graduate degrees for the ﬁrst ﬁve
years after college. Late years are omitted because sample size would be too small.
13Since statistical inference based on V˜ (δ) is extremely cumbersome, V˜ (δ) is replaced by V˜ (δˆ).
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Table 4.14: Treatment Eﬀects, Men, MA.
OLS Stratiﬁcation
Matching Stratum Weighted Convent. Weighted S T Mean
Year Pure Adjusted Coeﬀ. Eﬀect Coeﬀ. Eﬀect C Max
Narrow Model
1 0.454 0.486*** 0.494** 0.898*** 0.443*** 0.332*** 51 93 5.2
(0.342) (0.212) (0.233) (0.111) (0.198) (0.086) 374 14.0
2 0.460 0.369* 0.472*** 0.359*** 0.374** 0.322*** 45 79 6.7
(0.337) (0.255) (0.156) (0.050) (0.213) (0.090) 328 13.0
3 0.436*** 0.592*** 0.941*** 0.405*** 0.555*** 0.364*** 44 68 5.0
(0.145) (0.220) (0.203) (0.046) (0.241) (0.092) 300 10.0
4 0.501** 0.214 0.366** 0.249*** 0.514** 0.248*** 42 65 4.8
(0.272) (0.211) (0.196) (0.059) (0.253) (0.096) 291 10.0
5 0.516*** 0.455** 0.286** 0.330*** 0.554*** 0.476*** 37 54 4.4
(0.235) (0.230) (0.150) (0.049) (0.245) (0.109) 275 10.0
Heterogeneity, Pooled Model
Year 0.088** 0.095** 0.065*** 0.016
degree (0.038) (0.041) (0.008) (0.011)
Math 0.032*** 0.019** 0.032*** 0.026***
scores (0.011) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
Educ 0.029 0.078* 0.070*** -0.005
parents (0.029) (0.043) (0.011) (0.012)
Broad Model
1 0.362** 0.523*** 0.686*** 0.495*** 0.472** 0.401*** 41 61 5.0
(0.170) (0.238) (0.179) (0.063) (0.224) (0.105) 345 7.0
2 0.441** 0.449** 0.707*** 0.375*** 0.471** 0.323*** 35 52 4.4
(0.215) (0.215) (0.189) (0.059) (0.261) (0.104) 300 7.0
3 0.524*** 0.566** 1.103*** 0.560*** 0.875*** 0.484*** 33 47 3.8
(0.157) (0.306) (0.283) (0.069) (0.396) (0.129) 254 5.0
4 0.283 -0.066 0.336 0.114* 0.365 0.098 29 42 3.2
(0.204) (0.186) (0.262) (0.070) (0.319) (0.107) 241 6.0
5 0.498*** 0.218* 0.780*** 0.501*** 0.618** 0.355*** 28 37 3.3
(0.153) (0.141) (0.217) (0.064) (0.307) (0.119) 230 4.0
Kane & Rouse (1995) 0.556
(0.084)
Heterogeneity, Pooled Model
Year 0.024 0.019 0.000 0.016
degree (0.018) (0.020) (0.009) (0.013)
Math 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.026***
scores (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005)
Educ -0.003 -0.042 0.008 0.006
parents (0.022) (0.035) (0.011) (0.016)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *: 10%,
**: 5%, ***: 1%. Stratum weighted denotes the weighting scheme that corresponds to matching and
conventionally weighted denotes the usual OLS weighting. All weighting takes account of the NLSY
sample weights. The last three columns reﬂect stratiﬁcation results; S: number of strata, T: number of
treated, and C: number of control units. The last three rows report pooled model estimates of variables
which might drive heterogeneity. The critical ε is set equal to 0.4.
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Table 4.15: Treatment Eﬀects, Women, MA.
OLS Stratiﬁcation
Matching Stratum Weighted Convent. Weighted S T Mean
Year Pure Adjusted Coeﬀ. Eﬀect Coeﬀ. Eﬀect C Max
Narrow Model
1 0.429*** 0.473*** 0.962*** 0.433*** 1.158*** 0.463*** 70 87 3.1
(0.118) (0.122) (0.247) (0.062) (0.285) (0.092) 442 6.0
2 0.443*** 0.441*** 0.293* 0.437*** 0.718*** 0.430*** 62 75 3.5
(0.171) (0.187) (0.172) (0.066) (0.248) (0.101) 382 6.0
3 0.543*** 0.514*** 0.784*** 0.522*** 0.949*** 0.620*** 52 64 3.4
(0.137) (0.145) (0.219) (0.065) (0.294) (0.124) 364 6.0
4 0.839*** 0.807*** 1.130*** 0.817*** 0.930*** 0.901*** 48 55 2.6
(0.174) (0.190) (0.285) (0.092) (0.321) (0.155) 292 5.0
5 0.787*** 0.717*** 1.038*** 0.751*** 1.451*** 0.656*** 35 40 4.0
(0.176) (0.199) (0.330) (0.107) (0.492) (0.162) 189 6.0
Heterogeneity, Pooled Model
Year 0.019 0.025 -0.025*** -0.051***
degree (0.016) (0.017) (0.008) (0.012)
Math 0.012** 0.017** 0.009*** 0.004
scores (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Educ -0.057*** -0.061** -0.047*** -0.010
parents (0.021) (0.027) (0.010) (0.015)
Broad Model
1 0.380*** 0.452*** 1.114*** 0.355*** 1.124*** 0.357*** 63 78 4.0
(0.130) (0.168) (0.294) (0.059) (0.300) (0.085) 352 8.0
2 0.331** 0.878*** 0.124 0.360*** 0.523** 0.399*** 52 67 3.1
(0.185) (0.254) (0.182) (0.070) (0.261) (0.113) 308 7.0
3 0.509*** 0.617*** 1.165*** 0.483*** 1.023*** 0.523*** 48 57 3.3
(0.132) (0.217) (0.254) (0.059) (0.314) (0.119) 289 5.0
4 0.952*** 1.046*** 0.467* 1.012*** 0.947*** 0.730*** 41 46 2.3
(0.283) (0.364) (0.290) (0.138) (0.388) (0.167) 224 3.0
5 0.651*** 0.530*** 1.065*** 0.644*** 1.802*** 0.562*** 30 35 3.5
(0.180) (0.163) (0.394) (0.107) (0.700) (0.187) 128 4.0
Kane & Rouse (1995) 0.532
(0.085)
Heterogeneity, Pooled Model
Year 0.038** 0.015 -0.021** -0.041***
degree (0.018) (0.021) (0.009) (0.012)
Math 0.009 0.013 0.006 0.001
scores (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005)
Educ -0.036 -0.066** -0.055*** -0.028*
parents (0.022) (0.030) (0.011) (0.016)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *: 10%,
**: 5%, ***: 1%. Stratum weighted denotes the weighting scheme that corresponds to matching and
conventionally weighted denotes the usual OLS weighting. All weighting takes account of the NLSY
sample weights. The last three columns reﬂect stratiﬁcation results; S: number of strata, T: number of
treated, and C: number of control units. The last three rows report pooled model estimates of variables
which might drive heterogeneity. The critical ε is set equal to 0.4.
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Postsecondary Education: The
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Abstract. Frequently, a log-linear relationship between earnings and years of education
is assumed based on the classical human capital earnings equation suggesting constant
returns to schooling. This chapter reconsiders this functional relationship employing
an extended stylized human capital earnings function. If endogeneity of schooling as a
result of optimization behavior is neglected returns to schooling appear to be larger for
postsecondary than for high school education. This relationship can be found implicitly
in several studies and is conﬁrmed by this chapter as well. However, taking account of
endogeneity of schooling leads to returns to education that diminish with more schooling
acquired as predicted by the theoretical model.
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5.1 Introduction
Frequently, a log-linear relationship between earnings and years of education is assumed
based on the classical human capital earnings equation (Becker, 1967, Mincer, 1974).
This suggests constant returns to schooling independently of how much schooling is ac-
quired. In addition, Card (1999: ﬁg. 2) presents empirical evidence in favor of a log-linear
relationship between earnings and schooling using Current Population Survey (CPS) data.
This chapter reconsiders the functional relationship using the theoretical framework re-
cently proposed by Card (1995b) and data provided by the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1979 (NLSY). The analysis extends over the years 1989 to 1994 and over both
sexes.
Some empirical studies presented below implicitly report increasing marginal returns
to schooling as years of education rise suggesting that postsecondary education works
as some magic potion. Although this fact is conﬁrmed by this study, these ﬁndings
seem to be driven by endogeneity of schooling as a result of optimization behavior. If
individuals with higher inherent earnings abilities opt for more schooling because their
personal return to schooling depends positively on their abilities the relationship between
observed schooling and earnings is biased. Yet, explicitly controlling for ability in the
manner proposed by the theoretical model shows that, indeed, the return to education
diminishes as more schooling is acquired, especially for men. In other words, neglecting
ability not only yields classical ability bias in the rate of return to education but might
also bias the functional form between earnings and schooling.
Math test scores of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) provided
by the data are used as measures for ability. Alas, they might themselves be prone to
endogeneity in that respondents who had already acquired more education than others
of the same age while ability tests took place in 1980 might do better in such tests by
virtue of their experience with test situations in general. To address this issue schooling
is divided into a pre-test and post-test variable as already proposed by Griliches &
Mason (1972). Moreover, measurement error in the test scores is tackled by means of
the instrumental variables technique.
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The following section brieﬂy outlines the theoretical foundation of the human capital
model used in this study. Section 3 presents selective empirical evidence in the literature
while section 4 discusses evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979.
Finally, the last section summarizes the ﬁndings.
5.2 An Extended Human Capital Earnings Function
Card (1995b, 1999) develops an analytically tractable version of the human capital earn-
ings function that builds on Becker (1967). To provide a frame of reference his model
is brieﬂy presented. Abstracting from labor market experience, let y(S) denote potential
earnings after an individual acquires S years of education and let h(S) be an increasing
convex function reﬂecting costs of (or tastes for) schooling. Assume that individuals max-
imize the utility function U(S) = log y(S)− h(S) to derive their optimal schooling choice
S∗. Individual heterogeneity is modeled by personal diﬀerences in the beneﬁts people
derive and the costs they face from schooling as follows
y′i(S)/yi(S) = bi − k1S, (5.1)
h′i(S) = ri + k2S (5.2)
where bi and ri are jointly distributed random variables, possibly correlated, and k1, k2
are non-negative constants. Equation (5.1) reﬂects diminishing returns to education while
(5.2) mirrors increasing costs. As a result, the optimal schooling choice S∗i for individual
i is
S∗i = (bi − ri)/(k1 + k2). (5.3)
Equation (5.1) implies
log yi(S) = ai + biS − 0.5k1S2 (5.4)
where ai is an individual-speciﬁc constant of integration. To the extent that ai and
bi vary across the population, this is a random coeﬃcients model suggesting a concave
relationship between schooling and potential log earnings at the individual level. However,
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endogeneity of schooling owing to the optimization behavior of individuals expressed by
equation (5.3) leads to a positive correlation of earnings abilities bi and years of schooling
Si as bi− b¯ = ψ(Si− S¯)+νi where S¯ represents the population mean of schooling, b¯ mean
abilities, and ψ is a positive coeﬃcient. Likewise, ai is related to schooling (via bi) as
ai− a¯ = λ(Si− S¯)+ εi with positive λ. Inserting these linear projections of ai and bi into
(5.4) yields
log yi(Si) = (a¯− λS¯) + (b¯+ λ− ψS¯)Si + (ψ − 0.5k1)S2i + εi + νiSi (5.5)
and expected log earnings are a quadratic function of schooling; it is strictly convex if
ψ−0.5k1 > 0, strictly concave if ψ−0.5k1 < 0, and linear in schooling otherwise. Thus, the
observed relationship is convex if there is a strong positive correlation between earnings
abilities and schooling.
In this chapter, the model is slightly extended replacing equation (5.2) by
h′i(S) = ri + k2S − k3S2
with a non-negative k3. This extension might reﬂect the idea that some education, e.g.
postgraduate studies, is not acquired solely to increase valuable human capital but also to
concentrate on subjects one has a strong personal interest in, to broaden one’s horizons
etc.; in other words, that education tends to have an additional consumptive character
apart from investment in future earnings streams alone. Further suppose that individual
borrowing rates ri = r¯+νi are independent of individual earnings abilities bi, IE(νi|bi) = 0,
then optimization behavior implies
bi = r¯ + (k1 + k2)Si − k3S2i + νi = b¯+ (k1 + k2)(Si − S¯)− k3(S2i − S2) + νi.
Inserted into (5.4) leads to
log yi(Si) = (a¯−λS¯)+(b¯+λ−(k1+k2)S¯−k3S2)Si+(0.5k1+k2)S2i −k3S3i +εi+νiSi. (5.6)
In contrast to equation (5.5) which allows for an arbitrary quadratic relationship due
to possible correlation between bi and ri, equation (5.6) requires that the coeﬃcient of
the quadratic term be non-negative implying increasing returns but additionally that the
return to education diminish again after having reached a certain peak (k3 > 0).
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Likewise,Willis (1986, p. 551) discusses a comparable model that produces increasing
rates of return to education: Suppose that each individual faces rising borrowing costs as
investment into education increases and each individual invests to the point at which the
marginal borrowing rate is equal to the own internal rate of return itself depending on
personal abilities. If everybody faced the same schedule of borrowing rates, there would
be a positive correlation between the return to education and the level of schooling chosen.
Individuals with low internal rate of return would leave school earlier, others later.
Modeling Individual Abilities
Reconsider equation (5.4) and assume that the random coeﬃcients ai and bi capturing
earnings abilities depend on inherent abilities Ai as follows
ai = α0 + α1Ai + ε˜i
bi = β0 + β1Ai + ν˜i
with IE(ε˜i|Ai) = IE(ν˜i|Ai) = 0 and the mean of Ai normalized to zero. Moreover, let
Si be uncorrelated with ε˜i and ν˜i. This is justiﬁed by the assumption that individuals
themselves merely know their Ai but are ignorant about their ν˜i and therefore choose their
optimal schooling level on behalf of their expected ability IE(bi|Ai). Thus (5.4) becomes
log yi = α0 + α1Ai + β0Si + β1AiSi − 0.5k1S2i + ε˜i + ν˜iSi, (5.7)
and, in contrast to (5.4), the schooling variable in this earnings equation is free of corre-
lation with the residual. Further assume that scores of the math sub-test of the Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) provided by the data reﬂect Ai.
1
Although the test scores will be adjusted for age they might still be prone to endogeneity
as individuals who had acquired already more schooling in 1980 when the ASVAB tests
took place might have done better in the tests than they would have without their above-
average education. To take account of this possible problem schooling is divided into
1Other scores out of the ten diﬀerent scores in the ASVAB might be used, as well. However, there are
no substantial changes compared to results produced by math scores. Other studies also rely on math
scores, see e.g. Murnane, Willett & Levy (1995) or Kjellstro¨m (1999).
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two parts, one part capturing education obtained until 1980 and another one capturing
education acquired beyond 1980 similar toGriliches & Mason (1972) who divided their
schooling variable in one before and one after military service during which their ability
tests were performed. The idea is that the test scores are not inﬂuenced by schooling
acquired after the tests.
Formally, let S1i denote education acquired before ASVAB tests took place and S2i
education after that date. Further let A∗i denote inherent ability which does not change
for any given individual during life-time2 and which, unfortunately, is unobservable to
the analyst. What can be measured instead are test scores Ai after individuals have
already acquired a certain amount of education. Suppose education makes it easier to
solve test problems because of a general experience in how to cope with test situations and
because some knowledge acquired at school helps solve test problems more quickly. Thus,
participants with much education tend to fare better in ability tests than they would do
with less education.
Abstracting from any confounding variables Xi the following equations summarize the
idea
log yi = α0 + α1A
∗
i + β0Si + β1A
∗
iSi + β2S
2
i + u (5.8)
Ai = A
∗
i + δS1i.
The last equation rests on the assumption that ability tests Ai would measure A
∗
i without
error if everybody had the same level of education at the time the tests took place, i.e.
measurement error in test scores is ruled out. Instrumental variables regressions presented
in section 4 will address the additional issue of measurement error. Regression on A as
in (5.7) leads to biased estimates. Alternatively, replacing A∗i by Ai − δS1i yields the
following regression equation
log yi = α0 + α1Ai + β0Si + β1AiSi + β2S
2
i − α1δS1i − β1δS1iSi + u. (5.9)
Hence, the coeﬃcient estimates of Si and S
2
i should identify β0 and β2, respectively.
2It might depend on age which, however, is already controlled for.
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5.3 Received Evidence
Usually, omission of ability is considered to yield a bias in the estimates of the return
to education, the classical ability bias. In addition, as outlined above, it might also bias
the functional relationship between schooling and earnings from concavity to convexity.
Unfortunately, most studies a priori assume constant returns and thus make it impossible
to examine this relationship. Nevertheless, some report more detailed estimation results
that suggest increasing rather than constant or diminishing returns to education even
though this was not necessarily their principal aim.
For example, Blackburn & Neumark (1993: table 2), in a certain speciﬁcation of
their model, mention an estimate of the return to high school education that is signiﬁcantly
lower than that to college (about 25%) based on NLSY data. Yet, they have not pursued
this issue any further. Cawley et al. (1996) ﬁnd that returns to education for white
collar workers are signiﬁcantly higher than those for blue collar workers who have usually
acquired less education. By investigating the high school premium using PSID data of
1976 to 1981 for men,Weiss’ (1988) speciﬁcation of schooling as a cubic polynomial yields
estimates which are larger for higher levels of schooling. Table 5.1 shows own calculations
based on his coeﬃcient estimates.3 Note, however, thatWeiss reports strong evidence in
favor of a procyclical additional high school premium of 7% in counties with unemployment
rates of around 6%. If added to the twelfth schooling year, this would disturb the strict
monotonicity of the estimates.
Table 5.1: Return to Education for Men According to Weiss.
Years of Schooling 10 12 14 16 18 Mean HS Premium
Estimates of the Return 0.041 0.054 0.075 0.102 0.137 0.070
Own calculations based on Weiss (1988: table 9). Standard errors cannot be imputed. The
last column reports mean high school premium.
In a quantile regression approach based on CPS data Buchinsky (1994) reports sub-
stantial heterogeneity in the returns to education with higher returns for upper quantiles
in his restricted one-group model. His more ﬂexible 16-group-model leads to the general
3Variances cannot be imputed because of missing covariance information. Alas, each coeﬃcient esti-
mate in Weiss’ speciﬁcation itself is statistically signiﬁcant.
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Table 5.2: Return to Education for Men According to Park.
Years of Schooling ≤ 12 13, 14 15 16 > 16 HS Premium
Year 1979 0.057 0.066 0.010 0.071 0.046 0.026
1981 0.061 0.071 0.009 0.051 0.037 0.021
1983 0.057 0.079 -0.010 0.019 0.010 0.058
1985 0.061 0.086 0.023 0.065 0.048 0.077
1987 0.058 0.096 0.010 0.045 0.047 0.077
1988 0.043 0.084 0.037 0.091 0.043 0.094
1989 0.040 0.098 0.016 0.124 0.096 0.095
1990 0.044 0.108 -0.013 0.081 0.087 0.096
1991 0.056 0.106 0.008 0.089 0.088 0.078
Own calculations based on Park (1994: equation 7). Standard errors cannot be imputed. The
last column reports high school premium.
point that “the return to college education is higher, in general, than for high school
graduation at every quantile and for all experience groups”.4 Moreover, Kane & Rouse
(1995: table 2) investigating labor market returns to two-year and four-year colleges re-
port estimates based on the National Longitudinal Survey of the high school class of 1972
using hourly rate of pay which suggest increasing returns if ability is not controlled for,
but constant returns once it is controlled for. Yet, they do not discuss this ﬁnding any
further.
Park (1994) explicitly examines the functional form of the earnings equation with
respect to schooling using data for men from the CPS for the years 1979 to 1991. Al-
though he concludes that linearity may be maintained except for a peculiar deviation at
the ﬁfteenth year of schooling it is illuminating to calculate marginal returns based on
estimates from his broadest model (his equation 7). Table 5.2 presents own calculations
for some years. Although standard errors cannot be calculated due to missing covariance
information, the estimates suggest that returns are low for individuals with merely high
school education. They are larger for undergraduate education but diminish again for
individuals with more than 16 years of schooling. This pattern would be in line with
equation (5.6) except for the high school premium and the dip at the ﬁfteenth schooling
year.
Altonji & Dunn (1996) investigate the impact of family characteristics and IQ scores
4However, this is not the case for high school dropouts.
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Table 5.3: Return to Education According to Altonji & Dunn.
Schooling Increment 10 to 12 12 to 14 14 to 16
Return to the Increment
Men, Fixed Eﬀects 0.047 0.097 0.132
Men, No Fixed Eﬀects 0.087 0.097 0.096
Women, Fixed Eﬀects 0.122 0.125 0.112
Women, No Fixed Eﬀects 0.135 0.154 0.151
Own calculations based on Altonji & Dunn (1996: footnote 23). Standard errors cannot be
imputed. The estimates represent returns to two years of education.
on the return to education. Their baseline speciﬁcation of the earnings function includes
a cubic polynomial in schooling and excludes all IQ measures and parents’ education
interaction terms (see their footnote 23). They obtain estimated returns as shown in
table 5.3. Their results are based on data of the Young Men and Young Women cohort of
the NLS during 1966 and 1981 for men, and 1968 and 1988 for women. Their preferred
approach – a ﬁxed eﬀects analysis based on sibling diﬀerences – yields increasing returns
for men and constant returns for women. The increase seems to disappear for the analysis
without ﬁxed eﬀects. Finally, Ashenfelter & Rouse (1998b: ﬁgure 1) present a simple
graph based on CPS data from 1993 which indicates low, almost zero, returns for low
educated workers and positive returns for workers with 11 or more years of education.
The next section aims at replicating the ﬁndings of this section using the NLSY and
shows how increasing returns disappear if ability is controlled for in the right manner.
5.4 Evidence from the NLSY
The Data
The data are taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) admin-
istered by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The NLSY is a sample of 12,686 youths ﬁrst
interviewed in 1979 when they were aged between 14 and 22 and re-interviewed annually
until 1994. A detailed description of the data is given in the NLS Handbook (1997) and
the NLSY79 User’s Guide (1997).
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In 1989 respondents were aged 24 to 32 and most had ﬁnished their education. Begin-
ning in that year, returns to education are estimated for all subsequent years until 1994,
each year taken as a single cross-section. Variables that change their values after 1989, in
particular educational attainment or labor force experience, are updated each year. Men
and women are examined separately, but races are pooled. Individuals who are enrolled
at school or at college in the year under scrutiny are removed from the sample, yet, the
self-employed are kept.5 Oversampling of Blacks, Hispanics, and economically disadvan-
taged Whites suggests the use of sample weights provided by the NLSY for each year. The
outcome measure is the hourly rate of pay inﬂated to 1996 dollars using the US consumer
price index. Outliers in wages are removed, i.e. observations with an hourly wage above
$1000 are deleted and wages below $1 are set equal to $1. Furthermore, extraordinarily
large changes in wages between two subsequent years are smoothed by removing the local
outliers, as well.
The data contain numerous variables describing socioeconomic background, the high
school career, and labor force status (since 1975) used to generate a measure of actual
experience based on weeks worked per year. What is more, the NLSY provides informa-
tion on ten ability measures collected in 1980 when 94.3% of all respondents participated
in tests to update the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). Since re-
spondents participated in the tests at diﬀerent ages the scores are adjusted by regressing
the raw scores on age dummies and using the residuals subsequently as explanatory vari-
ables in the wage equation analogous to Blackburn & Neumark (1993). A descriptive
summary of the variables used in this study is provided in table 5.4 weighted by the
sample weights of the NLSY. Two diﬀerent types of variables in addition to the standard
ones, education and experience, will be considered: background variables that determine
earnings apart from investment into human capital and ASVAB test scores adjusted by
age.
5Kane & Rouse (1995), who also use the NLSY, report that their results are not sensitive to the
exclusion of self-employed.
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Table 5.4: Description of Variables.
Men Women
mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
Log hourly wage in 1989 7.055 0.500 6.806 0.538
Age in 1979 17.731 2.348 17.639 2.288
Years of education (in 1989) 13.005 2.337 13.228 2.138
Years of education before ASVAB tests 11.153 1.874 11.299 1.797
Years of education after ASVAB tests (in 1989) 1.852 2.092 1.929 2.120
Experience in years (in 1989) 8.260 2.723 7.376 2.895
Background Variables
Black 0.130 0.337 0.140 0.347
Hispanic 0.060 0.237 0.054 0.227
Lived in urban area 1987 0.775 0.417 0.781 0.414
Lived in north-east 1987 0.194 0.396 0.201 0.401
Lived in north-central 1987 0.303 0.460 0.277 0.447
Lived in south 1987 0.334 0.472 0.357 0.479
Lived in an area with high unempl. 1987 (1 to 6) 2.880 0.891 2.915 0.911
Physical height in 1985 (inches) 70.441 2.887 64.527 2.708
Health limit begun under age 18 0.080 0.272 0.096 0.295
Married (in 1989) 0.531 0.499 0.564 0.496
Member of a union (in 1989) 0.137 0.344 0.087 0.282
ASVAB Scores, Adjusted for Age
Paragraph comprehension 1.456 10.493 4.232 9.077
Word knowledge 2.537 10.086 3.624 8.974
Math knowledge 2.375 10.087 2.115 9.462
Arithmetic reasoning 3.624 9.958 1.633 9.191
General science 4.113 10.044 1.365 8.762
Auto and shop information 7.604 9.563 -2.092 6.561
Numerical operations 0.951 10.133 4.147 8.935
Electronic Information 5.971 9.813 -0.530 8.002
Mechanical Comprehension 6.189 9.929 -0.661 7.856
Coding speed -0.225 9.407 4.695 9.071
Number of observations 3413 3305
Means and standard deviations for variables in 1989. Observations are weighted by the NLSY
sample weights.
Estimation Results
A model of earnings as broad as possible will be speciﬁed in advance and tested against
polynomial speciﬁcations as proposed in equation (5.6) in order to distinguish between
a linear, quadratic, and a cubic relationship. Ability will not yet be controlled for. The
most general model possible uses dummy variables for each education level nesting the
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polynomial models. It maintains the additive structure of the human capital earnings
function: log y(S) = f(S) + Xβ + ε.6 Individuals are distributed across 17 schooling
categories S ∈ {4, 5, ..., 20} as shown in the appendix table 5.10. Alas, owing to small cell
size observations with less than seven years of schooling are completely removed. Using
incremental dummy variables 1(S ≥ i), where 1 is the indicator function, the functional
relationship between schooling and earnings is modeled as
f(S) =
S∑
i=7
δi 1(S ≥ i), S ∈ {7, 8, ..., 20}.
Thus, the marginal return to an additional year of schooling at level S = s equals δs+1.
7
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 present estimation results for men and women, respectively, also
controlling for the background variables. Both for men and women estimates vary consid-
erably, yet, a certain pattern seems to emerge. Returns to the earlier years of education
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, the signs of the point estimates are sometimes
positive sometimes negative. For men, only the last high school year (11 to 12 years)
yields positive signiﬁcant results for almost all years, indicating a potential high school
premium. The estimates remain high until the last two years when they are again insignif-
icant and sometimes negative. The peak of the return to education seems to be achieved
during college education with a possible premium for graduation from college at age 16
close to Park’s (1994) results. Women’s results are similar but with generally higher
estimates than men’s and no clear premium structure after certain schooling levels. Their
returns are positive after high school education and remain so even unto the 19th grade
with a peak around 14 to 16 and another at 19.
This general speciﬁcation is tested against the null hypothesis of linearity implying
δ8 = ... = δ20, against the null of a quadratic relationship, and against a cubic relation-
ship. Results of F-tests are reported in the respective panels of the tables. Linearity is
clearly rejected in all six years for men and for women alike. The less restrictive quadratic
6Nonparametric estimation of f by means of a partially linear additive model as outlined in Hastie
& Tibshirani (1990), for instance, would be an alternative way to proceed. However, since S takes on
only discrete values numerous ties would be produced although a conventional nonparametric smoother
would generally consume less degrees of freedom for reasonable smoothing parameters than the dummy
variables approach.
7Actually, the return is exp(δs+1)− 1 which is approximately δs+1 for small values.
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Table 5.5: Local Returns to Education, Men.
Education 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Pooled
7 to 8 years 0.068 -0.010 -0.173 -0.050 0.037 0.239 0.005
8 to 9 years -0.027 0.005 0.020 -0.081 -0.046 -0.079 -0.030
9 to 10 years -0.049 0.090 -0.005 0.022 0.037 -0.027 0.009
10 to 11 years 0.008 -0.072 0.049 -0.002 -0.000 0.008 0.001
11 to 12 years 0.103*** 0.100*** 0.033 0.119*** 0.072 0.119*** 0.091***
12 to 13 years 0.084*** 0.131*** 0.128*** 0.114*** 0.103*** 0.139*** 0.118***
13 to 14 years 0.068* 0.037 0.059 0.046 0.094** 0.017 0.051***
14 to 15 years 0.084* 0.059 0.083 0.071 0.107* 0.093* 0.081***
15 to 16 years 0.122*** 0.130*** 0.095** 0.169*** 0.116** 0.150*** 0.129***
16 to 17 years -0.006 0.080 0.041 0.048 -0.030 -0.040 0.013
17 to 18 years 0.036 0.038 0.027 0.071 0.155** 0.187*** 0.088***
18 to 19 years 0.133 0.017 0.045 -0.106 -0.083 -0.158* -0.037
19 to 20 years -0.043 -0.165* -0.120 -0.127 0.276*** 0.339*** 0.059
H0: Linear specification
Coeﬃcient 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.071*** 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.071***
F-value 4.238 4.365 4.554 5.977 3.392 4.050 20.157
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
H0: Quadratic specification
Linear coeﬀ. -0.017 0.038 0.021 0.049* -0.014 -0.005 0.015
Quadr. (÷10) 0.030*** 0.011 0.016* 0.008 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.020***
F-value 3.639 4.628 4.706 6.464 2.786 3.701 19.654
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
H0: Cubic specification
Linear coeﬀ. -0.693 -0.717 -0.846 -1.037* -0.614 -0.532 -0.718***
Quadr. (÷10) 0.550*** 0.589 0.680* 0.837 0.487*** 0.427*** 0.579***
Cubic (÷100) -0.129*** -0.143*** -0.164*** -0.204*** -0.110*** -0.096*** -0.137***
F-value 0.952 1.275 0.438 0.794 1.328 2.721 3.049
P-value 0.484 0.238 0.929 0.635 0.209 0.002 0.001
Number of obs. 3413 3355 2976 2838 2874 2834 18290
Incremental dummies reﬂect the return to schooling for each education category between seven
and twenty years of schooling. Background variables, experience, and its square are controlled.
The regressions are weighted by the sample weights. Standard errors are omitted. Heteroskedas-
ticity is not adjusted for. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *: 10%, **:
5%, ***: 1%.
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Table 5.6: Local Returns to Education, Women.
Education 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Pooled
7 to 8 years -0.111 0.124 -0.126 -0.040 0.068 0.112 -0.006
8 to 9 years 0.058 -0.099 0.180 0.007 0.001 -0.088 0.023
9 to 10 years 0.130* 0.148* 0.115 0.036 -0.050 -0.002 0.060
10 to 11 years -0.117* -0.077 0.016 0.015 -0.072 -0.077 -0.044
11 to 12 years 0.067 0.089* -0.052 0.091 0.123* 0.089 0.073***
12 to 13 years 0.095*** 0.081*** 0.108*** 0.058* 0.069** 0.031 0.078***
13 to 14 years 0.082** 0.114*** 0.139*** 0.162*** 0.113*** 0.153*** 0.126***
14 to 15 years 0.086* 0.075 0.124** 0.106** 0.141*** 0.131** 0.105***
15 to 16 years 0.154*** 0.170*** 0.068 0.145*** 0.139*** 0.146*** 0.137***
16 to 17 years 0.078 0.092* 0.093* -0.032 -0.069 0.080 0.030
17 to 18 years -0.019 -0.056 0.068 0.126* 0.123* -0.004 0.051*
18 to 19 years 0.242** 0.123 0.069 0.208** 0.298*** 0.355*** 0.219***
19 to 20 years 0.073 0.141 0.038 -0.022 0.038 0.137 0.059
H0: Linear specification
Coeﬃcient 0.086*** 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.099*** 0.092***
F-value 4.358 3.538 3.151 3.219 4.752 6.433 18.942
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
H0: Quadratic specification
Linear coeﬀ. -0.087** -0.018 0.006 -0.006 -0.086** -0.157*** -0.046***
Quadr. (÷10) 0.062*** 0.039*** 0.031** 0.036*** 0.063*** 0.090*** 0.049***
F-value 2.406 2.916 2.886 2.705 3.110 2.529 12.101
P-value 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000
H0: Cubic specification
Linear coeﬀ. -0.558** -0.618 -0.569 -0.630 -0.637** -0.592*** -0.581***
Quadr. (÷10) 0.422*** 0.495*** 0.468** 0.509*** 0.480*** 0.420*** 0.455***
Cubic (÷100) -0.089*** -0.112*** -0.108*** -0.116*** -0.102*** -0.081*** -0.100***
F-value 1.625 1.554 1.743 1.279 2.283 2.030 6.007
P-value 0.093 0.114 0.066 0.236 0.012 0.027 0.000
Number of obs. 3305 3269 2851 2666 2766 2732 17589
Incremental dummies reﬂect the return to schooling for each education category between seven
and twenty years of schooling. Background variables, experience, and its square are controlled.
The regressions are weighted by the sample weights. Standard errors are omitted. Heteroskedas-
ticity is not adjusted for. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *: 10%, **:
5%, ***: 1%.
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model is rejected, as well, for men and women, and, what is more, in all years estimates
show increasing rather than diminishing returns to education. Finally, a cubic relation-
ship between education and earnings as proposed by equation (5.6) is not rejected at
conventional levels for men in ﬁve years and for women in four years.
Since estimates vary considerably an average over all years is reported in the last col-
umn of the tables. To this end, observations of all six years are pooled and the dummy
variables model is re-estimated.8 However, the pooled estimates are for illustrative pur-
poses only because stochastic dependencies among observations in the pooled model are
not accounted for, thus exaggerating statistical precision.
Note that actual experience might be endogenous especially for women. Replacing
actual by Mincer potential experience, i.e. age - education - 6, does not markedly alter
the patterns found in tables 5.5 and 5.6 and points to a polynomial speciﬁcation of order
3 as well. Moreover, additionally dropping the ﬁrst and the last education cell, coeﬃcient
estimates of the remaining cells virtually remain unchanged. In sum, empirical evidence
seems to support low returns to secondary education for individuals who opted for low
education, comparatively high returns for the ﬁrst four college years for college gradu-
ates, and again lower returns for postgraduate education. Alas, these ﬁndings do not
necessarily reject diminishing personal returns to education as stated initially in equa-
tion (5.1). Endogeneity of schooling owing to the optimization behavior may well lead
to a reduced-form relationship as is found here and stated in equation (5.6). Therefore,
ability measures are included next; both of which might drive individual heterogeneity
coeﬃcients ai and bi.
The ﬁrst panel of tables 5.7 and 5.8 show estimation results of the basic equation (5.7)
for men and women, respectively. The schooling variable is transformed into years of
education exceeding the minimum level of seven years. This ensures that the coeﬃcient
of ability expresses the return to ability at seven years of education. For men, coeﬃcient
estimates of the linear schooling term are positive in all years and those of the quadratic
term are mainly negative although not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
8A further model comprising an additional time trend for all coeﬃcients has not produced convincing
evidence in favor of a trend. Therefore, the trend is omitted.
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Table 5.7: Estimation Results for Men.
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Pooled
Basic Model
Ability (÷100) 0.080 -0.190 -0.289 0.374 0.257 0.268 0.132
Abil*School (÷100) 0.135** 0.162*** 0.183*** 0.107* 0.115* 0.123* 0.133***
Schooling 0.035* 0.072*** 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.037 0.041* 0.051***
Schooling2 (÷10) -0.000 -0.025 -0.024 -0.018 0.008 0.002 -0.009
Homosk., p-value 0.028 0.132 0.045 0.118 0.003 0.000 0.000
Pre-test and Post-test Schooling
Ability (÷100) 0.080 -0.185 -0.278 0.368 0.319 0.279 0.142
Abil*School (÷100) 0.135** 0.161*** 0.182*** 0.109* 0.105 0.121* 0.131***
Schooling 0.036 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.074*** 0.047* 0.047* 0.054***
Schooling2 (÷10) -0.004 -0.034* -0.045** -0.026 -0.013 -0.006 -0.017*
S1 -0.003 -0.013 -0.037** -0.021 -0.037* -0.016 -0.012
S1 ∗ S (÷10) 0.006 0.021 0.039 0.011 0.051* 0.018 0.020*
Homosk., p-value 0.027 0.129 0.042 0.118 0.003 0.000 0.000
F-test 0.049 0.453 2.134 1.799 1.766 0.340 28.316
P-value 0.952 0.636 0.119 0.166 0.171 0.712 0.000
Basic Model, IV for Ability
Ability (÷100) 0.410 1.059 1.103 1.726** 0.911 1.198 1.152***
Abil*School (÷100) 0.172 0.016 0.020 -0.029 0.080 0.034 0.039
Schooling 0.030 0.029 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.010 0.018
Schooling2 (÷10) -0.009 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.015 0.021 0.011
Homosk., p-value 0.032 0.129 0.045 0.133 0.003 0.000 0.000
Hausman, p-value 0.014 0.071 0.052 0.024 0.127 0.143 0.000
Canonical correl. 0.252 0.248 0.238 0.238 0.244 0.253 0.248
0.306 0.297 0.299 0.320 0.316 0.336 0.312
Overid., p-value 0.366 0.315 0.979 0.818 0.271 0.427 0.459
Pre-test and Post-test Schooling, IV for Ability
Ability (÷100) 0.423 1.092 1.194 1.797** 1.042 1.241 1.179***
Abil*School (÷100) 0.170 0.012 0.011 -0.035 0.066 0.029 0.036
Schooling 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.029 0.027 0.016 0.022
Schooling2 (÷10) -0.012 -0.003 -0.009 0.004 -0.005 0.013 0.002
S1 -0.004 -0.014 -0.038** -0.022 -0.039* -0.017 -0.014*
S1 ∗ S (÷10) 0.007 0.022 0.040 0.011 0.051* 0.019 0.020*
Homosk., p-value 0.032 0.128 0.044 0.134 0.004 0.000 0.000
Hausman, p-value 0.032 0.089 0.080 0.038 0.091 0.150 0.000
Canonical correl. 0.253 0.248 0.238 0.239 0.242 0.253 0.247
0.306 0.297 0.300 0.322 0.318 0.338 0.313
Overid., p-value 0.357 0.284 0.993 0.839 0.354 0.459 0.496
Number of obs. 3413 3355 2976 2838 2874 2834 18290
Background variables, experience, and its square are controlled. The regressions are weighted
by the sample weights. Standard errors – adjusted for heteroskedasticity – are omitted. Stars
denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. F-tests in the second
panel test the augmented pre-/post-test schooling model against the basic model.
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Table 5.8: Estimation Results for Women.
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Pooled
Basic Model
Ability (÷100) 0.268 -0.178 -0.602 0.450 0.656 0.767* 0.293
Abil*School (÷100) 0.106 0.173*** 0.220*** 0.107 0.041 0.030 0.105***
Schooling 0.003 0.054** 0.079*** 0.041 -0.010 -0.042 0.024**
Schooling2 (÷10) 0.040* 0.003 -0.012 0.016 0.055** 0.083*** 0.029***
Homosk., p-value 0.129 0.159 0.634 0.001 0.041 0.239 0.000
Pre-test and Post-test Schooling
Ability (÷100) 0.176 -0.227 -0.710 0.394 0.614 0.606 0.232
Abil*School (÷100) 0.111* 0.175*** 0.227*** 0.105 0.042 0.043 0.108***
Schooling 0.038 0.071** 0.112*** 0.070** 0.012 -0.003 0.047***
Schooling2 (÷10) 0.005 -0.003 -0.044* -0.006 0.036 0.038 0.005
S1 -0.074*** -0.027 -0.067*** -0.055** -0.045* -0.088*** -0.048***
S1 ∗ S (÷10) 0.059** 0.001 0.054* 0.033 0.031 0.080*** 0.040***
Homosk., p-value 0.132 0.159 0.615 0.001 0.042 0.231 0.000
F-test 12.896 7.041 8.334 10.558 4.673 11.682 51.973
P-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000
Basic Model, IV for Ability
Ability (÷100) -0.307 -0.799 -0.919 -0.980 0.389 0.018 -0.402
Abil*School (÷100) 0.204* 0.278** 0.288** 0.314*** 0.081 0.144 0.212***
Schooling 0.022 0.076** 0.092*** 0.087** -0.002 -0.018 0.047***
Schooling2 (÷10) 0.022 -0.017 -0.025 -0.022 0.048* 0.062** 0.009
Homosk., p-value 0.124 0.153 0.610 0.001 0.041 0.214 0.000
Hausman, p-value 0.600 0.510 0.647 0.092 0.926 0.505 0.000
Canonical correl. 0.236 0.247 0.247 0.252 0.252 0.241 0.246
0.299 0.331 0.319 0.323 0.346 0.332 0.325
Overid., p-value 0.226 0.844 0.764 0.906 0.711 0.017 0.074
Pre-test and Post-test Schooling, IV for Ability
Ability (÷100) -0.132 -0.745 -0.815 -0.791 0.510 0.128 -0.310
Abil*School (÷100) 0.187 0.274** 0.276** 0.289** 0.067 0.133 0.202***
Schooling 0.049 0.091** 0.117*** 0.110*** 0.016 0.014 0.066***
Schooling2 (÷10) -0.009 -0.023 -0.053* -0.042 0.031 0.022 -0.013
S1 -0.074*** -0.028 -0.065*** -0.058*** -0.044* -0.087*** -0.049***
S1 ∗ S (÷10) 0.059** 0.003 0.053* 0.038 0.031 0.080*** 0.041***
Homosk., p-value 0.126 0.152 0.593 0.001 0.041 0.202 0.000
Hausman, p-value 0.750 0.664 0.744 0.273 0.874 0.737 0.000
Canonical correl. 0.244 0.252 0.254 0.260 0.258 0.248 0.252
0.299 0.331 0.320 0.322 0.348 0.333 0.326
Overid., p-value 0.195 0.845 0.724 0.888 0.677 0.016 0.056
Number of obs. 3413 3355 2976 2838 2874 2834 18290
Background variables, experience, and its square are controlled. The regressions are weighted
by the sample weights. Standard errors – adjusted for heteroskedasticity – are omitted. Stars
denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. F-tests in the second
panel test the augmented pre-/post-test schooling model against the basic model.
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Women’s results are in contradiction to what the theoretical model above predicts.
The coeﬃcient of squared schooling tends to be positive, even signiﬁcantly so in three
years, rather than negative. Due to possible endogeneity of women’s actual experience,
potential experience is used instead which leads to more conﬁrmative results shown in the
appendix table 5.12. Indeed, then, ﬁve of six coeﬃcient estimates of schooling squared
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (with three of them having a negative sign), only
one remains signiﬁcantly positive. Notice that men’s second order coeﬃcients look more
conﬁrmative, too, when potential experience is used (see table 5.11). Another reason for
women’s results might be that the math scores themselves are inappropriate as a measure
of inherent ability Ai which will be discussed below.
Interaction between ability and schooling yields positive and signiﬁcant estimates for
men suggesting strong heterogeneity in the returns to education. Alas, for women, esti-
mates provide only weak evidence underscoring heterogeneity. Chapter 4 reports similar
results. Heterogeneity plays an important role in other studies, too, e.g. Buchinsky
(1994). In particular, heterogeneity caused by variation in personal abilities is detected
by Altonji & Dunn’s (1996) preferred ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation. They report signiﬁ-
cantly positive coeﬃcient estimates of the interaction between education and IQ scores,
yet without overall convincing evidence. Furthermore, Blackburn & Neumark (1993:
table 4) discover that the importance of the interaction between ability and education has
increased signiﬁcantly during the 1980s. Murnane, Willett & Levy (1995) conﬁrm
this observation for men but not for women.
In addition, the tables indicate that the ability-schooling interaction seems to be less
pronounced in the early 90s for both sexes. Therefore, ﬁndings in Ashenfelter &
Rouse (1998b: table A2) who report an insigniﬁcantly negative interaction coeﬃcient
are not in contrast to this study. They used data of the NLSY in 1993, pooled men and
women, and controlled for age instead of experience. Taken together, their estimate is
comparable to the average of men’s and women’s interaction estimate of 1993 shown in
the appendix tables 5.11 and 5.12.
The last row of the basic model reports p-values of a test whether homoskedasticity
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is compatible with the data by regressing the square of the estimated residuals on the
square of schooling in accordance with equation (5.7). The signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient
estimate of squared schooling asymptotically equals the signiﬁcance of a test against
homoskedasticity (see e.g. Greene, 1993: p. 396).9 To take account of heteroskedastic
errors in the main model, OLS covariance estimates are adjusted by the estimated error
variances derived from the coeﬃcient estimates of the auxiliary regression. If equation
(5.7) is correctly speciﬁed errors should be heteroskedastic. This is conﬁrmed for men,
yet, for women, the tests indicate that heteroskedasticity is only weak.
The second panel of the tables present estimation results based on equation (5.9) when
test scores may depend on schooling attainment before the tests took place. The ﬁrst
six rows report coeﬃcient estimates of the corresponding variables. Interaction between
schooling and ability remains positive. Coeﬃcient estimates of S and S2 appear to conﬁrm
diminishing returns to education for men as already in the basic model. Interestingly, for
women, estimates of the coeﬃcient of squared schooling do not support increasing returns
anymore. Coeﬃcient estimates of S1 and S1S yield some contradictory results concerning
the sign of δ with some more weight on a negative than on a positive δ. This would mean
that more pre-test schooling would have negatively inﬂuenced ability test achievements.
Moreover, heteroskedasticity tests produce almost the same p-values as in the basic
model. All variance estimates are again adjusted for heteroskedasticity. A comparison of
the broader model augmented by pre- and post-test schooling with the basic model by
means of an F-test leads to the conclusion that endogeneity of the math scores plays, on
average, a minor role for men but is strongly conﬁrmed for women. As before, results
based on potential experience are more pronounced than those based on actual experience.
Finally, note that the coeﬃcient estimates of the interaction between ability and schooling
remain almost unchanged with respect to the basic model.
9The variance of the coeﬃcient estimate is adjusted for heteroskedasticity in this auxiliary regression
using White’s (1980) covariance estimate.
Chapter 5: Postsecondary Education: The Magic Potion? 138
Measurement Error in Test Scores
Math test scores measure certain aspects of abilities or skills. One might argue that
they only imperfectly capture inherent earnings abilities A∗. A similar observation can
be made for the other ASVAB scores. Suppose they all measure some sort of skills but
their errors in capturing true A∗ are independent of each other because diﬀerent skills vary
unsystematically aroundA∗. Then, if some of them have no impact on earnings given math
scores they are valid instruments for math scores. Examining some alternatives shows
that scores on general science and electronic information seem to fulﬁll the requirements.
Griliches (1977) already suggested to use one test score as instrument for another
provided more than one is available.
Estimations of the basic and the broader model are repeated using the two additional
scores as instruments for math scores. Results are reported in the third and fourth panels
of the tables. Hausman as well as overidentiﬁcation tests assess the instrumental variables
estimations. Furthermore, canonical correlations between the instruments and the math
scores are presented as an indication for instrumental relevance.10 The lowest canonical
correlation amounts to 0.24 for both men and women and overidentiﬁcation tests indicate
that the instruments are valid except for women in the last year 1994.
Unfortunately, in the basic IV model, almost all estimates of the schooling coeﬃcients
for men are statistically insigniﬁcant rendering a sound interpretation diﬃcult. Neverthe-
less, Hausman tests point to signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the IV and OLS regressions.
For women, coeﬃcient estimates of schooling squared are still not overly convincing un-
derpinned by the Hausman tests indicating that IV is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from OLS.
IV regressions of the broader model resting on the pre-test schooling variable S1 (fourth
panels of the tables) also yield insigniﬁcant estimates for men. Women’s estimates seem
to weakly conﬁrm a negative quadratic relationship at least for earlier years, however,
estimates are statistically imprecise. Again, estimation results on coeﬃcients of S1 and
10Canonical correlations are discussed in Bowden & Turkington (1984: Ch. 2) and in Hall,
Rudebusch & Wilcox (1996). They can easily be calculated as the square root of the eigenvalues of the
matrix (X ′X)−1(X ′Z)(Z ′Z)−1(Z ′X) where Z is the matrix of instruments for the possibly endogenous
regressors X. If there are only two endogenous variables solely two eigenvalues diﬀer from 1.
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S1S do not really conﬁrm a positive δ, similar to the second panel. Furthermore, replac-
ing actual experience by potential experience leads again to similar but more pronounced
results.
5.5 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter departs from an extension of the human capital model recently proposed
by Card (1995b). The model incorporates unobserved ability parameters ruling both
the absolute level of earnings and the individual return to education. Assuming that
individuals are rational agents maximizing the present value of their life-time earnings and
that their return to education diminishes as they acquire more education, their optimal
schooling level will depend on their personal earnings abilities. Neglecting this relation
between education and ability leads to a reduced form with indeterminate functional
form linking earnings and schooling, i.e. increasing, constant, or diminishing returns to
education.
Data from the NLSY show that the functional relationship without ability controls
follows a polynomial of order 3 yielding returns to education that increase with years
of schooling acquired but diminish again after passing a certain peak. This pattern is
consistent with strong correlation between education and ability and with the hypothesis
that education has an additional consumptive character apart from mere investment into
future earnings. To a certain extent, similar results can be found in the literature.
Yet, these ﬁndings do not give information about the true personal development of
the returns to education as long as the ability components are not taken into account.
In other words, omission of ability not only yields classical ability bias in estimates of
the return to education but might also bias the functional form between log earnings
and education. Indeed, controlling for ability in form of math test scores shows that
personal returns to education diminish as schooling increases, speciﬁcally for men. This
ﬁnding is only obtained if interaction between schooling and ability is introduced reﬂecting
diﬀering personal returns to education. The results show that the interaction term is
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statistically signiﬁcant for men, i.e. heterogeneity in the returns is substantial. However,
this observation is in contrast to earlier ﬁndings inGriliches (1977) who has not detected
interaction terms. For women, heterogeneity seems to play a less important role. These
ﬁndings are in line with Chapter 4.
Furthermore, endogeneity of the math scores – even adjusted for age – is a source of
bias in estimates of rates of return to education for women in that education acquired
before ability tests took place might inﬂuence the test results. Dividing schooling into
pre-test and post-test education addresses this issue. Measurement error in the scores is
tackled by conventional IV estimation techniques. Yet, IV estimation does not produce
conclusive results.
Diminishing returns are also reported byMurnane, Willett & Tyler (2000: tables
5 and 6) who analyze the general educational development (GED). They include math test
scores in their regressions and report estimates of the return to post-secondary education
that are markedly lower than those to secondary education. The results also conﬁrm
recent studies that cope with endogenous schooling by the technique of instrumental
variables ﬁnding estimates that are usually higher than corresponding OLS estimates (see
e.g. Card, 1999). The deviation might be explained by the fact that IV estimates do
not necessarily identify the mean eﬀect of education but the eﬀect of education on those
individuals who are mostly aﬀected by the chosen instruments, the so-called local average
treatment eﬀect. Angrist, Imbens & Rubin (1996) discuss this framework; see also
Imbens & Angrist (1994) and Angrist & Krueger (1999). In case of systematic
heterogeneity the two parameters diﬀer. Since the instruments that are generally used
mainly aﬀect low-educated individuals, higher IV estimates might be interpreted as higher
returns to early years of schooling than to later years.
In sum, endogeneity of education mainly caused by heterogeneous inherent earnings
ability plays an important role. Omission of ability measures might lead to classical
ability bias in estimates of the rate of return to education but, as shown in this study,
it might also bias the functional form of the human capital earnings equation. Without
correctly controlling for ability one might detect increasing rather than diminishing returns
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and thus one might wrongly wonder whether post-secondary education was some sort of
magic potion. Data from the NLSY seem to support this view and does not contradict
the theoretical approach this study is based on, particularly for men. Results are less
convincing for women. One reason might be endogeneity of female labor market experience
due to more complex female participation decisions supported by results using potential
instead of actual experience. Therefore, a better understanding of women’s optimization
behavior appears to be necessary.
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Appendix: Additional Results
For reasons of parsimony, the appendix presents detailed OLS regression results solely for
the basic model. Table 5.9 presents OLS estimates for men and women. The standard
errors, which are not explicitly presented, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The regres-
sion results in the main text are not sensitive to the exclusion of the background variables.
Furthermore, table 5.10 reports absolute frequencies over all schooling categories and, ﬁ-
nally, tables 5.11 and 5.12 are analogous to the tables in the main text; they show results
if actual experience is replaced by the Mincer potential experience.
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Table 5.9: Detailed Regression Results.
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Pooled
Men
Math scores 0.080 -0.190 -0.289 0.374 0.257 0.268 0.132
Math scores * Schooling 0.135** 0.162*** 0.183*** 0.107* 0.115* 0.123* 0.133***
Schooling 0.035* 0.072*** 0.066*** 0.062*** 0.037 0.041* 0.051***
Schooling squared -0.000 -0.025 -0.024 -0.018 0.008 0.002 -0.009
Experience 0.039** 0.050*** 0.043*** 0.038** 0.042** 0.061*** 0.047***
Experience squared -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001***
Black -0.096*** -0.130*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.124*** -0.110*** -0.117***
Hispanic 0.032 -0.053** -0.025 -0.020 -0.025 -0.023 -0.021*
Lived in urban area ’87 0.100*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.089*** 0.134*** 0.085*** 0.106***
Lived in north-east ’87 -0.005 -0.008 -0.024 -0.000 -0.019 -0.028 -0.014
Lived in north-cent. ’87 -0.077*** -0.104*** -0.120*** -0.092*** -0.120*** -0.118*** -0.106
Lived in south ’87 -0.081*** -0.100*** -0.096*** -0.092*** -0.085*** -0.123*** -0.096
Area of hi. unempl. ’87 -0.052*** -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.051*** -0.028** -0.039*** -0.041
Height in 1985 (inches) 0.008** 0.007** 0.006* 0.009*** 0.007* 0.010*** 0.008
Health limit under 18 -0.118*** -0.090*** -0.065** -0.107*** -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.099
Married 0.116*** 0.111*** 0.122*** 0.134*** 0.154*** 0.136*** 0.133
Member of a union 0.256*** 0.254*** 0.235*** 0.232*** 0.237*** 0.233*** 0.245
Constant 5.978*** 5.842*** 5.936*** 5.799*** 5.862*** 5.644*** 5.860
Number of observations 3413 3355 2976 2838 2874 2834 18290
Women
Math scores 0.268 -0.178 -0.602 0.450 0.656 0.767* 0.293
Math scores * Schooling 0.106 0.173*** 0.220*** 0.107 0.041 0.030 0.105***
Schooling 0.003 0.054** 0.079*** 0.041 -0.010 -0.042 0.024**
Schooling squared 0.040* 0.003 -0.012 0.016 0.055** 0.083*** 0.029***
Experience 0.044*** 0.021 0.025* 0.025** 0.034** 0.035*** 0.039***
Experience squared 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
Black 0.002 -0.023 -0.041 -0.006 0.005 0.024 -0.014
Hispanic 0.116*** 0.122*** 0.075** 0.122*** 0.093*** 0.114*** 0.104***
Lived in urban area ’87 0.053** 0.049* 0.089*** 0.082*** 0.072** 0.071*** 0.072***
Lived in north-east ’87 0.032 0.063* 0.043 0.014 0.097** 0.035 0.051
Lived in north-cent. ’87 -0.084*** -0.098*** -0.125*** -0.098*** -0.038 -0.058* -0.082
Lived in south ’87 -0.036 -0.044 -0.075** -0.081*** -0.052 -0.073** -0.058
Area of hi. unempl. ’87 -0.068*** -0.062*** -0.054*** -0.057*** -0.035*** -0.055*** -0.056
Height in 1985 (inches) 0.009** 0.008** 0.009** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.008** 0.010
Health limit under 18 -0.035 -0.054* 0.004 0.009 -0.045 -0.046 -0.034
Married -0.029 -0.032 -0.033 0.017 -0.032 -0.066*** -0.030
Member of a union 0.230*** 0.174*** 0.207*** 0.228*** 0.240*** 0.220*** 0.219
Constant 5.823*** 5.831*** 5.583*** 5.585*** 5.378*** 5.875*** 5.657
Number of observations 3305 3269 2851 2666 2766 2732 17589
Estimates obtained from the basic model with only one schooling variable and actual expe-
rience. Observations are weighted by the NLSY sample weights. Standard errors – adjusted
for heteroskedasticity – are omitted. Stars denote statistical signiﬁcance, *: 10%, **: 5%,
***: 1%.
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Table 5.10: Observations Per Education Cell.
Years 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Men Women
4 4 4 4 3 3 1 2 1 0 1 1 0
5 6 6 1 3 2 1 2 3 1 1 2 0
6 15 14 9 7 6 8 7 9 6 7 8 10
7 27 24 18 14 11 9 18 16 14 12 12 14
8 101 95 69 67 61 59 40 45 32 27 24 23
9 167 158 113 107 100 92 88 90 57 55 56 42
10 172 155 130 112 111 100 108 105 73 72 70 78
11 210 200 166 156 147 138 123 120 86 78 80 80
12 1582 1542 1377 1350 1350 1328 1536 1516 1283 1213 1245 1213
13 239 242 227 201 218 217 287 280 276 263 278 278
14 236 229 222 206 220 219 317 309 285 273 275 278
15 102 105 99 91 92 102 152 135 143 121 125 139
16 413 414 372 352 362 355 477 472 409 370 394 382
17 64 73 64 67 65 66 76 82 85 75 88 88
18 48 55 57 57 69 79 53 64 67 63 70 70
19 24 33 31 28 29 28 16 17 19 22 25 26
20 28 30 31 30 39 42 14 18 22 22 24 21
Total 3438 3379 2990 2851 2885 2844 3316 3282 2858 2675 2777 2742
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Table 5.11: Men, Potential Experience.
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Pooled
Basic Model
Ability (÷100) 0.375 0.049 -0.011 0.667 0.564 0.587 0.361**
Abil*School (÷100) 0.104* 0.140** 0.155** 0.079 0.089 0.096 0.112***
Schooling 0.068*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.094*** 0.053** 0.056** 0.068***
Schooling2 (÷10) -0.010 -0.026 -0.036* -0.039** 0.005 -0.003 -0.014*
Homosk., p-value 0.059 0.225 0.089 0.177 0.007 0.000 0.000
Pre-test and Post-test Schooling
Ability (÷100) 0.359 0.011 0.011 0.671* 0.591 0.570 0.335**
Abil*School (÷100) 0.097 0.136** 0.138** 0.061 0.068 0.086 0.110***
Schooling 0.041 0.060** 0.073*** 0.065** 0.034 0.031 0.053***
Schooling2 (÷10) -0.026 -0.049* -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.061** -0.034 -0.013
S1 0.026 0.026 -0.003 0.009 -0.004 0.017 0.014*
S1 ∗ S (÷10) 0.023 0.032 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.107*** 0.050 0.006
Homosk., p-value 0.071 0.187 0.094 0.217 0.009 0.000 0.000
F-test 4.353 6.092 12.090 13.772 10.331 5.662 34.075
P-value 0.013 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000
Basic Model, IV for Ability
Ability (÷100) 0.863 1.503** 1.551** 2.247*** 1.461* 1.738** 1.529***
Abil*School (÷100) 0.126 -0.028 -0.027 -0.093 0.016 -0.023 0.000
Schooling 0.059* 0.040 0.038 0.043 0.025 0.019 0.031**
Schooling2 (÷10) -0.017 0.008 0.001 -0.005 0.019 0.021 0.010
Homosk., p-value 0.068 0.238 0.093 0.198 0.008 0.000 0.000
Hausman, p-value 0.005 0.029 0.026 0.016 0.099 0.079 0.000
Canonical correl. 0.250 0.246 0.238 0.240 0.248 0.258 0.248
0.308 0.299 0.301 0.322 0.317 0.338 0.312
Overid., p-value 0.203 0.129 0.945 0.624 0.288 0.508 0.191
Pre-test and Post-test Schooling, IV for Ability
Ability (÷100) 0.775 1.367* 1.521* 2.143*** 1.474* 1.667** 1.442***
Abil*School (÷100) 0.127 -0.023 -0.039 -0.101 -0.003 -0.028 0.007
Schooling 0.042 0.021 0.030 0.026 0.014 0.002 0.022
Schooling2 (÷10) -0.030 -0.018 -0.065** -0.068** -0.047 -0.012 0.006
S1 0.018 0.018 -0.011 0.000 -0.012 0.010 0.009
S1 ∗ S (÷10) 0.018 0.036 0.103*** 0.099*** 0.107*** 0.052 0.008
Homosk., p-value 0.077 0.196 0.099 0.236 0.011 0.000 0.000
Hausman, p-value 0.023 0.071 0.093 0.080 0.154 0.167 0.000
Canonical correl. 0.244 0.239 0.232 0.233 0.237 0.248 0.243
0.298 0.292 0.294 0.315 0.311 0.331 0.311
Overid., p-value 0.208 0.129 0.930 0.734 0.347 0.525 0.222
Number of obs. 3413 3355 2976 2838 2874 2834 18290
Background variables, experience, and its square are controlled. The regressions are weighted
by the sample weights. Standard errors – adjusted for heteroskedasticity – are omitted. Stars
denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. F-tests in the second
panel test the augmented pre-/post-test schooling model against the basic model.
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Table 5.12: Women, Potential Experience.
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Pooled
Basic Model
Ability (÷100) 1.119** 0.498 0.014 1.118** 1.696*** 1.606*** 1.001***
Abil*School (÷100) -0.001 0.087 0.146** 0.021 -0.083 -0.059 0.019
Schooling 0.058** 0.090*** 0.109*** 0.081*** 0.059* -0.003 0.064***
Schooling2 (÷10) 0.013 -0.010 -0.021 -0.002 0.025 0.070*** 0.014
Homosk., p-value 0.302 0.470 0.968 0.017 0.129 0.592 0.011
Pre-test and Post-test Schooling
Ability (÷100) 1.091** 0.477 0.000 1.103** 1.637*** 1.598*** 0.991***
Abil*School (÷100) -0.006 0.090 0.147** 0.019 -0.084 -0.066 0.019
Schooling 0.065* 0.068** 0.099*** 0.069** 0.052 0.009 0.060***
Schooling2 (÷10) -0.044 0.014 -0.015 -0.006 -0.012 0.028 0.014
S1 -0.022 0.033 0.015 0.014 0.001 -0.024 0.004
S1 ∗ S (÷10) 0.085** -0.039 -0.011 0.005 0.054 0.066* 0.002
Homosk., p-value 0.276 0.458 0.973 0.014 0.124 0.573 0.010
F-test 4.119 0.844 0.197 0.750 3.140 1.850 34.575
P-value 0.016 0.430 0.821 0.472 0.043 0.157 0.000
Basic Model, IV for Ability
Ability (÷100) 0.595 -0.154 -0.272 -0.342 1.459 0.931 0.368
Abil*School (÷100) 0.064 0.181 0.196 0.226* -0.053 0.037 0.109**
Schooling 0.073** 0.110*** 0.119*** 0.123*** 0.066* 0.017 0.084***
Schooling2 (÷10) 0.002 -0.027 -0.030 -0.036 0.020 0.054* -0.002
Homosk., p-value 0.302 0.457 0.984 0.014 0.130 0.562 0.009
Hausman, p-value 0.748 0.623 0.865 0.125 0.953 0.660 0.000
Canonical correl. 0.236 0.244 0.244 0.248 0.253 0.241 0.247
0.297 0.330 0.316 0.314 0.344 0.331 0.324
Overid., p-value 0.409 0.972 0.801 0.963 0.742 0.007 0.057
Pre-test and Post-test Schooling, IV for Ability
Ability (÷100) 0.556 -0.244 -0.329 -0.413 1.395 0.966 0.342
Abil*School (÷100) 0.059 0.191 0.202 0.229* -0.060 0.023 0.111**
Schooling 0.079** 0.089** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.058 0.027 0.080***
Schooling2 (÷10) -0.056 -0.004 -0.023 -0.038 -0.017 0.013 -0.003
S1 -0.021 0.034 0.015 0.017 0.002 -0.024 0.004
S1 ∗ S (÷10) 0.086** -0.039 -0.013 0.001 0.055 0.065 0.002
Homosk., p-value 0.274 0.444 0.989 0.012 0.125 0.548 0.008
Hausman, p-value 0.831 0.773 0.947 0.215 0.905 0.842 0.000
Canonical correl. 0.229 0.236 0.240 0.244 0.245 0.235 0.247
0.296 0.328 0.311 0.307 0.339 0.325 0.324
Overid., p-value 0.316 0.975 0.805 0.962 0.754 0.005 0.057
Number of obs. 3413 3355 2976 2838 2874 2834 18290
Background variables, experience, and its square are controlled. The regressions are weighted
by the sample weights. Standard errors – adjusted for heteroskedasticity – are omitted. Stars
denote statistical signiﬁcance in a two-sided test, *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. F-tests in the second
panel test the augmented pre-/post-test schooling model against the basic model.
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Abstract. The evaluation of interventions such as active labor market policies or medical
programs by means of a randomized controlled trial is often considered the gold standard.
However, randomized experiments might face severe shortcomings especially if performed
at the group level. One such problem is caused by small sample size which might prevent
the experiment from developing its fundamental virtue in balancing all relevant covariates.
This paper investigates the potential and limits of experimental and non-experimental ap-
proaches to the evaluation problem, in particular the use of instrumental variables, in a
numerical simulation study, against the particular background of community-based inter-
ventions. In our simulations, we emphasize the trade-oﬀ between bias and precision by
imposing a smaller number of communities whenever we model a randomized experiment,
and by allowing for a correspondingly larger number of communities in all cases where
selection into the program is not controlled completely by the analyst.
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6.1 Program Evaluation: The Perils of Self-Selection
Self-selection is a fundamental obstacle for the evaluation of policy interventions. In the
classical case of an individually-based program, for instance a voluntary training program
for unemployed workers, potential trainees will in all likelihood base their participation
decision on a comparison of their perceived post-intervention outcomes with the cost of
undergoing treatment. It will often be the candidates with better schooling, and the more
talented or motivated individuals who tend to enter the program. As a consequence of
such self-selection, analysts cannot base the assessment of program impact on a simple
comparison of mean outcomes between participant and non-participant groups. Whereas
it is straightforward how to tackle selection on observables – schooling in the example
of the training program –, selection on unobservables – talent, motivation – provides a
serious intellectual challenge.
In the overwhelming majority of applications the mean eﬀect of treatment on the
treated, that is the population average over the individual gains from treatment for all
individuals participating in the program, is the principal object of interest. One can easily
construct an estimate of the mean outcome after treatment for program participants from
observed data. Yet, to perform an appropriate comparison, one has also to construct
the average counterfactual outcome that trainees would have achieved had they not been
trained, a problem of identiﬁcation.
Observable data alone will not suﬃce to construct this entity. Researchers have pro-
posed several alternative strategies to overcome this identiﬁcation problem, either by in-
voking a priori information on the process of selection into treatment or other aspects of
the program (Heckman & Robb, 1985, Angrist & Krueger, 1999) in a so-called
observational study, or by designing an appropriate experiment. In an experiment (the
classical reference is Fisher, 1935), participation is still voluntary, but some of the appli-
cants are withheld the treatment. Who receives treatment and who does not is chosen by a
random mechanism, allowing the construction of the desired counterfactual as the simple
average over randomized-out controls. In the natural sciences this randomized controlled
trial (RCT) has become the method of choice for the evaluation of interventions.
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While emphasis in methodological work is on the individual, practical applications fre-
quently concern the case of group-level or community-based interventions. Implementa-
tion of policy measures at the community-level is often a matter of necessity – whenever
it would be diﬃcult to treat some individuals in a community while excluding others,
evaluation has also to be at the community-level. For instance, the evaluation of an anti-
smoking information campaign at schools would require that some schools as a whole
be assigned to treatment. Obviously, it would be quite cumbersome, if not impossible,
to plan the intervention and its evaluation at the student level. Spill-over eﬀects from
the treated to the control students would easily contaminate the experiment. Hence, the
units of interest should be groups. Moreover, analysts might choose a community-level
approach to evaluation for reasons of costs. In general, interventions relevant to the social
sciences often have a community-based character.
Nothing seems more natural as a methodological approach to the evaluation of
community-based interventions as the translation of the RCT paradigm to the commu-
nity level. Objects of randomized assignment into treatment and control samples are then
entire communities, while outcomes are typically still measured at the individual level.
A comprehensive overview of the theory and practice of such group-randomized trials
is Murray (1998). It has long been recognized in the literature in various ﬁelds, for
instance in the epidemiological literature cited in Murray (1998) and in the economics
literature (see e.g. Kloek, 1981, Moulton, 1986, 1990), that the possible correlation
of outcomes within communities, clusters, or groups might seriously distort conclusions
regarding the statistical precision of the results.
Although one might be able to collect data on sizeable numbers of individuals within
each community participating in the study, the number of communities is typically lim-
ited. If within-community correlation is substantial the eﬀective number of observations is
closely tied to the number of included communities, irrespective of the number of individ-
uals. Thus, although group-randomized experiments implemented appropriately always
produce unbiased estimates1, it is diﬃcult to increase precision.
1Contamination of randomized experiments as, for instance, attrition of treated and control units is
disregarded in this paper.
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Observational studies, by contrast, typically include a respectable number of communi-
ties, yet they might suﬀer from the selection problem. Possibly a biased but more precise
estimate from an observational study might yield a lower mean squared error than the cor-
responding estimate of program impact from a group-randomized experiment. Thus, there
might be a serious trade-oﬀ to consider in the choice of evaluation strategy (Schmidt,
Baltussen & Sauerborn, 1999).
Moreover, the context of community-based interventions makes it unlikely that a ran-
domization study can be conducted at all. Problems preventing the researcher from
implementing a group-randomized experiment may be political or ethical in nature, or
reﬂect cost considerations. However, contrary to what many practitioners apparently be-
lieve to be the state of the art – either analyze an experiment or rely on simple regression
analysis to alleviate some of the disadvantages of observational data – does not properly
reﬂect the spectrum of identiﬁcation strategies for dealing with observational data. While
the economic literature has long emphasized the potential of the instrumental variables
method (see e.g. Bowden & Turkington, 1984, Angrist, Imbens & Rubin, 1996,
Heckman, 1996), this method has not been prominent in the epidemiological literature
(where it has been advocated recently by Schmidt et al., 1999).
This paper investigates the potential and limits of experimental and non-experimental
approaches to the evaluation problem, in particular the use of instrumental variables,
in a numerical simulation study, against the particular background of community-based
interventions. In our simulations, we emphasize the trade-oﬀ between bias and preci-
sion by imposing a smaller number of communities whenever we model a randomized
experiment, and by allowing for a correspondingly larger number of communities in all
cases where selection into the program is not controlled completely by the analyst. We
specify several variants of selection, on the individual and the community-level, and on
the basis of observable and unobservable factors. Speciﬁcally, we explore the potential
of instrumental variables in approximating the performance of randomized experiments
(for a complementary simulation study on instrumental variables at the group-level see
Shore-Sheppard, 1996).
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The following section formulates the basic evaluation problem and presents several
estimation techniques that have been suggested for its solution. The conceptual design
of our simulation study is explained in section 3. Section 4 discusses the results with a
focus on the assessment of estimator performance, while section 5 concludes.
6.2 Evaluation Strategies
This section provides the formal background for our simulation study by a statement of
the evaluation problem and of several solutions suggested in the literature, in particular
the method of instrumental variables. Assume that Y is the outcome variable of interest.
For notational convenience, subscripts indicating individuals are suppressed. Let Y0 be
the potential outcome if the individual would not participate in treatment and Y1 be the
potential outcome if the individual would. Note that only one of the potential outcomes is
realized for each individual. Furthermore, let T ∈ {0, 1} be a dummy variable indicating
whether a unit is treated, T = 1, or not, T = 0. Under the assumption of independence of
potential outcomes from the treatment status of other individuals (sutva, Rubin, 1986)
the expected eﬀect of treatment on the treated unit can formally be written as
∆ = IE(Y1 − Y0|T = 1). (6.1)
While IE(Y1|T = 1) is easily identiﬁed in the subsample of all treated units, there is no
way to identify the counterfactual IE(Y0|T = 1) unless further assumptions are imposed.
The least restrictive way to gather information on IE(Y0|T = 1) is presented in Manski
(1990, 1995) who demonstrates how upper and lower bounds for the counterfactual can be
obtained on the basis of indisputable a priori information. For instance, a dichotomous
outcome variable cannot take a value lower than 0 and higher than 1. In this fashion,
at least some values of IE(Y0|T = 1) can be excluded. If one desires point estimation of
the counterfactual, however, one cannot avoid either imposing additional assumptions or
addressing the issue already at the stage of designing the study.
A randomized experiment is following the second route to solve this problem as follows2.
2Heckman & Smith (1995) discuss the problems of contamination that might arise in randomized
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Units who decide to participate in the program, i.e. units with T = 1, are randomly
assigned to either an experimental treatment group or control group. The units of the
control group are denied treatment and, thus, realize the potential outcome Y0. It follows
that the control group provides an unbiased estimate of the counterfactual IE(Y0|T = 1).
Yet, while randomization at the individual level is arguably an ideal way to identify
causal relationships, randomized experiments usually suﬀer from low sample sizes if pur-
sued at the group level. On the other hand, observational studies do much better with
regard to the sample size but additional assumptions have to be invoked to identify the
counterfactual IE(Y0|T = 1). To this purpose, several estimators have been proposed.
Some of them are presented in this section including necessary assumptions that make
them valid; abstracting from ﬁnite sample variations only population moments are con-
sidered.
Cross-Section and Before-After Estimators
A ﬁrst assessment of an intervention might be based on comparing treated and untreated
individuals after treatment occurred. Unfortunately, the mean diﬀerence of their outcomes
identiﬁes the mean eﬀect of treatment, equation (6.1), only under strong assumptions
on the selection process. Formally, IE(Y0|T = 0) must be a valid substitute for the
counterfactual IE(Y0|T = 1) which requires that treated and untreated individuals be
equal with respect to characteristics that rule both the selection process and the outcome
equation.
Another straightforward approach to identifying the eﬀect of an intervention rests on
the availability of data for a period t′ prior to treatment. In this case, the mean outcome
before treatment (at time t′) is compared with the outcome after the treatment (at time
t), IE(Y t1 − Y t′0 |T = 1). As above, this approach requires equally restrictive assumptions
to hold; otherwise following it might cause severe biases. If external disturbances over
time and beyond treatment inﬂuence the outcome variable of some units these might
experiments. Nonrandom attrition of participants or randomization biases are prominent examples. Such
problems are not considered in this paper. In general, analysts stress the advantages of randomization,
though. For instance, Burtless (1995) emphasizes the positive aspects of randomized experiments.
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wrongly be attributed to the intervention, producing biased estimates. For instance, it
is inappropriate to perform a before-after comparison when the economic environment is
characterized by cyclical swings that typically aﬀect individuals under study.
Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Estimator
A combination of the before-after comparison and the cross-section estimator leads to the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach (d-i-d). It rests on the assumption that – apart from
treatment – both the treated and the untreated units experience the same time-varying
shocks. Assuming the time trend in the outcome variable is the same for treated and
untreated units
IE(Y t0 − Y t
′
0 |T = 1) = IE(Y t0 − Y t
′
0 |T = 0),
the before-after comparison of the untreated group IE(Y t0 − Y t′0 |T = 0) on average re-
ﬂects exactly the bias inherent in the simple before-after comparison of the treated units.
Subtracting this correction term yields
∆ = IE(Y t1 − Y t
′
0 |T = 1)− IE(Y t0 − Y t
′
0 |T = 0).
In other words, d-i-d requires that the diﬀerence (Y t0 − Y t′0 ) be mean independent of the
treatment T . This is violated, e.g., if the decision to participate is determined by the
individual pre-treatment outcome Y t
′
0 .
3 The simulation study takes account of such a
selection process when opportunity costs reﬂected by Y t
′
0 are involved.
Instrumental Variable Estimator
Finally, instrumental variable estimation (IV) is an evaluation strategy that enjoys con-
siderable prominence in economics (see Angrist et al., 1996 and Heckman, 1996).
It has been advocated in the epidemiological literature as a possible tool to evaluate
community-based interventions by Schmidt et al. (1999). Consider initially the con-
text of a constant-eﬀects model and assume a variable Z exists that (i) is correlated with
3If Y t
′
0 determines selection unobserved stochastic noise in period t
′ will be unevenly distributed
between treated and untreated units but noise in t – if only weakly correlated with that in t′ – will again
be more evenly distributed. Thus, the diﬀerence (Y t0 − Y t
′
0 ) will depend on T .
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the endogenous treatment indicator T , but that (ii) does not have a direct inﬂuence on
the outcome variable Y except through T . This variable is called an instrument for T .
The IV technique rests on the idea that the covariance between the outcome and the
instrument reﬂects the impact of the endogenous regressor – the parameter of interest ∆
– multiplied by the covariance between the regressor and the instrument.
In case of a binary instrument, the IV estimation technique provides a consistent
estimator of the mean eﬀect of treatment on the treated, resting on the ratio4
∆ =
Cov(Y, Z)
Cov(T, Z)
=
IE(Y |Z = 1)− IE(Y |Z = 0)
IE(T |Z = 1)− IE(T |Z = 0) .
In randomized experiments, T is its own perfect instrumental variable. Since the ran-
domized experiment is by deﬁnition independent of the outcome, and individuals per-
fectly comply with their treatment assignment indicated by the dichotomous indicator
Z, the correlation between T and Z is 1 in absolute value (see also Heckman, 1996).
Correspondingly, an instrument Z can be interpreted as a variable that is randomly dis-
tributed across units but, in contrast to a fully randomized experiment, only imperfectly
induces units to behave according to its realized value. In other words, IV estimation is a
quasi-experimental technique. Although the IV estimator is consistent if the two principal
assumptions (i) and (ii) are satisﬁed, it might be accompanied by large variance in ﬁnite
samples, especially if the correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable
T is weak (Bound, Jaeger & Baker, 1995).
A subtle issue is added to estimation with instrumental variables if the treatment
eﬀect is heterogeneous, though, i.e. if we leave the realm of the constant-eﬀects model.
Furthermore, if selection into treatment is based on the individual eﬀects of the treatment,
IV does not identify the mean eﬀect of treatment on the treated. Rather, the IV estimator
4The second equation is easily veriﬁed
Cov(Y,Z) = IE(Y Z)− IEY IEZ
IE(Y Z) = IE(Y |Z = 1)IP(Z = 1)
IEY = IE(Y |Z = 1)IP(Z = 1) + IE(Y |Z = 0)IP(Z = 0)
IEZ = IP(Z = 1),
Thus, Cov(Y,Z) = IE(Y |Z = 1)IP(Z = 1) (1− IP(Z = 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=IP(Z=0)
−IE(Y |Z = 0)IP(Z = 0)IP(Z = 1). Likewise,
Cov(T,Z) is transformed.
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converges to the average treatment eﬀect for all those individuals who are induced by the
instrument to enter the treatment but who would have stayed oﬀ treatment otherwise.
This entity is the so-called local average treatment eﬀect (LATE). Recent research typically
re-interprets the IV estimate as a LATE, see e.g. Angrist et al. (1996) and Heckman
(1997). Its peculiarities are discussed in section 4.
Conditioning on Observables
Whenever researchers succeed in capturing observable elements of the process jointly de-
termining outcomes and program participation, they can improve upon their evaluation
strategy by conditioning on these observable covariates. In anticipation of the simulation
setup implemented below, let X be an explanatory binary variable that takes the values
0 and 1. If self-selection depends in part on the realization of X, then within the sub-
samples deﬁned by X = 0 and X = 1, any remaining bias can only reﬂect the presence of
other factors. The selection bias would even disappear completely if selection depended
exclusively on X apart from random disturbances.
Then, participation is purely random within the two subsamples characterized byX = 0
and X = 1, i.e. T is independent of (Y0, Y1) given X. It follows that the untreated units
in the subsamples {X = x, T = 0} provide the counterfactual IE(Y0|X = x, T = 1).5
The unconditional mean IEX IE(Y0|X,T = 1) is obtained as weighted average over the
conditional means. In sum, if IE(Y0|X = x, T = 1) = IE(Y0|X = x, T = 0) it follows
IE(Y1 − Y0|T = 1) =
∑
x∈X
IE(Y1 − Y0|X = x, T = 1)IP(X = x) (6.2)
=
∑
x∈X
(IE(Y1|X = x, T = 1)− IE(Y0|X = x, T = 0))IP(X = x)
where X is the set of all possible values of X.
Since unobservable variables might additionally play a role in determining the selec-
tion process, conditioning on observables alone might not enable the researcher to avoid
selection bias. Yet, at least conditioning on observables might achieve to mitigate the
5However, in the extreme case when selection is fully determined by an observable X without any
stochastic components left the set {X = x, T = 0} is either empty or equals {X = x} making it impossible
to obtain the counterfactual from untreated individuals.
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problem. Because of that, it is recommended whenever possible. In this study, it is very
easy to follow this advice due to the binary nature of the observable variables. In practice
however, X might be of high dimension, thus, conditioning on all observables would be
quite cumbersome or even impossible. This problem is alleviated by imposing a regression
model or by conditioning on the propensity score, which is the probability of participa-
tion given the observable variables. Then, the sample would be stratiﬁed into subsamples
of units with equal or similar propensity scores and the overall treatment eﬀect estimate
would be constructed as a weighted average as in (6.2); the technique is often referred to as
matching. For further discussion of this topic, see e.g. Rubin (1973, 1974), Rosenbaum
& Rubin (1983, 1984, 1985), and Heckman, Ichimura & Todd (1997).
6.3 The Simulation Setup
The simulation is based on a data generating process that consists of two main equations,
the outcome and the selection equation, and two time periods, one before and one after
treatment. While the outcome equation always combines observable and unobservable
characteristics with heterogeneous treatment eﬀects, we consider two conceptually distinct
modes of selection into treatment. In one set of experiments, selection into treatment
is at the individual level – here we do not expect group level variables to introduce
any fundamental diﬃculties; we also consider situations, though, in which selection into
treatment is decided upon at the group level. It is these simulations where we particularly
expect new insights to emerge from our simulations.
The outcome Yigt of individual i, i = 1, ..., ng, in group g, g = 1, ..., G, at time t ∈ {0, 1}
depends linearly on time-invariant individual and group characteristics X1ig and X2g,
respectively, which are observable, as well as on unobservable characteristics, ν1ig and
ν2g. Furthermore, a variable µt captures exogenous time-variant shocks being constant
for all individuals in a given time period but displaying an upward time trend. The
unobservable variables ε1igt and ε2gt reﬂect white noise at the individual and the group
level. The treatment eﬀect is a sum of an individual eﬀect δ1ig and a group eﬀect δ2g which
are both random variables resulting in heterogeneity in the impact of treatment across
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Table 6.1: Variables and Parameters.
Variable Comment Parameter Comment
Outcome Equation
Constant – α0 0
X1ig binomial(1, 12) α1 1
X2g binomial(1, 12) α2 1
ν1ig N (0, 14) 1 –
ν2g N (0, 14) 1 –
δ1ig N (12 , 14) 1 –
δ2g N (12 , 14) 1 –
ε1igt N (0, 12) Corr(ε1ig0, ε1ig1) 0.25
ε2gt N (0, 12) Corr(ε2g0, ε2g1) 0.25
µt N (12 t, 116) 1 –
Cost Equation
Constant – τ0 such that 50% of the sample participate
Z1ig binomial(1, 12) τ1 suitable for given correlation (Z1, T )
Z2g binomial(1, 12) τ2 suitable for given correlation (Z2, T )
ηig N (0, 1) 1 –
The variables are independently and identically distributed if not mentioned otherwise.
individuals and groups. The dichotomous variable Tigt indicates the treatment status. In
sum,
Yigt = α0 + α1X1ig + α2X2g + (δ1ig + δ2g)Tigt + ν1ig + ν2g + µt + ε1igt + ε2gt. (6.3)
In our simulations X1 and X2 are binary variables taking the values 0 and 1 with equal
probability. Both treatment eﬀects δ1ig and δ2g follow a normal distribution with mean
1
2
and variance of 1
4
, the ν’s and ε’s are distributed normally with mean zero and variance
1
4
and 1
2
, respectively. Both individual and group ε’s are positively correlated over time
with value 0.25, and µ0 ∼ N (0, 1/16) and µ1 ∼ N (0.5, 1/16). The constant α0 equals 0
while α1 = α2 = 1. Table 6.1 summarizes parameters and variables.
When selection into treatment is considered to be an individual decision, it is mod-
eled as an optimization process as in Heckman, LaLonde & Smith (1999: ch. 8).
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Individuals decide to participate if they expect to gain from treatment and, thus,
Tigt =


1[Gig > 0] : t = 1
0 : t = 0.
(6.4)
The individual net gain Gig represents the diﬀerence between beneﬁts and cost of treat-
ment. The beneﬁts comprise all future treatment eﬀects δ1ig + δ2g discounted to present
value assuming a constant discount factor of 0.1 and constant eﬀects beyond period t = 1.
The cost of treatment is the sum of opportunity costs and other costs Cig to be speciﬁed
below. The opportunity costs of undergoing treatment comprise outcome before treat-
ment Yig0 reﬂecting the presence of observable and unobservable characteristics. Finally,
net gains are contaminated by stochastic noise ηig.
It has been recognized in the evaluation literature (see Heckman, 1997) that the
information available to individuals at the time of their decision whether to participate
in a program is a decisive element of the selection eﬀects to be expected. Speciﬁcally, if
individuals know their own treatment eﬀect and act upon it, the presence of heterogeneous
treatment eﬀects will necessarily lead – ceteris paribus – high-impact individuals to be
over-represented among the individuals receiving treatment. In consequence, the mean
eﬀect of treatment on the treated will exceed the population average of the treatment
eﬀects.6
On the other hand, individuals acting upon the precise knowledge of their opportunity
costs during the treatment period t = 0 will – ceteris paribus – typically choose to receive
treatment if their time-invariant characteristics generate relatively low outcomes in both
periods. While observable characteristics are controlled for easily enough, it is the unob-
servables which create the selection eﬀects any successful evaluation strategy has to deal
with. We will consider situations in which individuals select treatment on the basis of in-
formation on (i) opportunity costs Yig0 and their expectation of treatment IE(δ1ig + δ2g),
on (ii) precise information about both Yig0 and δ1ig + δ2g, and on (iii) expected oppor-
tunity costs IEYig0 and on expected eﬀects IE(δ1ig + δ2g) conditional on time-invariant
6Naturally, as long as the evaluation strategy will be able to identify the mean treatment eﬀect for
this subpopulation, this is not a fundamental ﬂaw of the setup, but rather a beneﬁcial consequence of
the liberation from a constant-eﬀects model.
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characteristics, respectively7. These various alternatives of Gig can generally be written
as
Gig = IE
(
δ1ig + δ2g
0.1
∣∣∣∣Ω
)
− IE (Yig0|Ω)− Cig + ηig (6.5)
with IE(·|Ω) denoting a conditional expectation given information set Ω. This set may
contain a subset of all relevant variables, but may also contain all variables, observable
and unobservable, rendering the expectation operator unnecessary. Thus, depending on
the ﬁneness of Ω either one or even both of the two expectation terms in equation (6.5)
may coincide with identity.
Other costs Cig allow the introduction of instrumental variables most naturally. Con-
sider costs being a function of two variables Z1ig and Z2g, where Z1ig is deﬁned at the
individual and Z2g at the group level; they take the values 0 and 1 with probability 0.5
each. These variables reﬂect aspects such as, for example, the distance to the treatment
site. In eﬀect, other costs are
Cig = τ0 − τ1Z1ig − τ2Z2g. (6.6)
The constant τ0 is chosen such that 50% of all units undergo treatment
8 and τ1 and τ2
are adapted such that the correlation between the instruments Z1 and Z2 and treatment
choice T correspond to a given value (see also table 6.1)9.
Treatment choice is a completely diﬀerent matter if it is decided upon at the group
level. Most importantly, if one of the individuals in a group receives treatment, so do
all other members of the group. In our study some democratic majority decision rule is
supposed to govern treatment choice. That is, the form of the selection equation (6.4)
is retained, albeit with the group speciﬁc expected gain Gg as its argument, and thus
Tig1 = 1(Gg > 0). The gain Gg of a group is simply the sum over all individual expected
gains. The same information scenarios arise as under individual treatment choice. Thus,
groups join treatment if their aggregate expected gain is positive. Note that summing
up individual gains Gig of the group members reduces considerably the importance of all
7The timing of treatment choice and outcome realization renders the scenario IEYig0 and δ1ig + δ2g
irrelevant.
8In fact, this is done by replacing the criterion Gig > 0 in equation (6.4) by Gig > median(Gig).
9The costs might be dependent on the other covariates X and ν, too, but this would complicate the
setup without further illuminating the main aspects of the simulation study.
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individual level variables as far as selection into treatment is concerned and the group
variables clearly dominate the decisions.
Any observational study would proceed along the following lines: take the sample of
treated and untreated individuals (with treatment varying within groups or not), and
observed individual-level and group-level characteristics (X and Z), under a speciﬁc iden-
tiﬁcation assumption, e.g. mean independence of treatment and outcomes conditional on
observable X. Alternatively, one might be able to tackle the evaluation problem by de-
sign, namely by constructing a randomized controlled trial. In this study, we consider
randomized experiments which are performed at the individual and at the group level.
Throughout, these experiments are assumed not to be contaminated by attrition or by
randomization bias and, throughout, they recruit their volunteers from the pool of in-
dividuals (or groups) who are willing to participate, i.e. those with a positive net gain.
Irrespective of the level of implementation, these experiments identify the mean eﬀect of
treatment on the treated under all combinations of parameters.
However, since randomized experiments, in particular those conducted on the group
level, usually suﬀer from small sample size, the corresponding impact estimates might dis-
play a high variance compared to estimates of large scale observational studies: although
an experiment achieves to balance all covariates on average, it might drastically fail to
do so in a particular small sample. To alleviate this problem, our simulated random-
ized experiments follow the recommendation to stratify samples prior to randomization
with respect to observable covariates and then to perform randomization within the strata
(Murray, 1998). This procedure ensures that at least observable covariates are balanced.
Nevertheless, the sample size of randomized trials is comparatively small. Thus, the
number of groups in randomized experiments is set equal to 20 while the corresponding
number in observational studies varies between at least 40 and up to 300. This range
is used to investigate the relative performance of estimates produced by observational
studies and randomized experiments. In both experimental and observational scenarios,
each group consists of 50 individuals. In the ﬁeld, it typically is the involvement of further
communities, not of individuals within communities, which raises the cost of a study.
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6.4 Simulation Results
The discussion of results focuses on two main features. First, all estimators of section
2 are presented for diﬀerent more or less favorable scenarios both at the group and at
the individual level and compared with regard to the root mean squared error (rmse).
Apart from root mean squared errors – reported in squared parentheses – variation net
of bias, calculated as
√
RMSE2 − bias2, will be reported in round parentheses. This
serves to assess the importance of the estimator’s bias component when switching from
one scenario to another. Second, separate more extensive simulations are performed
to compare particularly the quasi-experimental technique of IV with fully randomized
experiments.
Individual Level Selection
Table 6.2 is dedicated to estimation results when selection into treatment occurs at the
individual level. In the basic scenario reported in column (1) only observable variables
determine both the outcome and the selection equation. In particular, selection depends
on the expected treatment eﬀect IE(δ1+ δ2), similarly, opportunity costs are captured by
IE(Y0|X), while ν and µ are excluded from the equations. Thus, as documented in column
(1), identiﬁcation problems do not arise except for the simple cross-section estimator that
does not control for X and thus misses to control for self-selection. The diﬀerence in rmse
between the cross-sectional and the before-after estimator is due mainly to the fact that
the ﬁrst is based on more observations than the latter even though correlated ε’s over
time help reduce the rmse of the before-after comparison. Increasing this correlation
would successively diminish the rmse of the before-after comparison.10 Similarly, the
d-i-d estimator is aﬀected by this correlation, too.
On the other hand, IV based on the individual instrument Z1 suﬀers from the largest
rmse among all non-experimental estimators owing to its high variance but not to in-
consistent estimation; a fact that is common in IV estimation: the lower the correlation
10The conditional before-after-comparison is omitted since X-variables are time-constant and thus the
conditional and unconditional estimates coincide.
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Table 6.2: Estimation Results, Selection at the Individual Level.
ν’s µ’s Indiv. Indiv.
Basic included included opport. treatm.
costs eﬀects
Estimators (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
True eﬀect 0.999 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.466
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Standard Estimators
Cross-section 0.430 0.033 0.032 0.012 1.233
(0.050) (0.066) (0.068) (0.071) (0.085)
[0.572] [0.969] [0.970] [0.990] [0.248]
– controlled for X 0.999 0.458 0.456 0.360 1.326
(0.045) (0.062) (0.062) (0.066) (0.074)
[0.045] [0.545] [0.547] [0.643] [0.159]
Before-after 1.000 1.001 1.495 1.796 2.030
(0.067) (0.068) (0.363) (0.357) (0.362)
[0.067] [0.068] [0.614] [0.872] [0.671]
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 0.999 1.000 0.998 1.586 1.605
(0.054) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064) (0.074)
[0.054] [0.061] [0.061] [0.590] [0.157]
– controlled for X 0.999 1.000 0.998 1.638 1.605
(0.053) (0.062) (0.062) (0.066) (0.074)
[0.053] [0.062] [0.062] [0.642] [0.157]
Instrumental Variables Estimators
IV Z1 0.999 0.999 1.001 1.003 1.000
(0.087) (0.101) (0.103) (0.102) (0.102)
[0.087] [0.101] [0.103] [0.102] [0.478]
– controlled for X 0.997 1.001 1.001 1.003 0.996
(0.090) (0.100) (0.101) (0.096) (0.091)
[0.090] [0.100] [0.101] [0.096] [0.479]
– Corr(Z1, T ) 0.302 0.301 0.301 0.298 0.299
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
IV Z2 1.023 1.042 1.026 1.018 0.998
(0.432) (0.509) (0.510) (0.511) (0.506)
[0.433] [0.511] [0.510] [0.512] [0.689]
– controlled for X 1.003 1.042 1.022 1.030 0.980
(0.404) (0.481) (0.473) (0.477) (0.461)
[0.404] [0.483] [0.474] [0.478] [0.670]
– Corr(Z2, T ) 0.300 0.299 0.299 0.298 0.298
(0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.036)
Experimental Evaluations
Experiment 0.999 0.996 0.998 0.998 1.465
(0.097) (0.101) (0.104) (0.103) (0.087)
[0.097] [0.101] [0.104] [0.103] [0.087]
Stratiﬁed experiment 0.998 0.996 0.996 0.997 1.465
(0.099) (0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.092)
[0.099] [0.108] [0.107] [0.108] [0.092]
Means over all simulation iterations. Root mean squared errors are in square parentheses. Round
parentheses show variation net of bias. Number of groups in observational studies: 200, number of
iterations: 5000. Controlling for X in the before-after-comparison does not change estimation results and
is omitted.
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between instrument and endogenous regressor T the larger the variance of the IV esti-
mate. The coeﬃcients of Z1 and Z2, τ1 and τ2, are chosen such that the correlations are
approximately 0.3,11 the realized values and their standard deviations across simulation
iterations are shown in the table. In practice, such correlations are usually considered
producing good instruments (Hall, Rudebusch & Wilcox, 1996). Further note that
IV estimation controlling for X does not reduce the rmse which can be explained by the
independence of Z and X in this simulation study. Moreover, the IV estimates based on
the grouped instrument Z2 are accompanied by substantially higher variance caused by
the intra-group correlation among group members which reduces the eﬀective sample size.
The detrimental eﬀects of intra-group correlations on the precision of impact estimates
is the topic of a large literature in economics (Kloek, 1981, Moulton, 1986) and epi-
demiology (e.g. Murray, 1998). Recently, Shore-Sheppard (1996) has extended this
discussion to the problem of grouped instruments.
Experimental estimates are reported in the last two rows of the table. Taking into
account their small sample size they still perform quite well: compared to the large ob-
servational studies consisting of 200 groups or 10000 individuals, the randomized experi-
ments have to rely on only 20 groups or 1000 individuals. Yet, under these circumstances,
one would prefer the standard observational approaches and the IV estimate using the
individual-level instruments.
Column (2) reports estimates if unobservable characteristics ν enter the outcome equa-
tion. Naturally, this does not inﬂuence the true eﬀect but poor performance (= low
opportunity costs) might mistakenly be attributed to a poor eﬀect of the treatment. Ob-
viously, the cross-section estimator breaks down because it is unable to control for the
unobservable ν’s. However, since the ν’s are time-constant, both the before-after com-
parison and the d-i-d are entirely unaﬀected by them, the unobservables just cancel out,
and the estimates do not display higher variance. This is in contrast to IV: though it
is consistent as a cross-sectional estimator its variance increases to a small extent. The
experimental estimator, however, remains basically unaﬀected and performs as well as the
11The values of τ1 and τ2 are adapted step by step by performing additional simulations until the
correlations take the desired value.
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IV estimator.
Including time-variable shocks µ into the outcome equation destroys the before-after
comparison (column 3) while the other estimators remain unaﬀected. Since all individuals
experience a higher outcome in the post-treatment compared to the pre-treatment period
irrespective of having received treatment or not, the before-after comparison wrongly
attributes this general increase to the treatment. D-i-d successfully achieves to correct for
this bias by exploiting the before-after comparison of the untreated units who experienced
the same upward trend as the treated individuals, thus serving as controls.
The fourth column shows estimates when more severe endogeneity problems are in-
troduced. Opportunity costs are assumed to be captured by individual outcomes before
treatment, Yig0, instead of their conditional expectation, IE(Yig0|X, ν, µ), as above. Con-
sequently, ε1ig0 and ε2g0 determine selection, too, so they systematically diﬀer between
treated and untreated. Since the ε’s vary over time and units, the d-i-d estimator cannot
diﬀerence out the bias caused by them. The problem is the more severe the less is the
correlation between ε’s before and after the intervention. In the simulation the correlation
is set equal to 0.25; a perfect correlation would eliminate the bias in the d-i-d estimate.
Note that the ﬁrst two non-experimental estimators are also negatively aﬀected in this
scenario where more unobservables than before rule selection. Speciﬁcally, the before-
after-comparison suﬀers from regression to the mean: while ε1ig0 and ε2g0 determine se-
lection and hence are unevenly distributed across treated and untreated individuals, ε1ig1
and ε2g1 are more evenly distributed depending on the strength of the correlation ρ. On
the other hand, IV still produces estimates of the same quality as before, that is, IV based
on Z1 and the experimental approach are the preferred estimation strategies.
Finally, column (5) presents results of a scenario that additionally assumes that indi-
viduals correctly anticipate their individual gain (δ1ig+ δ2g) from participation. Although
the assumption is strong, it might be fulﬁlled if the setup of the program is transparent
to the public and people are able to judge well how they succeed in the treatment. In this
case, only the most successful individuals undergo treatment and, therefore, the mean
eﬀect on the treated increases from 1 to 1.47.
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Under this optimization behavior IV breaks down12; it does not anymore identify the
mean eﬀect of treatment on the treated but the so-called local average treatment eﬀect
(LATE) which is the eﬀect of treatment on someone who complies with the instrument,
i.e. who participates, T = 1, if Z = 1 and who does not, T = 0, if Z = 0. In accordance
with Angrist et al. (1996) and Imbens & Angrist (1994) further denote always-
takers as individuals who always undergo treatment irrespective of the realization of their
Z and, likewise, never-takers as those who never participate.13 Disregarding the group
variables for simplicity compliers are characterized by the set
{i : 10δi − Yi0 − τ0 + ηi ≤ 0 and 10δi − Yi0 − τ0 + τ1 + ηi > 0}. (6.7)
Since exactly half of the sample undergoes treatment it can be shown that the individual
treatment eﬀects of never-takers, compliers, and always-takers are ordered symmetrically
around the mean value of δi with never-takers at the bottom, compliers in the middle,
and always-takers at the top. Thus, under these special circumstances, the mean eﬀect
on compliers coincides with the mean eﬀect on a randomly chosen person, namely 1.
On the other hand, the mean eﬀect on the treated – the always-takers and compliers
who participate – exceeds 1. If the selection criterion were replaced such that exactly
40% of the sample participated, LATE would increase to above 1, if 60% underwent
treatment LATE would fall below 1. LATE answers the question of how large the gain
from treatment would be if the costs Cig were reduced by τ1 (or τ2 in case of Z2).
14
Alas, the other non-experimental estimators do improve in this scenario which is due
mainly to adverse eﬀects which cancel out some biases. No general pattern underlies this
improvement. It is merely an artefact of the special model used here. In this last scenario,
solely the randomized experiment is still able to identify the parameter of interest.
Interestingly, the stratiﬁed experiments in all scenarios do not do better than the
unstratiﬁed ones. This is not completely unexpected, since with a sample size of 1000
12Notice that the heterogeneity is not caused by observable covariates which could be coped with, but
by hidden characteristics only known to the individual.
13A fourth category, so-called defiers who simply do the opposite of what their Z indicates are ruled
out since T is monotonic in Z.
14Moreover, the set of compliers (6.7) oﬀers an interesting intuitive interpretation of the relationship
between instrumental relevance measured by correlation between Z and T and the variance of the IV
estimator. High correlation induces large τ1 and thus a large set of compliers which, in turn, increases
the number of observations IV is based on, i.e. reduces its sample variance.
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randomization already balances the two-dimensional observable covariates X. This will
be demonstrated to be diﬀerent in the context of group randomization.
Selection at the Group Level
If treatment occurs at the group level, the eﬀective sample size shrinks because the limited
variability of treatment receipt within groups confronts similarly limited variability of
observable and unobservable characteristics. In fact, results presented in table 6.3 clearly
demonstrate how rmse’s have increased, particularly because the estimator’s variances
have done so. However, the main pattern of results remains almost unchanged compared
to table 6.2. The rmse’s of the cross-section estimator increases whereas that of before-
after comparison only slightly rises. This is because a before-after-comparison still works
at the individual level since all group variables, which are time-constant, just cancel out
and individual level variation caused by ε1igt gains the upper hand again. Therefore, table
6.3 presents an additional before-after-estimator based on data where ε1 is removed and
the variance of ε2 is increased to 1. Then, the eﬃciency of this estimator worsens, too.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator doubled its rmse and that of its counterpart
controlling for X is even three times larger. Controlling for X would reduce bias caused
by X, though, it increases the variance because subsamples deﬁned by X might be rather
small, speciﬁcally at the group level. Albeit, all standard estimators continue to be
consistent. Concerning instrumental variables estimation, only Z2 is a relevant instrument
while correlation between Z1 and T is negligible and therefore results are omitted.
15
Compared to table 6.2 the grouped IV estimates display higher variance which might
be attributed to substantially increased variance of the instrumental correlation. If in
some iteration of the simulation the correlation happens to be very small, close to zero,
this iteration will contribute an extremely high variance to the mean over all iterations,
particularly if X is controlled for. Yet, there are no grounds for failure of the IV in
identifying the treatment eﬀect. Finally, the experimental estimator’s variance quadrupled
but achieves to outperform IV. IV estimation and the randomized experiment will be
15At the group level, Z2 dominates the selection equation because individual Z1’s aggregated to the
group level are almost equal across all groups and, consequently, do not inﬂuence the selection process.
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Table 6.3: Estimation Results, Selection at the Group Level.
ν’s µ’s Indiv. Indiv.
Basic included included opport. treatm.
costs eﬀects
Estimators (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
True eﬀect 0.999 0.999 1.001 1.000 1.364
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.043)
Standard Estimators
Cross-section 0.284 -0.057 -0.054 0.059 1.185
(0.114) (0.122) (0.120) (0.126) (0.143)
[0.724] [1.064] [1.062] [0.949] [0.229]
– controlled for X 1.001 0.287 0.294 0.358 1.257
(0.177) (0.164) (0.161) (0.134) (0.125)
[0.177] [0.731] [0.725] [0.655] [0.165]
Before-after 0.999 0.998 1.503 1.768 1.919
(0.087) (0.087) (0.366) (0.363) (0.363)
[0.087] [0.087] [0.621] [0.850] [0.663]
Before-after, no ε1 0.999 0.997 1.503 1.874 1.941
(0.122) (0.122) (0.376) (0.373) (0.373)
[0.122] [0.122] [0.627] [0.950] [0.687]
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 0.999 1.000 1.001 1.548 1.475
(0.123) (0.122) (0.124) (0.117) (0.123)
[0.123] [0.122] [0.124] [0.561] [0.165]
– controlled for X 1.000 1.000 1.001 1.648 1.475
(0.217) (0.173) (0.177) (0.133) (0.124)
[0.217] [0.173] [0.177] [0.661] [0.167]
Instrumental Variables Estimators
IV Z2 1.041 1.101 1.068 1.065 1.000
(0.496) (0.730) (0.590) (0.649) (0.530)
[0.497] [0.737] [0.594] [0.652] [0.643]
– controlled for X 1.004 1.089 1.049 1.104 1.037
(0.540) (0.680) (0.625) (0.825) (4.545)
[0.540] [0.686] [0.627] [0.831] [4.557]
– Corr(Z2, T ) 0.307 0.295 0.302 0.288 0.306
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
Experimental Evaluations
Experiment 0.998 1.007 1.006 1.006 1.362
(0.390) (0.415) (0.408) (0.432) (0.463)
[0.390] [0.416] [0.408] [0.432] [0.463]
Stratiﬁed experiment 0.996 0.999 1.006 0.996 1.363
(0.360) (0.397) (0.398) (0.402) (0.427)
[0.360] [0.397] [0.398] [0.402] [0.427]
Means over all simulation iterations. Root mean squared errors are in square parentheses. Round
parentheses show variation net of bias. Due to negligible correlation between Z1 and T corresponding
results are not meaningful and left out. Number of groups in observational studies: 200, number of
iterations: 5000.
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compared in detail under several settings below. Notice that at the group level – or,
in general, in small samples – stratifying the sample prior to randomization produces
estimates with lower variance.
As one moves from column (1) to (4) the standard estimators worsen considerably.
Note, however, that their rmse’s (in column (4) or (5)) though substantially rising do
not exceed those of table 6.2 to a large extent. It is speciﬁcally the variation net of
bias that has increased at the group level. Compared to the rmse of the IV estimator
the standard estimators still perform quite well. Albeit, their low rmse’s in column (5)
should be taken with a grain of salt for diﬀerent biases tend to cancel out due to special
model constellations. This cannot be generalized. As above, in column (5) IV identiﬁes
the mean eﬀect on compliers instead of the eﬀect on treated units, yet, its rmse merely
slightly increases with regard to columns (2) to (4).
Exploring the Potential of IV Estimators
Up to this point, results are generated under a certain simulation setup. Neither sample
size nor the correlation between instrument and treatment indicator have been varied. For
a thorough assessment of the relative performance of IV with respect to pure randomiza-
tion it is necessary to perform a further simulation that varies these two parameters. The
variables and parameters of the scenario reported in the fourth columns of tables 6.2 and
6.3 are selected and ﬁxed. Table 6.4 presents ratios of the root mean squared error of IV
and experimental estimates for certain correlations and number of groups.
As expected, IV produces more precise estimates as the correlation and the relative
sample size increase. At the individual level, for a reasonable correlation of 0.3, the obser-
vational study should comprise ten times as many groups as the randomized experiment
to generate a more eﬃcient IV estimator. At the group level, the observational study
should be at least 15 times as large as the group level experiment for the same correlation
of instrument and treatment participation. Holding the relative sample size of the obser-
vational study at ten times as many groups a suﬃcient instrumental correlation would
be around 0.4. This is already a high correlation but not completely utopian in practical
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Table 6.4: IV Versus Experiment.
Number of groups in observational study
Correlation 40 80 120 200 300
Individual Level
0.105 11.740 5.094 4.003 2.794 2.196
0.199 5.419 2.734 1.964 1.502 1.181
0.301 3.454 1.847 1.354 0.993 0.788
0.401 2.705 1.355 0.988 0.746 0.586
0.502 2.042 1.104 0.800 0.621 0.471
0.601 1.728 0.915 0.695 0.511 0.406
0.703 1.469 0.762 0.564 0.418 0.348
0.799 1.214 0.669 0.536 0.380 0.298
0.904 1.057 0.579 0.451 0.322 0.267
0.991 0.961 0.521 0.416 0.305 0.226
Group Level
0.100 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞
0.200 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ 2.030
0.303 +∞ +∞ 2.035 1.379 0.987
0.403 +∞ 1.797 1.233 0.892 0.708
0.500 +∞ 1.179 0.914 0.703 0.569
0.602 1.459 0.961 0.723 0.558 0.455
0.703 1.135 0.736 0.609 0.448 0.367
0.802 0.958 0.648 0.496 0.388 0.316
0.910 0.818 0.565 0.442 0.324 0.259
0.941 0.789 0.537 0.427 0.309 0.260
The table reports the ratio of root mean squared errors of the IV over the experimental estimate.
The number of groups in the experimental setting is 20. Number of iterations: 2000.
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applications.
Moreover, note that although the ratios of rmse’s at the group level are inﬁnitely
large for low correlations and low sample sizes, they diminish faster than they do at the
individual level as correlations rise. Break-even points, i.e. points where the ratios are
approximately 1 or less, are bold faced in the table; in general, they are later at the
group level than at the individual level indicating that IV suﬀers more from the grouped
structure than a randomized experiment. Only for the lowest number of groups in the
ﬁrst column reaches group-level IV its break-even point earlier. In all other columns the
break-even point is reached for a slightly higher correlation.
6.5 Conclusion
This paper performs simulations in order to assess several standard estimation strategies
such as the cross-sectional diﬀerences between treated and untreated units, before-after
comparisons, and, speciﬁcally, instrumental variable estimators as a prime example of a
quasi-experimental estimation strategy. These are compared to conventional randomized
experiments under the assumption that experiments generally suﬀer from small sample
problems. Therefore, they rely on markedly less observations than observational studies.
Standard estimators perform well as long as somewhat restrictive assumptions on the
selection process are satisﬁed. In practical applications, it is typically diﬃcult to justify
the applicability of these assumptions. Therefore, randomized controlled experiments
often provide the only credible counterfactual control group. However, situations are
conceivable – particularly in social sciences – where randomized trials reach their limits.
For instance, non-compliance, attrition, or randomization bias are well-known hazards of
any experiment.16 Focus here is rather on the problems caused by the small sample size
typical for experiments which might set even more severe limits to evaluation. In this
case, randomization might lose its persuasiveness for it cannot be expected to achieve
16Since these problems are disregarded in our simulations they show randomized experiments in a
favorable light. Other fundamental objections might be of ethical nature since treatments that produce
positive eﬀects are withheld the control group.
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balance of all relevant covariates between the treatment and control group.
Speciﬁcally, small sample sizes arise if randomization occurs at the group level and/or if
cost considerations prevent analysts from establishing a large scale experiment. Therefore,
alternatives should be considered as well. Instrumental variable estimation as a quasi-
experimental technique might be a helpful device to circumvent the small sample problem
and open the ﬁeld for less costly large scale observational studies if a good instrument
is available. The simulation results suggest that correlations of around 0.3 to 0.4 can
be considered to characterize a good instrument if the observational study comprises ten
times more observations than a corresponding randomized experiment. In practice, one
might even encounter ratios larger than 10 which would thus allow to utilize instruments
with lower correlations. Moreover, contaminations of randomized experiments – especially
at the group level – would also be avoided in observational studies.
Albeit, IV estimation yields inconsistent estimates in case treatment eﬀects are hetero-
geneous and individuals or groups decide whether to undergo treatment upon their true
eﬀects. In this case, IV identiﬁes the mean eﬀect of treatment on compliers, i.e. the local
average treatment eﬀect. Thus, it would answer the question of how large the treatment
eﬀect would be if the binary instrument Z were increased from 0 to 1, for example, if
more treatment sites were established such that some individuals or groups had a shorter
distance to their site. This measure would only aﬀect compliers while always- and never-
takers would be unaﬀected. From this point of view, LATE might give answers to policy
relevant questions, too.17 Nevertheless, it seems fairly unlikely that individuals know their
own treatment eﬀects in advance; in contrast, it seems more probable that they have to
make their participation decision upon some sort of expected gains.
In sum, if a randomized experiment is infeasible because of practical reasons or because
it would not provide enough observations, observational studies are not necessarily a
contemptible alternative. They often contain valuable and detailed information that might
still help to identify causal relationships. On the other hand, absent randomization bias
and systematic attrition or noncompliance, randomized controlled experiments are the
17See Angrist (1990), Angrist & Krueger (1991), and Imbens & Angrist (1994) for examples
and a formal discussion.
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most convincing evaluation approach as long as a suﬃcient number of units are involved
in the trial.
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